are followed of course.
In much of the national territory, the campesino population saw the benefits of illicit crops, which grew in these fertile and forgotten lands, with little investment, without much care, in a short time and, most attractive of all, with good profit margins and with the guarantee of purchase (everything that is produced is sold). That was one of the great errors made by the State; leaving the territory in the hands of illegal groups. After these businesses took force and drug trafficking became one of the country’s biggest problems, the Government then wished to curb the cultivation, processing and commercialization of illicit crops, and recover these territories. It is under these conditions that the conflict transformed into a war between legal and illegal groups, leaving death, poverty, desolation, forced displacement, attacks and massacres in its wake, marking territories as red zones, which then further distanced them from any possibility of progress. Thus, the greatest victims of this were and continue to be the campesinos, the population that has remained at the center of the conflict, a war that has been going on for more than fifty years.
Subsequently, a negotiation period was propitiated, however, before specifying this event, it is appropriate to cite Ogliastri (2001) in the document “How do Colombians negotiate?”, where the author makes a tour of the country analyzing the cultural roots of the negotiation techniques used from the beginning of the conflict. From this, he argues that Colombians are accustomed to resolving conflicts through unilateral actions or by the use of force, as part of the authoritarian culture. The author outlines how Colombians are haggling negotiators; initially asking for a lot to later lower the amount, finding the midpoint between the two. There is also a belief that if the other party wins, you yourself have lost, along with personality traits that lead to the desire to win just for the satisfaction of seeing the opponent lose; a selfishness that prevents seeing midpoints where there are no losers, only winners. Typical of the armed conflict in Colombia, is the use of unilateral action followed by the wait for retaliation, strengthening extreme positions and involving yet more people. This has introduced the same human complexity, loaded with feelings of pain, frustration and irreparable moral damage, to both belligerents of the conflict, as it has to the innocent, including minors, peasants and residents of rural and urban areas. The civilian population has been caught up between the extreme positions, where the problem is solved by the one with the most power. For them, the difference between negotiation and war is not defined; everything is flexible. There are intermediate areas, but ultimately, one believes in winning or losing. This has led to extreme and contradictory behavior during the negotiations, beginning with great kindness and courtesy, but passing on to posturing with personal threats and open conflict, attempting to intimidate the other and force him to accept a way of thinking. These are the “soft” and “hard” versions of traditional negotiation; two sides of the same coin. This form of negotiation clearly demonstrates the selfish nature of human beings when fighting for survival and threatened or intimidated. Often, that struggle to survive has led Colombians to leave material wealth behind and give relevance to simply living, becoming a statistic within the alarmingly large numbers of displaced people. As mentioned by Ogliastri (2001), there is a cultural lack of social responsibility. There is merely a sense of solidarity towards the family and close groups. Nor is individual responsibility assumed in the face of society. It is a world of personalized relationships, where it is better not to get involved, with a frank and cold indifference felt towards the news of the day. With the density of conflict related events, one news story easily overshadows another, but the negative emotions of pain and resentment remain in the victims. In those people most affected by the war, the feeling of “belonging”, of warm and close supporting relations, are part of the survival in this hard, uncertain world, full of urgencies and needs. Ogliastri rightly states that to negotiate, there is a need for conflicting interests, but also an area of mutual convenience where the difference can be resolved.
This area of convenience between the parties –National Government and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC– was indeed nurtured in Colombia, leading to a negotiation process that culminated in the signing of the peace treaty, which laid the foundations for peace.
Melo (2016), in the “Resumen del acuerdo de paz” or “Summary of the peace agreement”, in the “Revista de Economía Institucional” or “Journal of Institutional Economics”, summarizes that the document signed on September 26th is primarily an agreement whereby the FARC renounces its project, outlined since 1962 , to come to power through weapons, and agrees to follow the rules of Colombian democracy to pursue its political objectives.
The Government, for its part, renounces the imposition of penalties, on the rebels, defined by criminal law for their political, politically related or other crimes, and will stand by a set of approvals that allow FARC members to act legally in politics: brief approvals that do not imply, as a general rule, the loss of political rights for guerrilla leaders.
In this sense, the success of the agreement reflects the end of the FARC as an armed organization and its transformation into a party that is subject to legal norms and that benefits from some special support to act […].
Finally, although the agreement is based on the idea that the aim of the negotiation is to achieve the abandonment of weapons and the end of the armed conflict, and that the transformation that the country requires must be the result of peaceful political confrontation following democratic rules, it also addresses two other special issues due to the very close relationship they have had with the armed conflict in recent decades: the problem of land and that of drug trafficking.
In this sense the agreement considers:
The renunciation of armed struggle and the participation in democratic politics, amnesty and justice and comprehensive agrarian reform. Mentioning aspects related to drug trafficking, the FARC establishes a commitment to contribute, “effectively” and in a variety of ways, to the definitive solution to this problem. However, there are no specific commitments or clear obligations to provide information on drug processing or commercialization.
The Government is committed to “implementing” “policies and programs” to deal with the corruption caused by drugs, etc. Among other things, it commits to pursuing drug trafficking (p. 109) and money laundering, to controlling inputs, to the seizing of assets (a “new strategy of criminal policy” that includes “coordinating agencies”, a more “efficient use of resources”, the formulation of a new statute “against money laundering and control over the importation and commercialization of inputs for drug production”).
The items of fundamental importance, which simply reiterate current policies, are: the commitment to treat drug consumption as a health issue, which in general terms is already accepted in the country; and the voluntarily eradication of illicit crops, although if this is not achieved or communities oppose, manual eradication may be used. Campesino farmers will not be punished criminally, a policy which is already in place and is part of any sensible drug policy (which should focus on the repression of traffic and prosecution).
Now, after the signing of the aforementioned Peace Agreement, with the post-agreement period reached, the outlook was encouraging, both for Colombians and for the rest of the world. The people of Nariño believed that the war would finally be over, however, we are still very far from that wish becoming a reality. In the territory, the conflict for power, the struggle for the territories, drug trafficking, the illegal economy, all remain the same or stronger than before the Peace Agreement. The FARC did at first leave their weapons, however, non-demobilized ex-combatants formed new groups, which then imposed themselves upon the territory. Social leaders are now being killed for promoting the practice of peaceful coexistence; leaders who fight for the eradication of illicit crops and now give more value to peace and subjective factors that money cannot buy.
An unfiltered look shows there are no significant changes; there is even more violence Children and young people remain without opportunities, levels of education are low, informal employment is commonplace with the illegal economy paying more than the legal one, the culture of ‘conflict resolution being
