as expressing them. For our purposes it is necessary only to look at the introductory principles. The first is a thoroughly philosophical view of what constitutes human perfection:
The ultimate perfection of man occurs in the part of the soul by which [man] is particularized and that [part of the soul] is the intellectual faculty and it [occurs] when [the soul] is perfected by the apprehension of those intelligibles that are attainable. [Aristotle] has written about this in one [of the chapters of] the Book of the Qualities [Nicomachean Ethics] and [al-Ghazali] in his preface to The Intentions [Maqāṣid], and most of the philosophers have agreed on this [principle]. Indeed, as for the quality of this perfection, one sect thinks that the hylic intellect turns into the acquired intellect and that the more intelligibles one acquires, the more one’s intellect is perfected. And [another] sect thinks that there is a higher level [than this] and it is [achieved] when this hylic intellect, after its perfection, is unified with the separate [intellect] and conjoins with it [in] a conjunction [by means of] apprehension. And ibn Rushd has written at length about this and upholds this possibility in his treatise called The Possibility of Conjunction,12 and the true prophets arrived at this level while they yet lived. Maimonides has explained this in his chapter about prophecy, Guide II.37.13
Duran explains human perfection in intellectual terms: the rational faculty apprehends intelligibles while the body lives. And afterward? There are two opinions on the nature of immortality: some, according to Duran, believe that it consists in the sum total of the intelligibles apprehended in life, the Gersonidean view. The more eternal truths one has learned over the course of one’s life, the more blissful (or at least interesting), presumably, immortality will be. Others believe that there is yet a higher level of immortality, namely, that the perfected human intellect becomes conjoined with the agent intellect after death, presumably enjoying all of the intelligibles comprehended in the agent intellect. Duran refers us to the Guide II.37, where Maimonides discusses the intellectual overflow “through which we have intellectual cognition” and its different effects on different men, among them men of science and prophets.14 Presumably Duran understands Maimonides to hold the second opinion with respect to this conjunction.
Then Duran turns to the nature of prophecy itself: “Second, the prophesying soul is particularized by three virtues [that differentiate it] from the rest of the human souls: one, knowledge of the future; two, subjugation of the matter of the world; three, and this is the most considerable, knowledge of the secrets of existence. And truth emanates suddenly without intermediate boundaries, and this happens to it because of the conjunction with the separate [intellect]. [Al-Ghazali] already wrote this in The Intentions and The Balance of Inquiries,15 and [Maimonides] hinted about it in his estimable book.”16 Just as the human soul is differentiated from that of animals by the intellectual faculty, so too the prophet’s soul is differentiated from the soul of regular humans by three virtues, or abilities. First, the prophet can see the future; second, he can control matter, that is, perform miracles; third, he knows “the secrets of existence.” Duran is evidently alluding to knowledge about the created world that can be attained only by prophecy, as discussed above in Chapter 3. If we follow Duran’s position there, we might include among these “secrets of existence” knowledge of the nature of celestial matter and some partial knowledge of the separate intellects. Prophetic knowledge is therefore of two types: knowledge of sublunar events before they happen and knowledge about the universe that cannot be attained through the unaided use of human reason.
Finally, Duran turns to the requirements for prophecy:
Third, this perfection, however it comes to be, will indeed come with perfection of the temperament and its equability and the disposition particular to it, and with choice [free will] and intellection to bring the intellect from potentiality to actuality by the apprehension of the sciences. And with these two causes, [Aristotle] thinks that this [makes] achieving [prophecy] possible. But according to the opinion of the men of Torah, there is a third cause here and it is the divine will. [Maimonides] has explained this in [Guide] II.32. And if what is intended by the “divine will” is what some of the later sages understood, namely, what is written in the Book of Adam Rishon,17 about which the master hinted (according to their opinion) at the end of [Guide] II.33, then the philosophers acknowledge this reason also.18
As Duran describes it here, an individual must first be physically perfect, as measured by the equability of his temperament. That is to say, the humors and qualities in the body should be perfectly balanced. This equable temperament allows the development of a disposition toward intellection. And the perfection of the intellect itself is achieved through the study of the sciences. According to the philosophical view, prophecy is automatically and necessarily attained once all these requirements have been met. As Duran himself notes, this is the view expressed in Guide II.32, where Maimonides describes the philosophical opinion thus: “when in the case of a superior individual who is perfect with respect to his rational and moral qualities, his imaginative faculty is in its most perfect state, and when he has been prepared in the way that you will hear, he will necessarily become a prophet, inasmuch as this is a perfection that belongs to us by nature.”19
According to Maimonides, however, this is not the approved Jewish view—that of the “men of Torah.” Instead, these men hold that prophecy can be withheld even from someone who is physically and intellectually prepared, if God so wills it: “It may happen that one who is fit for prophecy and prepared for it should not become a prophet, namely, on account of the divine will.”20 In the final line of the extract above, Duran cites the argument of some later interpreters of the Guide to the effect that when Maimonides speaks of “divine will” in this context, he means secretly to indicate something other than what is usually considered to be the divine will. According to this interpretation, Maimonides believes the two positions—the philosophical position and the position of the Torah—to be entirely congruent, but exoterically explains them as disparate.
Duran’s description of the path to perfection according to the philosophers is thus consistent with his Maimonideanism, in that he accepts the philosophical understanding of prophecy as Maimonides explains it in the Guide while implicitly (“according to their opinion”) distancing himself from the more radical interpretation of Maimonides as having been secretly in agreement with the Aristotelian view. In passing, we may note with some amusement that Duran is choosing to read an obscure sentence attributed to Solomon in a text of magical practices as a description of a philosophically conventional view of prophecy.
* * *
In this letter as in his other philosophical responsa, Duran reveals a broad and detailed familiarity with philosophical arguments as well as a confidence in deploying them. The letter “On Immortality and Eternal Damnation” is another fine example of his approach. In it, he responds to the question “whether, according to our faith, some individual souls have immortality and eternal salvation, and whether a soul that sins a particular sin receives punishment and pain and eternal cutting off.”21 The question has two parts: first, whether there is such a thing as eternal salvation, and second, whether there is also eternal damnation. Duran answers as a philosopher, with arguments based on logical premises and scarcely a biblical proof text to be seen until he is at least halfway through. For Duran, the philosophical approach to questions of religious doctrine was no merely rhetorical exercise. It is his home ground, and, by implication, the home ground of his intended audience as well.
For Duran, the first part of the question hardly merits discussion, for in his opinion it has already been settled by the philosophers as well as by “men of Torah.” In this case, both groups admit eternal salvation. Even Aristotle, according to Duran, believed in the immortality of the soul and, he notes, established it in De anima. The only disagreements among philosophers have concerned not the fact but only the nature of the soul’s immortality. And since immortality and salvation exist, so, too,
