in attacks upon a friendly country in violation of NATO commitments.”41 This view would become the basis for a broad legalistic and persuasive argument capable of attracting widespread bipartisan support in Congress. Arms agreements forbade the use of weapons in such a manner and prescribed an arms cutoff in the event of a violation. Turkey was therefore breaking the law, and the administration must punish Ankara as the law stipulated. Coming on the heels of the Watergate scandal and the chief executive’s bold violation of the law, this argument resonated with members of Congress. They were being called on to defend the basic principle of upholding the law—a principle for which they had struggled in recent months. If they failed to act now, all they had achieved could be lost. This approach lifted the debate from a narrow ethnic concern to a legal imperative. Also in play were humanitarian concerns for the displaced Cypriots, which coincided with rising support in Congress for human rights in general, an issue that received a cold reception from the secretary of state. This combination of principles would surely attract the interest and support of most members of Congress.42
Cartoon published in the Denver Post, October 16, 1974, showing President Ford fondly cradling a diminutive Turkish pasha wielding a bloody sword and a hypodermic needle. (©2019 Patrick Oliphant/Artists Rights Society, New York)
The day after the attack, the five congressmen met with Kissinger and his senior staff to discuss the situation on Cyprus and US policy to address the crisis. The secretary tried to put a good face on developments, arguing that, in hindsight, the United States might have done things differently, but “anything constructive that had developed during the crisis in Cyprus had been the result of US pressure.” Brademas, the most senior of the five, attacked the State Department’s failure to speak out at key moments about the coup, the Turkish invasion, or the Geneva talks. The United States, he claimed, had remained virtually silent. They were not blaming President Ford, he told Kissinger, “but rather … we place the blame squarely on you, sir.” Private diplomacy had failed, and they expected an end to US military sales and grants to Turkey until its armed forces left the island. Kissinger indicated that he could live with a sense-of-Congress resolution but not with any kind of mandate. He did not want to take action that would “mortgage our long-term relations with the Turks.” He favored a cantonal arrangement for Cyprus. Brademas ended by assuring Kissinger that he and his colleagues were not acting out of any sense of ethnic chauvinism.43
In this one long meeting, the two sides set out their basic arguments, which they would repeat many times over the following months. Kissinger knew that Brademas was a skillful tactician and fully conversant with the legislative intricacies of the House of Representatives. Brademas had served in Congress for fifteen years and would soon become the Democratic majority whip; he was thought to aspire to an even higher position in the House hierarchy. In fact, on another occasion, Kissinger would say to Brademas, “They tell me that one day you will be Speaker. Help me now with the new members of the House.” The secretary knew he could not trifle with the Indiana congressman.44
As protests large and small unfolded across the country, embargo forces were organizing in both houses of Congress. Theirs was no easy task because they faced intense pressure from the White House, which warned of dire consequences to US-Turkish relations should an arms cutoff be mandated. Nevertheless, new champions of censure arose in both the House and the Senate, and they were not Greek Americans; thus, they were unlikely to be accused of pursuing parochial interests. In the House, Benjamin Rosenthal (D-NY), a senior member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, became a leading spokesman for the embargo, based on the principle that the invasion violated American law. He and Pierre DuPont (R-DE) introduced an amendment to the continuing appropriations bill that would suspend aid to Turkey until the president certified that a satisfactory agreement had been reached regarding military forces on Cyprus. On September 24 the House passed the amendment by a vote of 306 to 90. But that was far from the end of the legislative battle. Over the next three weeks, Rosenthal was in the forefront of successful attempts to reject weaker Senate language and to respond to two presidential vetoes. Success came at last on October 17. Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), another strong supporter of the amendment, had feared that a failure to override the veto might cost them the whole battle; he sensed that the House was losing patience and that its members were eager to leave the capital for the fall recess.45
During these tense days, while the measure was making its way slowly through the House, Brademas attended a swearing-in ceremony in the White House Rose Garden, where he engaged in an impromptu conversation with President Ford. The president teased Brademas for giving him a hard time. Brademas responded that he was only trying to help Ford obey the law. The congressman also told the president that, “quite frankly, we simply could not believe much of what Kissinger told us.”46
In the Senate, Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) became the fourth member of the so-called Gang of Four, joining Brademas, Sarbanes, and Rosenthal. Eagleton had gained public attention in 1972 when Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern chose him as his running mate and then quickly dropped him from the ticket when he learned that Eagleton had received psychiatric treatment for depression. Brian Atwood, the senator’s senior adviser on foreign policy and defense issues, believed the incident had only enhanced his influence in Congress, making him a national figure. “He was probably the most sane person in the US Senate,” remarked Atwood. After his rejection by McGovern, Eagleton turned his attention back to Capitol Hill, where he continued to oppose the Vietnam War and the so-called imperial presidency.47
Atwood had recently met with a young State Department lawyer who revealed that he had written a brief for the secretary of state concerning the legality of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The lawyer had concluded that Turkey violated its agreement when it used American weapons offensively. His report had been shelved on the advice of Kissinger’s former personal lawyer and current State Department counselor Carlisle Maw. Troubled by this information, Atwood wrote a speech for Senator Eagleton that took a cautious line, indicating that “unnamed bureaucrats were not informing the president of his legal responsibilities…. That got front-page headlines in the [Washington] Post and the New York Times. It was really big because the press had already been asking about it [the legal question]. Eagleton’s speech gave everybody on that side of the issue a boost.”48
Atwood became worried, however, about the growing tension between Congress and the executive branch. As a former diplomat, he was also concerned about the harmful effect of a cutoff on US-Turkish relations. With Eagleton’s permission, Atwood met with Maw and “suggested to him that if State could indeed get something going on the diplomatic front, perhaps through the UN, perhaps just directly, to get the Turks to agree to come to the table to talk about the issue, then they could legitimately ask the Congress to hold off.” He got nowhere.49
Later, Kissinger called Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) and asked whether there were going to be any problems with this issue. Surprisingly, Mansfield reportedly said, “I don’t think you’ll have a problem as far as I know but why don’t you come down to the Senate and you can address the Democratic caucus, and we’ll see.” So Kissinger made arrangements to speak to each caucus separately.50
When the secretary of state met with the Senate Democratic caucus on September 19, he faced considerable hostility. Eagleton questioned him about the State Department’s legal memorandum “claiming [that] Turkey’s August actions could not be legally justified.” Kissinger acknowledged that his lawyers agreed with the senator but added that Eagleton did not understand “the foreign policy priorities.” The senator replied, “Mr. Secretary, you do not understand the rule of law.” This confrontation only a month after President Nixon’s resignation “shocked some senators and convinced them that Congress was compelled to take extraordinary measures.”51
Eagleton led the embargo campaign in the upper house during this time, making a number of powerful speeches. He reminded his fellow senators
