Muş, and Hakkari, and the districts of Cizre, Bohtan, and Mardin,18 all within the borders of today’s Turkey.
Within the historical context, the foundation of the Republic of Turkey is seen as a radical and revolutionary rupture from the Ottoman past, and a step forward in the sequence of modernization process. However, ironically, referring to Kurdistan within the Ottoman imperial realm has become an anathema for the modern Turkish nation-state. Zürcher asserts that
the republic created out of the ruins of Ottoman Anatolia in October 1923, was, of course, legally and formally a new state. . . . At the same time, it is evident that in some ways Turkey is a very different heir to the empire, say, Syria or Albania. . . . it inherited not only the limbs but the head and heart of the empire, its cultural and administrative centre.19
Thus, in the imagination of the new state, acknowledgment of Kurdistan, implying the land inhabited by a non-Turkish ethno-national community, would prejudice its “head and heart” and also its “administrative centre.” It would also jeopardize its highly avowed unitary character, thereby arouse concerns on further dismemberment of the homeland, which is regarded in modern Turkish historiography as the “last refuge,” the land salvaged from the Ottoman imperial estate.
Yes to Mustafa Kemal, No to Atatürk
To the extent of banning the use even of euphemisms for Kurdistan or the Kurdish language, acknowledgment of the Kurdish question proved to be extremely difficult in the Republican era. In fact, during the initial phase of the national struggle (1919–1922), its leader Mustafa Kemal consistently nourished the hopes of certain Kurdish circles regarding the implementation of specific Kurdish national rights and privileges. This even goes back to October 1919, when Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues, in preparation for the national struggle in Anatolia, signed the Amasya Protocol. The Protocol was signed with the Minister of War of the Ottoman government on the borders of the Ottoman state to be defended against the victors of World War I. The Ottoman land to be defended was defined as where Turks and Kurds live together. The main reference point is the document adopted on January 20, 1921 (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu), that practically served as the constitution of the national struggle until the foundation of the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1923, and even later—that is, until the first Constitution of the republic was made in 1924. In the 1921 document, there is a reference to self-rule to be exercised by the governorates. The Kurdish political leaders continuously referred to Article 11 of the Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu as the basis of their claims for autonomy or federalism in Turkey.
The most crucial document in this respect is the Draft Law for a Proposed Autonomy of Kurdistan as Debated in the Grand National Assembly (at a secret session) on February 10, 1922.20 The British High Commissioner in İstanbul, Sir Horace Rumbold, sent a telegram including the draft to British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon. Thanks to the archives of the British Foreign Office, the draft has become a source of reference for those seeking autonomy for the Kurds.
Of the draft’s 18 articles, the first is especially interesting. It reads as follows:
(ı) The Great National Assembly of Turkey, with the object of ensuring the progress of the Turkish nation in accordance with the requirements of civilization, undertakes to establish an autonomous administration for the Kurdish nation in harmony with their national customs.21
Articles 15 and 17 are of particular interest in understanding the limits of the autonomy envisaged for the Kurds:
(15) The Turkish language only shall be employed in the Kurdish National Assembly, the service of the Governorate and in the administration of the Government. The Kurdish language, however, may be taught in the schools and the Governor may encourage its use provided that this shall not be made the basis of any future demand for the recognition of the Kurdish language as the official language of the government.
(17) No tax whatsoever may be imposed by the Kurdish National Assembly without the approval of the Governor-General and before the Great National Assembly of Angora [Ankara] shall be informed.22
It should however be noted that some Turkish historians have contested the authenticity of the Draft Law for a Proposed Autonomy of Kurdistan, as cited in the appendix of Robert Olson’s book The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism 1880–1925 on the grounds that the Turkish archives do not contain a secret session of the parliament on that date, February 10, 1922.
Another vital reference point regarding the “promise of Mustafa Kemal” on Kurdish autonomy that has been sporadically brought up over the years by Kurdish political figures is the conversation Mustafa Kemal had with prominent journalists like Ahmet Emin (Yalman) and Falih Rıfkı (Atay) accompanying him in the city of İzmit, in the proximity of İstanbul, on January 16–17, 1923. In responding to a question by Ahmet Emin on what he thought about the Kurdish issue, Mustafa Kemal made reference to Teşkilat-ı Esasiyle Kanunu of 1921 that stipulates self-rule. Yet, he did not specified self-rule exclusively for the Kurds. On the contrary, he drew the attention of his audience to the practical impossibility of drawing borders to delineate the areas that the Turks and the Kurds are living in because of the deep penetration of the Kurdish element in those areas where Turks have settled.
The Kurdish political figures, nonetheless, made frequent references to this “promise” to promote their objectives to achieve self-rule within the context of Turkey’s territorial integrity. Abdullah Öcalan in many of his texts and interviews alluded to the alleged documents and the “the press conference of Atatürk in İzmit, in January 1923.” He distinguished Mustafa Kemal from the other Turkish leaders and spoke and wrote positively about him, in general. In my long conversation with Murat Karayılan in November 2010, as the PKK’s politico-military leader at large, he emphasized that Öcalan always exempted Mustafa Kemal “from the sins committed against the Kurds” and put the blame on the Unionists (İttihatçılar) and their remnants among the Kemalists.
İsmail Beşikçi, a Turkish scholar and sociologist who spent seventeen years in prison for his research on the Kurdish issue, made a distinction concerning the stance of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) toward the Kurds. In his article entitled “Mustafa Kemal, Atatürk ve Kürtler” (“Mustafa Kemal, Atatürk and the Kurds”) published in October 2013, he wrote, “The sentiments and thoughts of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Atatürk regarding the Kurds are very different. Mustafa Kemal Pasha connotes the year 1919 and the 1920s while Atatürk connotes the 1930s”23 He proceeded to illustrate, in chronological order, how Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had deviated from his initial stance and changed his position on the Kurdish issue.
Kurdish Autonomy: Forever Impossible
Whether Mustafa Kemal ever signaled considering autonomy for the Kurds is still up for debate. But even if he did, it perhaps should be understood in the context of his wit and pragmatism under the most challenging circumstances of the national struggle. Indeed, these qualities were indispensable in forming alliances and gathering as much support as he could against formidable adversaries. As the goals that he had set were surmounted and achieved, he left his temporary and tactical alliances, dictated by the imperatives of the national struggle, behind. There was nothing to suggest that Mustafa Kemal had any ideological background to acknowledge self-rule in the Ottoman territories to be salvaged. Autonomy for Kurdistan was, of course, no exception.
For Jonathan C. Randal, the celebrated American journalist, a prominent expert on the Kurds, “Atatürk’s hallowed interest in the French revolution helped to explain Turkey’s unending penchant for Jacobinism, the belief in a centralized lay state uniting disparate peoples in the cult of the nation even at the expense of their own cultures, languages, religions, and other particularities.”24 Randal asserted, “Only a state as slavishly faithful to the ossified letter of its founding dogma could have backed itself into
