In the Shadow of Policy. Robert Ross

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Gullies have resulted from overgrazing and ploughing in the Eastern Cape and in the rest of the country (Beinart 2003; Bundy 1988; Hoffman and Todd 2000; Lent and Mupakati 2007).

      Apartheid, betterment planning and homelands

      The apartheid era saw a consolidation and fine-tuning of the laws, acts and degrees issued before. The advent of the National Party government in 1948, however, changed the nature of state intervention dramatically. The Group Areas Act No. 41 of 1950 signalled the beginning of complete segregation. Native reserves were gradually transformed into independent ‘homelands’ with which white South Africa could maintain economic and political relationships. In 1955, the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa, headed by Tomlinson, released its report based on the most comprehensive investigation of socio-economic conditions in the native reserves ever undertaken (Tomlinson Commission 1955). The Commission’s brief had been to develop a rural policy of separate development. One of its key recommendations was that the rural population needed to be divided into a landless group and a group of progressive farmers. The Tomlinson Commission rejected the ‘one-man-one-plot’ principle of land allocation. Instead, it called for the allocation of landholdings that were large enough to form economic farming units. It also recommended the abolition of communal tenure and its replacement by a system of private tenure. This would be subject to restrictions, however, in order to avoid the accumulation of land. The commission recommended the development of urban centres and industries in the ‘native areas’ in order to accommodate people that were already landless as well as those who would become landless because of the plans. The commission’s plans would entail a fundamental restructuring of society in the ‘native’ areas, and called for a massive investment by the state to make this possible. The South African government rejected two of the commission’s key recommendations: the abolition of communal tenure and the establishment of white-owned industries. The financial implementation of the original plan was considered far too costly. Politically, too, the recommendations were unacceptable. The removal of 50 per cent of the population would lead to massive resistance. However, the Verwoerd government realised that it would have to make provision for the influx of vast numbers of people into the homelands, in any event. After all, its own grand apartheid plan envisaged that all non-white South Africans would become citizens of an ethnic homeland. Betterment planning after 1955 became part of a complex set of policies that were developed in response to the government’s desire to maintain control over the population in the ‘native areas’. Two key elements of betterment planning after 1950 contributed to improving control over the ‘surplus people’ residing in the homelands. Firstly, people were moved from dispersed homestead clusters to villages. Secondly, the government interfered with traditional leadership. Chiefs and headmen became government employees. They were expected to support government policy in order to maintain their status and benefits. Those who opposed the government were replaced (Westaway 1997). Together with the removals, this created a general atmosphere of distrust and protest.

      In accordance with the objectives of apartheid, native areas or homelands were encouraged to adopt self-governance and become independent states. The general policy goal of controlling the African population in these areas was maintained by the governments of these new states, but there was also an effort to provide local livelihood opportunities for the resident people. African farming was supported by the state in the form of subsidised tractor services (called ‘Trust tractors’), an increase in public extension services and services supporting production, marketing and providing access to finance – services which would be supplied by parastatals. Several studies, however, have demonstrated that the implementation of betterment planning had an adverse effect on agricultural production largely because it separated homesteads from natural resources and disrupted the cooperative work arrangements that had been based on kinship relations (De Wet 1989; McAllister 1988). Large capital investments in agriculture, most notably the irrigation schemes in the valleys of major rivers, aimed to increase agricultural production. Many of these investments had limited success or were financially unsustainable. Agricultural banks were restructured to reduce their reliance on state subsidies, making access to finance by small-scale farmers more difficult than before. The public agricultural extension service was criticised for its lack of impact (Bembridge 1985; Steyn 1988), and its budget was reduced progressively.

      Land and rural development policies under apartheid were ambiguous, to say the least. Cross and Haines (1988: 88–90) argue that state-designed and -funded programmes had little impact on poverty and land use. Programmes were designed in a ‘top-down, top-heavy management’ manner, and their benefits tended to accrue to elites. Instead of seeking inputs from the grass roots, a style of imposing reforms from above became the norm. Interventions were entangled with patron–client relationships. The approach to land questions was frequently overly technical and misdirected, because it tended to ignore actual constraints (see also McAllister 1988).

      Post 1994: land and agrarian reforms and social policies

      Land and agrarian reform has been one of the main areas in which the post-apartheid state has asserted itself since 1994. Land and agrarian reform were initiated alongside expanding the social security network. The scale and reach of social grants has expanded considerably since 1994 and has become a more significant factor in rural development (Devereux 2007; Francis 2002), in budget and in magnitude, surpassing the role of land and agrarian reforms.

       Land reform and agrarian reform

      Land reform in South Africa began even before the new government led by the African National Congress (ANC) took control of the country in 1994, albeit with more limited objectives. In March 1991, De Klerk’s government passed the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act (No. 108), which repealed the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts and all the other provisions that regulated ownership of land according to race. The differences between pre-1994 and post-1994 land reforms were both strategic and substantive. The post-1994 land and agrarian reform objectives were more comprehensive and overarching, encompassing restitution, redistribution and security of tenure.

      Land and agrarian reforms entrenched, for the first time in history, equal rights to land, documented in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (Act 108). An early initiative of the Mandela administration after the first democratic elections in 1994 was the articulation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 1994–1996 that set out to undo the legacy of apartheid, including the skewed distribution of land and income, racially discriminatory laws and regulations, and immense poverty. Land and agrarian reforms were initiated in order to correct and transform the agrarian structure (DLA 1996, 1997; DOA 2001). Government budgets for its land and agrarian reform programmes have grown since the mid-1990s, and some budgets have even tripled in size, but critique of the quantity and quality of service delivery soon surfaced (Aliber and Hall 2012; see chapter 3 in this volume for more details).

      The state has shifted its policies and the allocation of its budgets over time from a more populist approach, which emphasised human and citizenship rights and gender and racial equity principles (during the period in which Derek Hanekom was minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs), to a more neo-liberal and paternalistic one (under ministers Thoko Didiza, Lulu Xingwana and Gugile Nkwinti). During the first years of the Mbeki administration the RDP was succeeded by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme reiterating the importance of employment, with redistribution to be achieved through a neo-liberal economic framework of state intervention (Habib and Padayachee 2000; see also chapter 3 in this volume). The change in focus is also apparent in the move away from the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), which provided grants of R16 000 to people to access land if their monthly income was below R1 500 (Lahiff 2007: 1580; Williams 1996; see also chapter 3, this volume), and the introduction of the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme, which demands contributions from potential land reform beneficiaries themselves (DOA 2001; see

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