As already mentioned, the phrase “die Phänomenologie des Geistes” appears in the German edition without italics. Sometimes it refers to Hegel’s text and is a title; and sometimes it refers to the process or movement of the thinking that is underway: the phenomenology of spirit as the very work of thinking. In each case we have tried to determine which sense of the phrase was operative. In this translation, Phenomenology of Spirit (in italics and capitalized) refers, obviously, to the Hegel text, whereas the phrase “the phenomenology of spirit” (without italics, in lower case, and without quotation marks) refers to that movement in thinking that is the work of the phenomenology of spirit. (The same problem, distinction, and solution apply to the Logic—Hegel’s text—and to “logic”—the movement of logic in the work of thinking.) We are aware that there is interpretation involved in this procedure and, moreover, that we are thereby making a distinction that the German edition—and perhaps even Heidegger himself—did not or did not need to make. (Does the work of thinking that we the readers participate in suffer more with the distinction or without it?)
2. In consultation with the French translation, we have occasionally changed the paragraph divisions in order to make possible a smoother and more readable text.
3. The use of italics in the translation varies from that in the German edition. Italics in Heidegger’s original text serve to emphasize certain things within the context of oral delivery and are less appropriate for the written text. Moreover, italics are part of the language and should be used according to peculiarities of the particular language. Thus, our italics are not always those that appear in Heidegger’s text. We found that at times we could not wisely carry the italics over into our English rendition. On the other hand, we found that at times the English requires italics when the German does not. Thus, in some instances our use of italics varies from the original German, based on our understanding that the use of italics is not just a technical aspect that exists independently of the specific language being used, but is part and parcel of the language itself, one of its gestures.
4. We used A. V. Miller’s translation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, while making emendations to that translation. At times we found it necessary to deviate from the English Hegel terminology—e.g., that used by Miller—because we had to adjust his rendition to the context of Heidegger’s work with Hegel’s text, and thus to the context of our translation.
5. Given these various issues in general and within that context, we offer the following reflections on significant tensions within individual words:
absolvent. There is no English equivalent for this word. It is, of course, not really a German word either. The term absolvent is crucial for the work that Heidegger does with Hegel’s text. Thus, we kept the word in our translation, without ignoring entirely the possibilities offered by such English words as “detachment” or “the act of detaching.” The term absolvent must be distinguished from “the absolute” (das Absolute). Absolvent knowing, for example, carries with it at all times several connotations: in the process of being absolved/detached, in the process of the absolute, becoming absolute.
aufzeigen. Throughout this translation, we have translated aufzeigen as “showing up”—and not, as is commonly done, as “pointing out.” It seems to us that the term “showing up” better accounts for the process of appearing, manifesting, shining—which is of utmost concern for Hegel and for Heidegger’s reading of Hegel.
dieses and diesig. A common word in German, dieses is used in Hegel’s text to indicate that he wants to think something which is not yet thought in traditional ways of thinking about a thing. When Hegel says “dieses,” he wants to think a thing as it is on its way to becoming an object for consciousness. When Heidegger uses the words “diesig” or “das Diesige,” he is reconsidering this same process and finds that to be “dieses” a thing must have the character of a dieses, must be diesig. Only thus can a thing be on its way to becoming an object for consciousness. Thus, we have translated diesig as “having the character of a this.” (Similar explanations can be offered in regard to other terms, such as hiesig and ichlich.)
einzeln. English has two possibilities: particular or individual. The nuance of each of these words in English is perhaps more a matter of style than of anything else. We have translated einzeln consistently as “particular,” even though we are aware that a case can be made for the appropriateness of the word individual in some instances.
gleichgültig. It is our judgment that Hegel uses this word in two senses: as “indifferent” and as “with equal weight or force.” In each instance we have chosen one or the other, trying to be mindful of this difference.
meinen, das Meinen, and das Meine. First, meinen and das Meinen can sometimes be translated into English as “meaning,” but more often as “intending.” We have used both English words. Second, the connection that these words have in their German rootedness is impossible to maintain in English translation. The reader simply needs to remember that the words are rooted together in German.
die Mitte. This is a crucial technical term for Hegel. It presented us with a special difficulty, in that the most readable English translation—“middle term”—carries with it a possibly misleading nuance. We might have chosen “middle,” “midpoint,” or “mid-point.” With great hesitation we have sometimes rendered die Mitte as “middle term,” aware of the risk that the language will tend to reduce the tension and movement in Hegel’s thought of “die Mitte” to a logical nexus—thereby covering over the experiential character of the phenomenology of spirit that Hegel’s work undertakes and that Heidegger’s reading of Hegel’s work invites us the reader to participate in.
rein. We hope that translating rein as “sheer” rather than “pure” will allow us to get closer to what Hegel has in mind. It seems to us that the English word sheer better reflects the absolute character of the process which Hegel has in mind.
wahrnehmen and die Wahrnehmung. These words are usually translated as “perceiving” and “perception” respectively. We have also done that. But in some crucial places we have used the more literal phrase “taking for true,” in order to keep visible the root meaning of wahr-nehmen. This meaning is implied in the English word perception, but it is not explicit. Wahr-nehmen as “taking-for-true” is of central philosophical concern for Hegel as well as for Heidegger reading Hegel.
wissen. This term in Hegel refers at times to the process of knowing and at times to knowledge itself. Thus, we have translated wissen sometimes as “knowing” and sometimes as “knowledge.” Again, this occasionally became a matter of interpretation, something that the German edition—and perhaps Heidegger himself—did not need to make so explicitly. (Note: We have translated the German word die Erkenntnis as “cognition,” precisely to reserve the English words knowing and knowledge for wissen.)
zugrundegehen. We found that Heidegger’s word zugrundegehen is as diverse as Hegel’s aufheben. Thus, we have translated it variously as “running aground,” “going under,” and “being annihilated.”
Technical Aspects of the Text in Translation. All additions to the German text by the translators are within square brackets [ ], including information that was added in the footnotes. Significant and problematical German words that we chose to carry along in the body of the text are also in square brackets. The symbols { } are used to distinguish Heidegger’s additions or comments within quotations.
Footnotes from the German edition are at the bottom of the page and are numbered consecutively from the beginning of each
