rebuked for furtively insulting the aristocracy. Editors thereafter practised self-censorship and refrained from discussing political issues. In addition, the relative backwardness of Prussian society helped Frederick: ‘If he did not suppress political opposition it was because none existed.’35 A political doctrine effectively challenging his own was not formulated during his rule. Despite Kant’s contention, intellectuals were not allowed to argue ‘about whatever’ they liked (VIII, 37, 4). Frederick, who had a personal contempt for religion, did not object to criticism of religion. As Gotthold Ephraim Lessing put it in 1769, the ‘Berlinese freedom of thought and writing’ was nothing more than ‘the freedom to make as much fun as you like of religion’. Other countries allowed criticism in the field of politics. Lessing concluded that, compared with Austria, France and Denmark, Prussia was ‘to this day the most slavish in Europe’.36 Kant’s essay on Enlightenment almost exclusively deals with religious affairs. At the end of the essay, he ‘excuses’ himself for that. After all, he argues, rulers usually do not interfere in matters of the arts and the sciences. What about politics? Kant does not give a direct answer. Instead, he refers to Frederick’s willingness to allow ‘his subjects to make public use of their own reason’ in terms of legislation. They may ‘put before the public their thoughts on better ways of drawing up laws, even if this entails forthright criticism of the current legislation’ (VIII, 41, 17–21). Kant alluded to the public discussion on the Allgemeines Landrecht, which began in spring 1784 (he finished his article in September). Lawyers, legal philosophers, and writers in general were encouraged to present their views (this ‘freedom of the pen’ was later reaffirmed in Allgemeines Landrecht § 156, II, 20). Sixty-two proposals on how to change the legal document were received. Some criticized the acceptance of serfdom and absolutism. The Berlinische Monatsschrift published several anonymous articles on the new constitution.37 The discussion was public in a limited sense. Most of the population did not participate and remained unaffected. Frederick’s intellectuals only communicated with each other. A broader public discourse might have challenged the status quo.
Frederick was apparently convinced that philosophical disputes about abstract topics did not harm the state, even if their implications were political. Frederick’s successors, however, became more cautious and realized the possible impact of philosophical discourses on society and politics. It is revealing that Kant consistently tried to convince his readers, including of course his censors, that the process of Enlightenment was, as he put it in 1798, nothing more than ‘innocuous political gossip’ and by no means a ‘menace to the state’ (VII, 86, 28–9). In 1798, however, the authorities no longer accepted this view, but Frederick was convinced by this argument and Kant expressed his gratitude on several occasions.
Frederick has the reputation of being a champion of religious tolerance. The frequently quoted classical statements are that ‘[r]eligions must all be tolerated’ and ‘[a]ll religions are equal and good, if only those people who profess them are honest people; and if Turks and heathens came and wanted to populate the country, we would build them mosques and churches’.38 Frederick’s religious tolerance stems from his indifference (or hostility) towards religion in general and towards sects and churches in particular. In the Political Testaments, he expressed his contempt for all religions as based on ‘incomprehensible systems of fables’, on ‘prejudices and errors’.39 Frederick rarely referred to the Enlightenment argument that the sovereign has no rightful power over the thinking and conscience of the citizens. The main argument was again pragmatic and utilitarian: religious tolerance was in the interest of the state. Frederick did not want to lose tax-paying subjects who would leave the country if they were persecuted for their religious beliefs. Above all, Frederick feared that they might emigrate to the territories of his enemies, particularly the Habsburgs, support their economy and add to their military strength. Hence prudence dictated that the king was ‘neutral between Rome and Geneva’ and that religious feelings were respected.40 Frederick did not care what his subjects were thinking about religious topics. What really mattered was that they ‘populated the country’ and behaved ‘as good citizens and patriots’.41
Kant supported Frederick’s separation of state and churches. The sole interest of the state in matters of religion should be in the teaching of religious instructors. The government may oblige them to provide for ‘useful citizens, good soldiers, and in general loyal subjects’ (VII, 60). All other religious affairs were none of its business. Like Frederick, Kant favoured religious tolerance, but his justification was different. Kant distinguished between a juridical and ethical commonwealth (VI, 95–6). Rooted in the principle of moral autonomy, morality and religion cannot and should not be enforced. The executive branch is entitled to enforce legality in external actions, but the citizen’s moral disposition is left alone. ‘That I should make it my maxim to act in accordance with right is a requirement laid down for me by ethics’ (VI, 231, 8–9).42 Again, Kant’s argument was, unlike Frederick’s, moral rather than pragmatic.
Because of Frederick’s church–state policy and religious tolerance, Kant called his age ‘the century of Frederick’. The Prussian king is the ‘liberator’ of humankind:
A prince who does not regard it as beneath him to say that he considers it his duty, in religious matters, not to prescribe anything to his people, but to allow them complete freedom … is himself enlightened. He deserves to be praised … as the man who first liberated humankind from immaturity (as far as government is concerned), and who left all human beings free to use their own reason in all matters of conscience (VIII, 40).
Frederick’s Prussia has been characterized as a state ‘owned’ by its army. Were legal freedom and Enlightenment only possible because Prussia was in a sense a military state? Many representatives of the Enlightenment answered in the negative. Johann Georg Schlosser, for instance, claimed: ‘Wherever there are standing armies, lasting freedom of the citizens is impossible.’43 Particularly after the War of American Independence, German intellectuals argued in favour of a militia, with citizens willing to defend their country. Kant agreed in principle that standing armies should be abolished in favour of an army composed of ordinary citizens (see VIII, 345). However, he did not believe that standing armies necessarily undermined political freedom. Quite to the contrary, Kant held that contemporary events in Prussia contradicted this theory. For Kant, Frederick’s rule was an example of how ‘a well-disciplined and numerous army’ may ‘guarantee public security’, the precondition of the Enlightenment process (VIII, 41, 24f.). Frederick’s army was indeed numerous. The Soldatenkönig Frederick William I had built up an army of 83,000. After 1740, the Prussian army encompassed 100,000 soldiers, and in 1786 around 200,000.44 In the Political Testament of 1752, Frederick advised his successor to choose military studies as the main subject and to be ready for war all the time. Since Prussia was surrounded by powerful neighbours, its military should be number one in the state.45
Kant was caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, he repeatedly deplored the fact that rulers wasted money on building up armies instead of financing education and the sciences. ‘[T]he state … (as Büsching laments) has no money left over to pay qualified teachers who will carry out their duties with enthusiasm, since it needs it all for war’ (VII, 93, 1–3; VIII, 28, 15–18; XXVII, 470). Financial support for education, particularly for schools in the countryside, remained indeed marginal. Frederick had no interest in educating the masses. He thought that ‘a little reading and writing’ was sufficient, and it prevented young people in the countryside from becoming ambitious.46
On the other hand, Kant admitted that, at least in Prussia, this deplorable situation had positive results. In his later historical writings, Kant attempted to explain the paradox with the concept of a heterogeneity of ends and the work of nature or providence in history. Frederick, who built an army to conquer provinces and wage war, unintentionally made it possible for philosophers to write essays on republicanism and perpetual peace, and to criticize this very policy. Kant was struck by the paradox that ‘a lesser degree of civil freedom gives intellectual freedom enough room to expand to its fullest extent’
