as caliph and remained loyal to the Umayyads. Ali’s attempts to place his own governors in office in Syria during the year of his election backfired, for Syrians were staunch supporters of Muawiyah, who had ruled Syria before Ali was elected to the caliphate. This opposition caused severe problems for Ali’s consolidation of power and threatened to undermine the unity of Islam. The conflict between the Umayyads under Muawiyah in Damascus and the House of the Prophet under Ali in Kufah ultimately led to a confrontation at Siffin in Iraq. The battle indecisively ended in a stalemate, and both parties returned to their respective seats with nothing more than uncertain compromises. The schism between Syria and Iraq intensified the following year when Egypt allied itself with Syria, leaving Ali’s power considerably reduced, and his strength as a leader waned as a result. These reasons, along with many other sociopolitical factors and insurgence by the rebel Kharijites, a radical theocratic separatist group, led to a dual caliphate in 37 A.H./658 C.E. Muawiyah was recognized as caliph in Syria and Egypt, while Ali remained in charge at Kufah. Ali’s remaining rule was fraught with difficulties. He was never able to regain the confidence of many who lost faith in him after Siffin, and the Kharijite insurgencies also added to the precariousness of his rule. Their rebellious attitude led to Ali’s assassination at Kufah during Friday prayers by a Kharijite named Ibn Muljam in 40 A.H./661 C.E.31 Theoretically, Muawiyah was left as the sole caliph. The fact that the historical record suggests that Ali was a weak ruler does not hinder Shi‘i interpretation of his infallibility, a trait believed to be shared by all imāms
The question of a successor to Ali naturally became a major concern in Kufah, but the answer was ambiguous at best. It is claimed that when he was asked on his deathbed if his eldest son, Hasan, should become caliph by hereditary succession, Ali stated: “I do not command it, neither do I forbid. See ye to it.”32 Hasan thus succeeded his father in 40 A.H./661 C.E. Since Hasan was never officially elected at Medina, his web of influence did not extend far beyond Kufah. He was a weak ruler who kept a fairly low profile. Realizing Hasan’s military passivity, Muawiyah prepared to attack Kufah, hoping to consolidate his power. His plan was an attempt to make the empire one political entity again. Rather than confront Muawiyah in battle, Hasan negotiated with the Umayyads and abdicated that same year. For a modest pension, Hasan agreed to move his retinue back to Medina, where he lived out the remaining years of his life comfortably.33 At long last, Muawiyah was able to enter Kufah triumphantly. Having finally “tamed” the Eastern Provinces, he returned to the empire’s sole capital, Damascus, to rule in the manner of an Arab shaykh—quiet but stern. Muawiyah reigned for the next twenty years as the undisputed caliph of Islam, even though conflicts with the Kharijites and Alids did arise from time to time.
So far, we have seen that the Shi‘ah placed great emphasis on succession through an intrinsic form of transmission based on infallible guidance, whereas the Umayyads based it on election and consensus.34 Muawiyah created a precedent for hereditary nomination, however, when he chose one of his sons, Yazid, to take the oath of fealty and become heir apparent. This shift from election to nomination changed the character of the caliphal office forever. It came to resemble a monarchy more than its original function as a seat of the “commander of the faithful.”35 Before Muawiyah died in 60 A.H./680 C.E., he warned Yazid that Husayn, the younger brother of Hasan, would be a problem for the empire. It is reported, however, that Muawiyah advised Yazid to deal gently with Husayn because the blood of the Prophet ran through his veins.36 One Sunni source claims that Muawiyah conveyed a warning to Yazid, cautioning him to confront Husayn only in a good way, to let him move about freely, and to suffer him no harm. But Muawiyah also told Yazid that he should be respectfully stern with the grandson of the Prophet by means of diplomacy, not war. His final warning to Yazid was: “Be careful O my son, that you do not meet God with his blood, lest you be among those that will perish.”37 Both Sunni and Shi‘i sources suggest that Muawiyah felt remorseful toward the end of his life that he had slighted the House of the Prophet. His newfound respect for Muhammad’s family is most likely the reason why he advised Yazid to be lenient with Husayn. Unfortunately, Yazid did not heed his father’s warning.
Husayn, living in Medina, had vowed to march back to Kufah in order to receive Iraqi support for his campaign after Muawiyah’s death. Promises of support poured in from Kufah, and Husayn resolved to go there via Mecca to claim his regal rights. While in Mecca, Husayn sent an emissary named Muslim to Kufah to prepare for his coming. When Yazid learned of the plot, he sent Ubaydallah ibn Ziyad to Kufah to bring the situation under control.38 Muslim was executed in Kufah along with later messengers sent by Husayn, who learned about these executions while on his way to Kufah but refused to turn back. Ibn Ziyad sent one thousand horsemen under the command of al-Hurr with the mission to check Husayn’s movements and bring him back as a captive. They met near Karbala, at a place called Qadisiyyah, and al-Hurr informed Husayn of the impending doom awaiting him if he proceeded. Al-Hurr apparently meant Husayn no harm, for he attempted to convince him to take another road, one not leading to Kufah. At first, Husayn was inclined to accept his offer, but he refused on second thought because he had a pact with the Kufans.
Husayn reached Karbala on the second of Muharram in 61 A.H./680 C.E. He and his forces pitched camp there and made preparations for the rest of the journey. On the third, al-Hurr received word from ibn Ziyad by courier, that he should prevent Husayn’s party from taking water from the Euphrates. Husayn was thus forced to pay homage to Yazid or die of thirst in the desert. Ibn Ziyad then sent Umar ibn Sad, the son of one of the Prophet’s companions, to Karbala. Alhough ibn Sad attempted to turn down the task, ibn Ziyad forced him to go.39 He thus proceeded to Karbala with four thousand men. Ibn Sad did not want to do battle with Husayn and hoped for peaceful reconciliation. But following the command of his superior officer, ibn Sad sent soldiers to guard the river against Husayn’s access during the negotiations. Ibn Sad was, however, sympathetic to Husayn and therefore did not enforce this order strictly until the seventh, when he sent five hundred men to guard the banks of the Euphrates.40 His congenial position and respectful attitude toward Husayn’s party led to some partial agreements with the imām concerning the future course of events. It is surmised that Husayn provided ibn Sad with three alternative courses of action: to allow Husayn to return, to confront Yazid, or to go freely to another land.41 Ibn Sad then sent word to ibn Ziyad that reconciliation leading to peace would be for the best. It is purported that ibn Ziyad was at first inclined to accept Husayn’s proposal but was eventually dissuaded by Shimr ibn Dhi-l Jawshan, who argued that accepting any of the options would be admitting to cowardice. Shimr was thus sent to Karbala with a letter demanding an unconditional surrender from Husayn and a strong suggestion for ibn Sad to comply with the order to destroy Husayn’s party if he did not pledge allegiance to the caliph. If Husayn was not willing to accept this proposal, his punishment would be death.
Shimr passed on ibn Ziyad’s message to ibn Sad on the ninth of Muharram. That day ibn Sad delivered the final ultimatum to Husayn, who asked that the battle be postponed until the next morning so that the small group could pray together one last time. Meanwhile, the order to guard the river from Husayn’s soldiers was stepped up again. It is reported, however, that Husayn’s half brother and standard bearer, Abbas, was able to fill twenty water skins with the help of fifty of Husayn’s men before the order was strictly enforced.42 That evening Husayn gave a sermon and urged the others not to fight, for Yazid wanted only Husayn. But out of piety and devotion to the ahl al-bayt, no one turned back. All agreed to die as martyrs alongside Husayn. After prayers and the sermon, Husayn ordered a trench to be dug on one side of his encampment. The trench was filled with reeds and kindling to create a protective bed of flaming embers, allowing battle on only one side of the camp.43
The tragic battle began with a parley the next morning. Husayn’s party was hopelessly outnumbered and the result was a slaughter. Ibn Sad, who wavered at first, is said to have shot the arrow that marked the beginning of heavy fighting. Seeing the massacre that was being committed, al-Hurr defected to Husayn’s side before midday, asking to be in the front ranks of those to be killed. The fighting was fierce and bloody; even small male children in Husayn’s party were killed, according to sources wishing to stress the extreme cruelty of
