reason for NATO intervention against SRJ in 1999, 29.8 percent named “the policy of the Milošević regime,” while 55.2 percent identified either the political or economic “interest of the West.”12 The factor of distance applies on comparative scales as well. Asked to choose between two options for “guilt for misfortune,” respondents named Slovenes (45.3 percent) more than Serbs (10.8 percent), the United States (27.3 percent) more than NATO (25.2 percent), the “international community” (44.8 percent) more than “all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia” (20.5 percent), Milošević (42 percent) more than “the people who elected him” (17.6 percent), and the interests of international business (53.7 percent) more than the interests of domestic business (11.2 percent).13
This form of projection did not necessarily arise from ignorance about the behavior of Serb military and paramilitary forces in the wars. Asked to name three events “which first come to mind” in relation to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the three most frequent responses were atrocities committed by Serb forces: the mortar attack on the Markale market in Sarajevo (48.1 percent), the siege of Sarajevo (28.8 percent), and the massacre in Srebrenica (21.3 percent). Respondents named atrocities committed by other forces far less frequently: the bombing and destruction of the bridge in Mostar (12.7 percent), the sniper attack on the Serb wedding party in Sarajevo in 1991 (12.6 percent), and general “crimes against Serb civilians” (7.2 percent).14 However, this pattern did not apply when the same question was asked about the war in Croatia. Although the siege of Vukovar was the second most frequently offered response (53.1 percent), actions on the part of Croat forces were dominant, such as the reconquest of the Knin region (55.3 percent) and the arrival of refugees from Croatia (30.5 percent). Only 5.3 percent of respondents named the bombardment of Dubrovnik.15 Asked to identify three war crimes committed by Serbs in the preceding ten years, a large majority named the massacre in Srebrenica (69.4 percent), while large numbers named the destruction of Vukovar (31.4 percent) and the massacre in Račak (18.6 percent).16 Results were more spread out when respondents were asked to name war crimes committed against Serbs: the three most frequent responses were the exodus of Serbs from Croatia (49.1 percent), the NATO bombing (35.4 percent), and the “suffering of civilians in Kosovo” (16.2 percent).17
A curious contradiction emerged with regard to the question of knowledge. The preceding results suggest that knowledge of at least some events was widespread in Serbia. At the same time, when asked directly, respondents did not indicate that they believed they were well informed: 22.3 percent of respondents considered themselves well informed about the wars in Croatia, while 19.4 percent considered themselves well informed about the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina.18 Nor did respondents indicate that they believed their fellow citizens were well informed.19
However, when asked the long and possibly confusing question, “Has it ever happened that a new fact which you have learned from any source about any event related to the conflicts (wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo) caused you to change your thinking or position about the role (responsibility) of the warring sides?” an overwhelming 85.5 percent answered in the negative.20 Despite this somewhat discouraging result from the point of view of efforts to promote information, the survey results suggested some potential ways in which efforts to disseminate information might have a more meaningful effect. The results indicate a wide gap between the sources of information people trusted and the sources they actually used. Asked to name their primary sources of information during the war, responses broke down as shown in the first table. When people were asked what sources of information they trusted, the structure of responses was different, as in the second table.
| RTS-TV/state media | 80.4% |
| Independent papers (Blic, Glas, Danas) | 67.9% |
| Stories of witnesses | 62.3% |
| Stories of relatives | 45.5% |
| State-controlled papers (Politika, Ekspres, Novosti) | 43.1% |
| Independent radio/TV (ANEM, B92) | 42.4% |
| Personal experience | 17.4%21 |
| Source | Trusted | Did not trust |
| RTS-TV/state media | 23.2% | 42.5% |
| State-controlled papers | 28.8% | 36.5% |
| Independent papers | 44.7% | 17.9% |
| Independent radio/TV | 62.4% | 16.2% |
| Relatives | 68.6% | 16.2% |
| Witnesses | 62.2% | 15.4%22 |
The results suggest that efforts to shape opinion by using media already inclined to participate in a campaign of reshaping opinion would suffer from some important limitations. First, the question of availability of information arises—why did people tend to use most the sources of information they trusted least? The answer would most likely have to do with the structure of distribution and availability, and immediately suggests that one source of disjunction between events and perceptions has to do with the quality of information people receive. Second, aside from the broadcast programs offered by ANEM and B92, respondents expressed the most faith in interpersonal sources, particularly relatives and witnesses. The personally close category of “relatives” attracts more trust than the potentially unlimited category of “witnesses.” Here, as in the attribution of responsibility, distance is a factor. International media, especially the programs sponsored by governments with an eye toward influencing public opinion in Serbia (such as the VOA and BBC language services) are not mentioned, but the distance of these sources might interfere with the level of trust they enjoy. The same might be said of international nonmedia sources, such as statements from international governments, the United Nations, or ICTY.
The clear implication here is that if minds were likely to be changed, the way that would happen would have to be through the stories people tell one another, rather than the stories people are told by institutional sources. To offer a concrete example, Serbian prosecutors did not declare an intention to investigate Slobodan Milošević for war crimes after the ICTY indictment, or after demands for prosecution by European and American politicians, but after domestic media revealed a case in which there was clear indication of efforts to remove evidence of massacres on the part of high state authorities.23
An earlier survey by the same agency raised related questions. Here respondents were asked about the possible guilt of specific individuals and about the prospect of cooperation with ICTY. While a great majority believed that Milošević was probably guilty of corruption, treason, and electoral fraud, only 10 percent believed he was guilty of war crimes. Most respondents expressed some degree of opposition to cooperation with ICTY, especially to extradition. About half responded that Serbia should cooperate with ICTY only in exchange for international aid.24
The findings of surveys asking directly about the question of responsibility and the role of ICTY may only get us so far, however. We have seen from the review of results presented above that some findings are contradictory, that there are problems with regard to how widely information is believed, and that public opinion on concrete questions is more likely than not in a state of transition. Given the not entirely clear findings of survey research
