assessments and reactions of international markets, the suddenness of financial economic developments and the frequent imminence of potentially catastrophic consequences required decisiveness and a clear vision and, above all, the courage and ability to make decisions and, when the occasion demanded, to make them quickly. Brian had these qualities in abundance and when making decisions he had the ability to consider varied and multifaceted problems and to assimilate great volumes of information. The scale of what faced him and what needed to be done would have overwhelmed most people, but not Brian. He was never daunted by the circumstances in which the decisions had to be made, by the necessity to make immediate decisions, by the impossibility of being certain as to the effect or outcome of the decisions or by the requirement to make decisions when there were so many matters relevant to that decision over which he had no control. I found it remarkable that during this period he never once sought to avoid issues or problems. In fact, the contrary was the case. He was always looking ahead to identify the problems that were likely to develop and he would consider how they might be addressed if they did develop. This ability to think ahead and to anticipate problems was of immense importance because it provided an additional opportunity for consideration of issues and problems which ultimately had to be confronted. Most people would have wished existing problems away and would not have had the time or the energy or the willpower to begin thinking about problems that had not yet emerged. Brian was very different from most people.
Added to these external pressures on Ireland was the domestic collapse, the scale of which was enormous. Real GDP fell by 3 per cent in 2008, 7 per cent in 2009 and unemployment rose to almost 14 per cent by the end of 2010. These domestic developments and the rapidity with which they occurred, greatly exacerbated the problems for the domestic banks. They also created great difficulties in developing a budgetary strategy that could cope with, on the one hand, the huge collapse in public finances and, on the other, the continuing demands on those public finances – not least because of the large increase in unemployment. This and the financial support for the banks led to a huge increase in Ireland’s budget deficit. Ireland moved from a surplus of 0.1 per cent GDP in 2007 to deficits of 7.3 per cent and 14 per cent of GDP in 2008 and 2009 and plunged to a 31.2 per cent deficit in 2010.8 The resulting budgetary challenges were immense, both at the level of principle and at a political level. At the level of principle, a means had to be found to bring public finances under control. At a political level, great care had to be taken to ensure that not only would the necessary measures be approved by the Oireachtas, but that the cuts would not lead to social disruption and a breakdown of societal cohesion. Brian understood what needed to be done and never flinched from these challenges. Again his understanding of what was politically possible and what would be accepted by the people was of vital importance. Brian was very conscious of the effect of cutbacks on those who needed State support and it required great determination and focus to take the necessary steps to address the budgetary problems. I remember Brian speaking to me about this with great sadness and compassion on a number of occasions.
By the middle of 2009, it was clear that the Irish banks had a large number of problem loans which were not being addressed and, unless some solution was found, it was feared that this would result in ‘zombie’ banks, which would be unable to engage in the lending which a real economy required. In a situation where the value of troubled assets was continuing to decline, some action was required to address the problem. There was no tried and tested formula anywhere for solving the problem and the financial and legal issues that needed to be addressed as part of any solution were of immense complexity. There was also the political reality that any attempt to remove bad loans from the banks would be seen and represented as helping the banks and, worse still, helping the developers whose loans were now so severely impaired.
The proposal for the National Asset Management Agency Bill was published for the purpose of public consultation at the end of July 2009. The proposal was quite unique. It contained the change and refinement following public consultation and further internal review. The proposal described in detail how NAMA was to operate and how it would affect the participating banks and their debtors. Between the publication of the proposal and the eventual passage of the Act on 22 November 2009, Brian participated in the very animated and, at times, bitter public debate on the proposal and provided careful explanation of what the NAMA Act would involve and how it would affect the banks and others. The change in public attitude to the proposed NAMA Act, which ultimately facilitated its passage through the Oireachtas in November 2009, was in large part due to his indefatigable defence of the proposal and his willingness to engage in public on the detail of the proposals and on the concerns raised about them. His mastery of the detail of the complex legislation and his deep understanding of the rationale for the legislation and its necessity, in terms of dealing with the problems created by the volume and extent of impaired bank loans, enabled him to respond to the trenchant criticisms of the proposal and to convert many who were sceptical about it. When Brian spoke, people listened and trusted him. Brian was convinced, as was clear from his public statements, of the necessity of this Bill in order to deal with the problems of the financial system, but it took great courage to be so publicly associated with a proposal that initially looked as if it would certainly be defeated. It also took great courage to champion a proposal that involved such an enormous commitment by the State and the success or otherwise of which would only be determined many years in the future. detailed provisions of the Bill which were to be subject to further.
NAMA was, of course, only one of the many challenges Brian faced in 2009. In legislative terms, Brian also introduced legislation to provide for a substantial reduction in the remuneration of public servants. This meant that all persons employed or holding office in public service bodies, which embraced in effect the wider public service and, therefore, a very significant part of the electorate, were to be subjected for the first time to reduction9 in remuneration from 3 per cent to 10 per cent, depending on their salary. Ensuring the passage of such a measure through the Houses of the Oireachtas was a major achievement. In 2009, Brian was also responsible for the introduction and passage of a number of other very important legislative measures affecting financial matters, including the Finance Act, the Financial Services (Deposit Guarantee Scheme) Act, and the Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act, (No. 2) Act, 2009.
Brian’s work rate in 2009 was astonishing. He was indefatigable and continued to engage fully in all aspects of political life. He was always optimistic that the measures taken would improve Ireland’s financial situation. Nothing could have prepared him, or the rest of us, for the tragic news that Brian was to receive a few days before Christmas 2009 and nothing could have prepared him for what was to be the greatest challenge of his life. Brian had no inkling in December 2009 that he had any serious illness. The diagnosis of his illness came as a complete shock. Brian’s reaction to his illness was as awesome as it was inspiring. I remember talking to Brian about his diagnosis shortly after it was made. He was his usual courteous self and appreciative of the inquiry and concern. He was able to talk about his illness and what it meant in a detached but very focused and realistic way. He made no complaint about his diagnosis. Above all, there was no element of self-pity.
The diagnosis was very serious and the prognosis for recovery was very poor, as he well knew. His decision to continue in office and to carry out his public duties was a reflection of his sense of public duty and of his great personal courage. He spoke of his decision as if it were the only obvious decision to make and certainly expected no thanks or commendation for it. It was, in fact, a momentous and courageous decision. He could so easily have given up the struggle against the unremitting tide of financial and economic problems battering the State and nobody would have blamed him for doing so. To gain any appreciation of the courage involved in the decision, one has to understand the scale of the challenges he continued to face and the enormity of the burden, which he continued to carry and that he knew was unlikely to diminish.
Throughout 2010 I would have seen Brian at cabinet and would have met him or spoken to him every few days. His performance levels were remarkable. He had no difficulty meeting the tremendously tight timelines in which decisions had to be made and issues confronted and had no difficulty in confronting the issues. He did not waste time lamenting his condition nor did he seek sympathy. I remember mentally remarking
