Truths, till he hears them from others. For if they were innate, What need they be propos’d, in order to gaining assent; when, by being in the Understanding, by a natural and original Impression (if there were any such) they could not but be known before? […]
§ 22. If it be said, The understanding hath an implicit Knowledge of these Principles, but not an explicit, before this first hearing, (as they must, who will say, That they are in the Understanding before they are known) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a Principle imprinted on the Understanding Implicitly; unless it be this, That the Mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such Propositions. […]
§ 23. There is I fear this farther weakness in the foregoing Argument, which would perswade us, That therefore those Maxims are to be thought innate, which Men admit at first hearing, because they assent to Propositions, which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any Argument or Demonstration, but a bare Explication or Understanding of the Terms. Under which, there seems to me to lie this fallacy; That Men are supposed not to be taught, nor to learn any thing de [48]novo; when in truth, they are taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For first it is evident, that they have learned the Terms and their Signification: neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired Knowledge in the case: The Ideas themselves, about which the Proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their Names, but got afterwards. So, that in all Propositions that are assented to, at first hearing; the Terms of the Proposition, their standing for such Ideas, and the Ideas themselves that they stand for, being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there is remaining in such Propositions, that is innate. […]
§ 24. To conclude this Argument of universal Consent, I agree with these Defenders of innate Principles, That if they are innate, they must needs have universal assent. For that a Truth should be innate, and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a Man to know a Truth, and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then, by these Men’s own Confession, they cannot be innate; since they are not assented to, by those who understand not the Terms, nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard, nor thought of those Propositions; which, I think, is at least one half of Mankind. But were the Number far less, it would be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby shew these Propositions not to be innate, if Children alone were ignorant of them.
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§ 28. […] Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground, to think these two famed speculative Maxims innate: since they are not universally assented to; and the assent they so generally find, is no other, than what several Propositions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them: And since the assent that is given them, is produced another way, and comes not from natural Inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following Discourse. And if these first Principles of Knowledge and Science, are found not to be innate, no other speculative Maxims can (I suppose) with better Right pretend to be so.
No innate practical Principles
§ 1. IF those speculative Maxims, whereof we discoursed in the fore-going Chapter, have not an actual universal assent from all Mankind, as we there proved, it is much more visible concerning practical Principles, that they come short of an universal Reception: and I think it will be hard to instance any one moral Rule, which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as, What is, is, or to be so manifest a Truth as this, That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be. Whereby it is evident, That they are farther removed from a title to be [52]innate; and the doubt of their being native Impressions on the Mind, is stronger against these moral Principles than the other. Not that it brings their Truth at all in question. They are equally true, though not equally evident. Those speculative Maxims carry their own Evidence with them: But moral Principles require Reasoning and Discourse, and some Exercise of the Mind, to discover the certainty of their Truth. They lie not open as natural Characters ingraven on the Mind; which if any such were, they must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own light be certain and known to every Body. But this is no Derogation to their Truth and Certainty, no more than it is to the Truth or Certainty, of the Three Angles of a Triangle being equal to two right ones, because it is not so evident, as The whole is bigger than a part; nor so apt to be assented to at first hearing. It may suffice, that these moral Rules are capable of Demonstration: And therefore it is our own faults, if we come not to a certain Knowledge of them. But the Ignorance wherein many Men are of them, and the slowness of assent, wherewith others receive them, are manifest Proofs, that they are not innate, and such as offer themselves to their view without searching.
§ 2. Whether there be any such moral Principles, wherein all Men do agree, I appeal to any, who have been but moderately conversant in the History of Mankind, and look’d abroad beyond the Smoak of their own Chimneys. Where is that practical Truth, that is universally received without doubt or question, as it must be if innate? Justice, and keeping of Contracts, is that which most Men seem to agree in. This is a Principle, which is thought to extend it self to the Dens of Thieves, and [54]the Confederacies of the greatest Villains; and they who have gone farthest towards the putting off of Humanity it self, keep Faith and Rules of Justice one with another. I grant that Outlaws themselves do this one amongst another: but ’tis without receiving these as the innate Laws of Nature. They practise them as Rules of convenience within their own Communities: But it is impossible to conceive, that he imbraces Justice as a practical Principle, who acts fairly with his Fellow High-way-men, and at the same time plunders, or kills the next honest Man he meets with. Justice and Truth are the common ties of Society; and therefore, even Outlaws and Robbers, who break with all the World besides, must keep Faith and Rules of Equity amongst themselves, or else they cannot hold together. But will any one say, That those that live by Fraud and Rapine, have innate Principles of Truth and Justice which they allow and assent to?
§ 3. Perhaps it will be urged, That the tacit assent of their Minds agrees to what their Practice contradicts. I answer, First, I have always thought the Actions of Men the best Interpreters of their thoughts. But since it is certain, that most Men’s Practice, and some Men’s open Professions, have either questioned or denied these Principles, it is impossible to establish an universal consent, […] without which, it is impossible to conclude them innate. Secondly, ’Tis very strange and unreasonable, to suppose innate practical Principles, that terminate only in Contemplation. Practical Principles derived from Nature, are there for Operation, and must produce Conformity of Action, [56]not barely speculative assent to their truth, or else they are in vain distinguish’d from speculative Maxims. Nature, I confess, has put into Man a desire of Happiness, and an aversion to Misery: These indeed are innate practical Principles, which (as practical Principles ought) do continue constantly to operate and influence all our Actions, without ceasing: These may be observ’d in all Persons and all Ages, steady and universal; but these are Inclinations of the Appetite to good, not Impressions of truth on the Understanding. […]
§ 4. Another Reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical Principles, is, That I think, there cannot any one moral Rule be propos’d, whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason: which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd, if they were innate, or so much as self-evident; which every innate Principle must needs be, and not need any Proof to ascertain its Truth, nor want any Reason to gain it Approbation. He would be thought void of common Sense, who asked on the one side, or on the other side went to give a Reason, Why it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be. It carries its own Light and Evidence with it, and needs no other Proof: He that understands the Terms, assents to it for its own sake, or else nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But should that most unshaken Rule of Morality, and Foundation of all social Virtue, That one should do as he would be done unto, be propos’d to one, who never heard of it before, but yet is of capacity [58]to
