also because of its limited diplomatic presence and trade relations within the hemisphere prior to 1970. During the administrations of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1968—79, 1980—84), Parliament reevaluated its relationship with Latin America, increasing its embassies and consulates and creating a number of new institutions to oversee trade, investment, and development. Like Mexico, Canada tried to craft a foreign policy independent in tone and substance from the policies of the United States, partly in response to nationalist complaints that Canada was a “US territory” overly influenced by the culture and world view of its superpower neighbor. Canada's foreign and immigration policies, then, became means through which to distinguish its international priorities and assert its distinct cultural identity.
Canada's first experience with accommodating large numbers of immigrants from Latin America came in the 1970s, when it agreed to offer asylum to Chilean refugees fleeing the rightist military dictatorship. Less than a decade later, thousands of Central Americans migrated to Canada because of its more generous asylum policies. Unlike the United States, which prior to 1990 granted asylum to fewer than 3 percent of Salvadorans and Guatemalans, Canada granted asylum to up to 80 percent of applicants. The number of Central Americans increased significantly after the US Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act, demonstrating the impact that the polices of neighboring countries had on the character and flow of migration. In response to IRCA, thousands of Central Americans, especially Salvadorans, arrived at Canadian border cities requesting asylum. The administrative backlog that it created pointed to the weaknesses in its refugee determination system. That Canada kept the door open was in no small part due to pressure from advocacy networks that forced a reexamination of national debates about Canadian identity and the country's role in the hemisphere. Chapter 4 examines the impact of Central American immigration on Canada's national debate on immigration, its identity as an open and multicultural society, and US-Canadian and hemispheric relations.
The concluding chapter examines the difficulties and challenges of crafting a regional response to migration, especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Despite the lessons learned from the Central American refugee crisis and from the subsequent international efforts to exchange information, coordinate policies, and share responsibility for the accommodation of displaced persons, US interests have dominated these regional discussions and policies. Safeguarding civil liberties, due process, and human rights is often trumped in the name of national security. Once again, it is the non-governmental actors that remain the asylum seekers' most vocal advocates, trying to force nations to examine difficult issues that in the post-9/11 era many are reluctant to examine.
I
THE WARS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS
[Central America is the] most dramatic and divisive foreign policy issue since the Vietnam war. It has dominated the front pages of newspapers for many months; co-opted almost all of the prime moments of national television news; fueled acrimonious exchanges in Congress; and ignited a national protest movement, centered in the universities and the churches but reaching into unions, professional associations, and the cultural community.
MARK FALCOFF, Commentary
The revolutions in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala were each the product of decades of struggles over land, resources, and power. However, what began as localized conflicts became international crises that affected dozens of nations, including neighboring Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico; hemispheric allies such as the United States and Canada; and even Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the European Community. Thousands of Central Americans died, and millions were uprooted as a consequence of the domestic and foreign policy decisions of these various actors. But just as local political conflicts became internationalized, so, too, did their eventual resolution. The negotiated peace settlements and the reintegration of the displaced involved some of these very same actors, who through diplomacy, investment, and aid tried to establish peace, social and political stability, and economic opportunity in the region.
THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION IN NICARAGUA
In 1979, the Sandinista rebels overthrew the US-supported government of Anastacio Somoza Debayle. The Somoza family—Anastacio Sr. and his sons, Luis and Anastacio (Tachito)—had controlled Nicaraguan politics since 1934, thanks in some part to the United States, which helped them to consolidate their political control. From the Truman to the Ford administrations, the Somozas were regarded by the United States government as reliable allies in the Cold War1 and were rewarded with millions of dollars in economic and military aid, much of which found its way to private coffers. US support also guaranteed the Somoza dictatorship millions of dollars in loans from the international banking community, as well as substantial investments in the nation's industries. US corporations, in particular, benefited from their government's relationship with the dictatorship. Not only did Nicaragua get most of its imports from the United States, but US corporations also controlled thousands of acres of Nicaragua's most fertile land and owned or managed the leading mines, the railroads, and the lumber and banking industries.
The extensive US presence in Nicaragua's national life never guaranteed the people peace or socioeconomic mobility. The majority of the three million Nicaraguans lived in extreme poverty, and high infant mortality, illiteracy, and unemployment were common features of day-to-day life.2 Two percent of the farms controlled nearly half of the tillable land, and over two hundred thousand peasants were landless. In turn, the Somoza family's wealth was estimated at more than a billion dollars. The Somoza family was said to control one-third of the country's acreage; the nation's construction, meatpacking, and fishing industries; the national airline and major television station; and banks, radio stations, and various other businesses. American investors made handsome profits from their ventures in Nicaragua: US investments yielded hundreds of millions of dollars in yearly income that was exported back to the United States.3
The extreme disparities in wealth and the corruption in the highest echelons of the government raised the consciousness of the citizenry, especially labor organizers, university students, journalists, and public intellectuals. Prior to 1972, the US-trained Nicaragua National Guard helped to keep the opposition weak and disorganized by assassinating over thirty thousand of the dictator's opponents and driving thousands more into exile.4 (A former US Speaker of the House once called the Guard “murderers, marauders, and rapists.”)5 However, after an earthquake devastated the capital city of Managua in December 1972, the forces of opposition expanded. Strikes and demonstrations increased in the months after the earthquake as Nicaraguans protested the blatant theft of international aid and the shameless corruption of government officials who financially profited from the devastation.6 Inspiring the protests was the politically moderate editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, who used his small opposition newspaper, La Prensa, to meticulously document the corruption and abuse of authority.
The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) increased its support base at this time. Founded in Havana in 1961, the FSLN favored a revolutionary political and socioeconomic agenda.7 Over the next eight years, the Sandinistas, as members the FSLN were popularly called, waged war against the dictatorship, kidnapping and ransoming prominent political officials and business leaders and attacking military garrisons, government offices, and other symbols of Somoza's authority. Determined to eliminate the FSLN, the Nicaragua National Guard increased its surveillance of the population as well as its campaign of imprisonment, torture, and assassination. The Guard especially targeted the northern provinces, where the Sandinistas were believed to have their greatest support. Even the political moderates came under attack: Chamorro was jailed and finally assassinated in 1978.This action, more than any other, turned the political tide. A two-week general strike calling for Somoza's unconditional resignation evolved into a full-scale, nationwide insurrection. By May 1979 the Sandinistas controlled the nation's major towns and cities, including parts of Managua.8
On July 17, 1979, Somoza fled to Miami with some
