the death of the child (Bahnassi 1982: 183).22 Backed up by shariat, Iranian Civil Law allows fathers’ endorsement to punish their children physically. Article 1179 in the Civil Law says: “Parents are permitted to penalize their children but not outside the restriction of punishment.” There is, however, no definition of restriction. Article 220 in the Penal Law goes even further: “Father or father’s father who kills his child will not be punished afterward (qessas). He would be sentenced to pay dieh [blood money] to the murdered person’s heirs” (quoted in Kar 1378/1999: 117). Within families a harsh system of control is applied to youths in order to protect them from “social and ethical delinquency” (enherafat-e ejtemai va akhlaqi) (Rejali 1994: 86–89).
Pastoral power is a supplement to discipline-oriented power. It is imposed not only by states or religious institutions but also by parents and teachers. It concerns the care of young people: the moralization of their bodies, welfare, and salvation. This is best expressed by a former member of the Supreme Judicial Council, Ayatollah Bojnourdi, who declared that “Penalty in Islam is correction rather than punishment.”23 While disciplining attempts to achieve normalization by drilling individuals, salvation-oriented tutelage does it by engaging in dialogue. In his study of torture in modern Iran, Rejali observes,
Individuals are treated not as objects that require training, but as subjects of questioning and guidance. Tutelage alters self-understanding and so behavior. In this respect, it assumes that individuals possess within themselves a deeper self that is realized through speech. In practicing tutelary techniques, individuals realize themselves as normal members of a moral speech community. (Rejali 1994: 84)
To understand the mechanisms of pastoral power in Iran, and in particular the ways power and hierarchy legitimate themselves, we need to study the institution of the morad/morid relationship and the way it is expressed in Sufism, family life, the bazaar, and the educational system. Originally coming from Sufism, the morad/morid relationship is a generational hierarchy that allocates power to the elders, a system that schools youngsters into total obedience to the patriarch. Morad is the master and morid the disciple. The master is also called pir (old) in Sufism. To find the right path in life, one needs a master, a pir. A person without a pir is “like a wild tree that bears no fruit.”24 The Sufi master not only is a teacher, but is himself the goal (morad literally means goal), a beloved role model for living. The disciple loves his master and devotes a large part of his life to serving him.25 The master/disciple relationship is not very different from that between father and son. During education the master replaces the disciple’s father. Total obedience to one’s father is transformed into total obedience to one’s master. While this pattern of obedience and loyalty (morad/morid relationship) originally had religious underpinnings, very similar forms can be found in secular political movements. Analogous patterns of interaction also mark the relationship between a master and his apprentice in the bazaar. Humiliation is perhaps the primary aim in the power system.
Contemporary pastoral power has been reshaped in new and mundane forms. Worldly salvation in terms of health, security, and welfare replace (Foucault 1983: 215) or supplement religious salvation (see also Ong 1999). The “caring power” in Iran emphasizes that sin is a violation not only of divine rule, but also of the sinner’s well-being. The metaphors used in political discourse condemning the “cultural invasion” are often related to the body and health—“injection,” “rape,” “dissipating youth’s energies,” “poison,” and “drugs.”
The Cultural Foundation of Islamic Messages (Bounyad-e Farhangi Payam-e Islam) has published a series of handbooks on how to discover and clear out moral corruption in society. One of its publications, entitled Javanan, Chera? (Youth, Why?) is concerned with masturbation; how to prevent it and how to cure it. The book regards masturbation as a form of addiction that damages the eyesight, weakens the body, reduces the sexual drive, causes loss of memory or even madness, increases agitation, and finally damages the institution of the family (Zamani 1379/2000). In a similar way, gambling is seen as a sin and immoral because it damages the gambler’s household economy (see Sanadjian 1996). It is by demanding “physical and spiritual hygiene” (pakizegi-ye rouhi va jesmi) that the forces of Islamic pastoral power authorize themselves to impose discipline and tutelage upon young people.
Ways of talking about morality and its relation to health are extended metaphorically to the level of the collective health of the Iranian nation or society by the notion of “Weststruckness.” The Parent-Teacher Association (Anjoman-e Ulia va Murabian), a government organization with a “caring mission,” publishes books for parents on how youth should be disciplined and how to counter “Weststruckness.” These handbooks provide good illustrations of how pastoral power stimulates individuals to internalize discipline. In one of these handbooks, which is about the regulation of relations between boys and girls, we read:
We should note that we do not make our child faithful and restrained. She or he alone finds faith and control her/himself. We are just her/his guides. We do not direct our youth away from misdeeds: she/he does it herself/himself. We merely inform them, remind them of values, and explain the strength of willpower. (Ahmadi 1380/2001: 70)
Responsibility for proper self-government, alongside the collective duty of conducting amr-e be m‘arouf va nahi az monkar, draws individuals into the power relations. As Rose and Miller put it, “Power is not so much a matter of imposing constraints on citizens as of “making up” citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulating freedom. . . . [M]ost individuals are not merely the subjects of power but play a part in its operation” (1992: 174, see also Foucault 1997).
The Eye of Power
As an effect of Islamic rule, social space has been partly transformed through attempts to strengthen moral control. Public places are turned into arenas for preventive demonstrations of punishment and are constantly scanned by the agents of the regime for transgressions and cultural crimes. This section deals with the various organizations mobilized for surveillance.
Revolutionary Committees (komiteh) were established in order to maintain Islamic order inside society. When in 1991 the komiteh were amalgamated with the police organization, the basijis became the major guardians of moral order on the streets.
The term basij (mobilization) refers to the militia of volunteers who provided the teenage “human wave” in the war against Iraq. In the early stages of that war Ayatollah Khomeini called upon young men to join the basij, which he called the “army of 20 million,” referring to the 20 million young men in Iran; basijis, however, fought at the various fronts, joining the army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Abrahamian 1989: 70). Today, the basijis stand close to the hard-liners of the government. The basiji is the ideal young person (man). As Ayatollah Khamenei described the basiji, he is one
who cares for Islamic values, who is humble before God, who wants to be righteous and pure, who keeps away from moral evils, who struggles diligently for the development of his country and the emancipation of humankind from injustice.26
The last week of November each year (according to the Iranian calendar) is Basij Week, when special ceremonies and activities are organized in order to commemorate the establishment of the basij. Many basijis have military ranks conferred on them during these celebrations, and military manoeuvers are held. There are also sporting contests, a nationwide display of basijis. Among the programs scheduled for the week, basij Youth Clubs offer activities in various areas of interest such as Islamic teaching, as well as art, film, photography, theater, and competitions. The authorities claim that, during the 1990s, the basij has been expanding, and now controls 300,000 full-time men. During the same period its annual budget has increased by a factor of four (Zahedi 2001: 163).
In 1994, some 180,000 members of the basij forces went through
