from such diversity is not easy, but that somehow the very term “religion” must mean something that can be justified as well as elucidated without oversimplifying, misrepresenting phenomena, or reading concrete specifics as general or even Absolute.31
When one is influenced to regard something—whether a god, idea, an ontological structure or some element or power supposedly behind it, a moral principle, an economic value or method, a racial identity, or anything else—as unchallengeable or Absolute or incommensurable, therefore beyond one’s reason/judgment, at that point it becomes what at least many people in Western cultures treat as they would a formal “religion.” Even with a focus on quite specific entities it becomes “metaphysical” when it is turned into the Absolute, being raised beyond all questions.
If we understand that despite the fact that human brains carry within them somewhat similar computational systems from their long evolution, we also know that since no two people’s experiences are ever exactly identical, this is certainly true of different cultures as well. A mere grouping together does not signify an obvious uniformity of understanding or values whatever except in the very broadest terms,32 not unless the majority either are simply not thinking or they are merely imitating others. It would be incorrect to assume that every human who is religious stands at precisely the same place in his or her understanding. Some may be unable to articulate a reason why they engage in certain rituals or have particular emotional responses to them. An even greater number may not be able to defend precisely why they believe what they say they believe, or why they belong to one certain religion rather than another or none.
Yet if Whitehead is correct, they are all trying to shape their character not just for the sake of character, but so as to experience a fuller, more authentic life, even if they do not accept all of the traditional rituals, symbols, emotions, myths, and statements of belief in that specific religion, or even if they believe its particular identity is not really so important as an institution. But if they have absolutized something, accepted the notion from others that it is beyond question or doubt, to that degree they are “religious.”
I am persuaded that most people try to figure out reasonably what the flourishing life they desire will require of them as regards their character and attitude. I think this is one of the major points of Steven Pinker’s How the Mind Works (1997) 33 that the human mind has evolved with the “natural selection” process pointing to reproduction and survival, which means, of course, maximizing the life that is to survive and reproduce. This focus on maximizing that life is not simply an unconscious dependence upon what we have inherited genetically, but with the developing brain, it becomes a continually conscious process of analysis, assessment, reshaping, re-formulating, anticipating the future in interdependence with the “givens” that are already determined by other forces. This is certainly as true of nonreligious or “secular” people as it is of religious people.
Of course, the “character” Whitehead alleged as the goal of religion to direct one toward that better life has not remained statically defined. Otherwise human sacrifices, human slavery, and the spoils of a religious war would still be part of the desired character assumed. Some people even in the twenty-first century may still be tied to ancient forms of ritual, emotion, or belief. But for most, the process of rationalization of religion has begun a process of humanizing the character desired, progressively as the world and its different cultures have been brought together in greater proximity with all of cultures’ other humanizing influences. Even if the ideals, rituals, and symbols of a religion change, if one holds to anything as the Absolute, one is “religious.” But humanization itself would seem to require that humans develop a mutual autonomy.
Whitehead’s “fourth” stage, that of the rationalization of religion, has been around for ages. In ancient forms, anthropomorphisms gradually displaced natural power to describe the unseen powers. This is evident as early as ancient Vedic literature of India, ancient Egyptian and Mesopotamian literature, and the Jewish scriptures, as well as in ancient ancestor worship even of isolated communities in the Pacific. The anthropomorphic development was often a mixture of qualities of character that a particular group judged as good and bad. Some gods were almost totally good. Others were evil. But character was often a big issue, just as when Plato rejected the Greek pantheon.
Allegedly, to speak or conceive of the power that people felt was greater than they in human terms or suprahuman terms seemed to carry the promise that they might at least possibly be able to appease, honor, or persuade it to give them some benefit. It was not just a brute force, since the ancient world actually knew of no “brute forces.” The cosmos and its various parts were all thought to be animated, living, and therefore could be responsive to one’s supplications. This is evident in ancient Aztec rituals as well as ancient Egyptian rituals, the early Vedic practices in India, and others. Even despite the moral emphasis in the world in the pre-Christian centuries, Virgil’s Aeneid reveals that the predominant way of defining “piety” or “religiousness” in the Roman world of his day was by counting the regularity of the individual’s sacrifices to a certain god or goddess. It was a matter of getting the god’s attention and favor, or at least putting pressure on the god to reciprocate or feel obligated to help the pious person.
This is obvious in the “personal laments” in Ancient Israel’s Psalms that were used to express the community’s desires—often for Yahweh to show his faithfulness to them, to arise and protect them, to keep his promises to them, to not allow them to be ashamed or defeated, to provide them with the life they should have as his people. That corresponds to James’ and Dr. Leuba’s insight. The irony is that if ancient people saw the ultimate powers as personal because of their unscientific approach to the phenomena of the universe, religious people today still usually think of ultimate powers as personal, but it is now despite their scientific understandings and personal experiences.
It is obvious that attempts to rationalize the religions go back 5,000–6,000 years or more, so the religions still utilized considerable ritual that was not explained fully, emotion that still was often seen as merely an end in itself, whether one understood why or not, and belief that was stated briefly, or belief in symbols and myths even if never explained and still a bit contradictory or incomplete. But they must be seen today for what they were: human responses to some alleged transcendent experience, rational attempts to make the ritual, emotion, and belief credible to the community that embraced them, explanations of alleged divine patterns or expectations that must be observed in order for the community to survive and flourish since it was these patterns or expectations or power they believed behind them that the community had absolutized. Almost from the outset, the “institution” of any religion had its own vested interests that usually could be seen just below the surface of these rationalizing efforts.
Once we accept that this rationalization process in religion has been going on for many millennia, during which time human understanding of the universe in which we live has also changed, it would be only natural that the people living during the rationalization stage might either feel uncomfortable with some of the very ancient rituals, emotions, or beliefs (e.g., D.F. Strauss) or, conversely, might stretch their idea of “reasonable” so far as to continue to accommodate those ancient forms, which they eventually stretch to square with the modern world understandings (e.g., John Locke). Despite the fact that scientific and historical explanations these days utilize empirical studies from which to formulate hypotheses, to quantify, experiment with, and analyze in order to make conclusions, which then are regarded as “paradigms” as Thomas Kuhn called them,34 or the equivalent—religions operate totally without this. Religions accept something as Absolute.
Science may assume values and ends, but its concern is with relative relationships of every existing thing, so it does not fasten onto an Absolute. As Kuhn and other scientists stress, the scientific method itself is totally the opposite of the religious method. The former is transparent, giving sufficient facts, data, and methods, which, if followed by another qualified scientist may be able to test their conclusions by reduplicating
