pescoçada, e quel çiño el espada, e que gela desçiño su hermano mayor.
[The emperor asked him how he had been knighted, and he said that he held a vigil in the Church of Saint Mary for an entire night on his feet and never sat down, and the following day, in the morning, the king went there to hear mass. Once mass was over, the king went to the altar and gave him a blow to the neck and girded his sword, and then his older brother ungirded it.] (Wagner, El libro del cauallero Zifar, 440)
Except for certain changes in order, this knighting ceremony is based on the section of the Partidas 1 have mentioned above. For the emperor of Trygrida, who doubts whether it is opportune to knight Roboán a second time, the description of the ceremony definitively convinces him to do so: “Agora vos digo, dixo el enperador, que puede resçebir otra caualleria de mi, ca grant departimiento ha de la costunbre de su tierra a la nuestra” [“‘Now I say to you,’ said the emperor, ‘that he can be knighted again by me, as there is a great difference between the customs of his land and ours’”] (Wagner, El libro del cauallero Zifar, 440).
The difference in ceremonial forms is not the only argument that the emperor employs to justify a new investiture. It is, however, the ultimate argument, summing up all others. The argument that the emperor submits appears precisely as he first manifests his desire to make Roboán a knight and his doubts regarding a second knighting ceremony. It is this argument that allows us to investigate the issue of the definition of relations and conflicts of power among which chivalry is given birth:
“Señor,” dixo el infante, “¿que es lo que pierde el cauallero sy de otro mayor cauallero puede resçebir otra caualleria?” “Yo vos lo dire,” dixo el enperador, “que non puede ser, por el vno contra el otro, quel non estudiese mal, pues caualleria auia resçebido del.” “¿E non vedes vos, dixo el infante, que nunca yo he ser contra el rey mi padre, nin contra vos por el, ca el non me lo mandarie nin me lo consejaria que yo fallesçiese en lo que fazer deuiese?” “Bien lo creo,” dixo el enperador, “mas ay otra cosa mas graue a que ternian los omes oio: que pues dos cauallerias auia resçebido, que feziese por dos caualleros.” “E çertas,” dixo el infante, “bien se puede fazer esto, con la merçed de Dios, ca queriendo ome tomar a Dios por su conpañero en los sus fechos, fazer puede por dos caualleros, e mas, con la su ayuda.”
[“Sir,” said the prince, “what does a knight lose in being knighted again by some greater knight?” “I will tell you,” replied the emperor, “that it cannot be done by one knight to oppose the other, he cannot act against one of his knighters on behalf of the other one and be without blame, since he had been knighted by him.” “And do you not see,” said the prince, “that I will never oppose my father, nor will I act against you on his behalf, because he would not order me, nor would he advise me to fail to do what I am obligated to do?” “I believe so,” said the emperor, “but there is a more serious matter that we should be aware of: if a man is knighted twice, he should act as two knights.” “Clearly,” replied the prince, “this can be done, with the mercy of God, because if a man wishes to take God as his companion in his actions he can do deeds as two knights, and even more, with His help.” “You should receive knighthood from your father and no other man.”] (Wagner, El libro del cauallero Zifar, 439)
Roboán’s answer is an affirmation of the loyalty he owes his father and natural lord. It is also a confirmation of the hierarchies to which the principles of natura and naturaleza are bound, as defined by Alfonso X in Partidas 4.24. The subjective and objective loyalties of the chivalric individual (father, lord, God) are above the solemnities of admission into knighthood. While the first are necessary, the investiture is totally contingent and can even be reduplicated. Family bonds, as interpreted by the individual, cannot be similarly modified.
The ceremony imposes a formal difference but does not amend the political contracts previously established by natural relations. The ceremony indicates a manifestation of affect, amor: the joy of the father upon recovering his sons and that of the Emperor Who Does Not Smile at finding Roboán—affect that is also political yet precedes the ceremony and could exist in its absence.
The political thesis posited in the dialogue between the emperor and Roboán concerns two different spheres of medieval power relations. It is the dialectic of natural bonds taking shape in the concrete space between familial and political bonds. We find several specific examples of this dialectic in the political events of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in Castile, such as the rebellion of Sancho IV against his father, Alfonso X, which resulted in the latter’s loss of the throne. The knighting ceremony plays a crucial role in this case, since Sancho refuses to be knighted by his brother Fernando, as King Alfonso had ordered. Jaume I, the king of Aragon, advised Sancho to be knighted by none other than his father (“que predades cavalleria de vostre padre e no d’otro homne”), but the king does not knight Sancho.38 A similar case of political and familial conflict dealing with chivalric investiture is that of the “denaturation” of Don Juan Manuel regarding Alfonso XI.
In light of these events and their concrete reality, the Zifar proposes a different dialogue, issuing from what might be described as au-dessus du réalisme (in Lévinas terms). The dialogue between the emperor and Roboán specifies a particular hierarchy of subjection that places chivalry beneath familial bonds. This is indeed an important thesis on the political limitations of chivalric investiture, whereby the transformation of the candidate at the time of the knighting ritual does not alter this subject’s affect toward his lineage. The ritual does not influence “vertical love,” an expression of the lineage’s genealogical hierarchy, or “horizontal love,” a manifestation of generational solidarity. These cannot be erased or restricted in their expression. The chivalric subject is modified, but not alienated from his history, his memory, or the contracted relationships that precede his admission into knighthood. This thesis counters sacramental theses, such as that of Alfonso X, Llull, or Don Juan Manuel, particularly the latter, where the knight who enters an ordo becomes a distinct subject (not unlike the ordination of the clergy) and must abandon all memory of his previous life.
The permanence of the chivalric subject’s individual affects, grounded in his history, memory, and lineage, is secure within the political discourse of the knightly corporations that concern both the nobility and the bourgeoisie. This chapter’s examination of the knighthood ritual allows the formulation of an important question: how is it possible to create a political and juridical apparatus designed to facilitate the construction of an ordo? This inquiry unveils myriad strategies and theses on the repercussions of the knighting ritual. Medieval Castilian writers, working from very different textual spaces, or perhaps exploring their own textual spaces in search of the best vantage point from which to view the problem, explore different theses on power relations, on domination, and on subjection that derive from each ceremonial proposal and knightly investiture.
Ultimately, the construction of the ordo is the creation of a social and political category. Regarding its form as well as its presence and mission within society, this category is crucial and has continued to be crucial since its creation. The creation of knighthood and chivalry through ritual, through this interior and exterior transformation of the chivalric subject, is also the creation of a subjectivity, an identity that has—throughout history and into the present—a political and moral mission of key manifestations in Western civic and moral relations.
The importance of this category explains the complex, extensive, and extraordinarily varied system of critiques and debates surrounding the creation of mechanisms of power and knowledge relative to chivalry. These critiques are frequently based on the enactment of a language game, of a “final vocabulary” (Rorty) that inserts into political tradition a manner of speaking about chivalry and about its political and juridical problems. On other occasions, the apparatus goes beyond setting a form of expression and advances a complete hermeneutics of rituals and their related forms.
In any case, this
