and Kissinger’s Western worldview. Both men had studied European history and Great Power diplomacy, but knew comparatively little about China. After the summit, Beijing invited congressional delegations to China, and in the next seven years before formal U.S. recognition, around one hundred American legislators visited. Before one such delegation departed, Nixon cautioned them to avoid linking trade with the political relationship, though he admitted that they were linked in an unspoken way because of America’s economic power. “We don’t have to like each other’s systems to work with them,” he concluded. “Frankly, they don’t have anything to sell us.”100
Given Nixon and Kissinger’s willingness to concede so much to achieve a rapprochement, Mao’s treatment of the Chinese people was nowhere near Nixon’s agenda. The only humanitarian matter raised at the entire summit was the plight of four American pilots who had been imprisoned after their planes were shot down during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Zhou Enlai was clearly interested in removing this obstacle; Beijing released one of the prisoners immediately and freed the others the following year.101 Kissinger later had an exchange with Zhou regarding missing American soldiers and journalists in Southeast Asia, though even here he clarified that he was not making a formal representation, but rather “a personal request” for information. True to his style, Kissinger also showed his hand by noting that the issue was only for public consumption and would not interfere with the relationship. “The families ask us if we have asked you the question,” he told Zhou. “If we could say at a press conference that we have asked you and you have assured us that there are no missing in action, that would be sufficient.”102 But although the release of the imprisoned pilots and the search for missing soldiers and journalists were humanitarian matters, they had nothing to do with the rights of the Chinese people. Indeed, negotiating for the release of one’s own nationals was a routine aspect of bilateral diplomacy. Margaret MacMillan concludes that the 1972 U.S.-China breakthrough was good for both countries, but she adds that it is possible to ask whether Nixon and Kissinger were too eager for a rapprochement. They offered the lion’s share of concessions, and they made some promises that they could not keep.103 The budding relationship had virtually no impact on Chinese internal policies, nor would it in the years to come.
The Ongoing Crisis of Greek Democracy
President Nixon’s preference for realpolitik formed the basis of his policy toward the Greek junta. He was willing to listen to different opinions during his first year in office, but it was not long before he decided to continue, and eventually augment, American support. Nixon publicly backed a return to democracy, but in keeping with his noninterference principle, and because he saw Greece as a bulwark against Soviet power and an important link to the Middle East, he worked to strengthen relations and keep it within NATO. In the words of a senior official, “We have a better chance to influence the [Greek] government to change if we continue to work with them than if we turn our back to them.” Thus Nixon lifted the arms embargo and instructed Ambassador Henry Tasca to stay out of Greek internal affairs.104 The Greek government reciprocated with a beneficial homeporting agreement for U.S. Navy vessels, but uncomfortable questions about America’s ties to a dictatorship and the efficacy of “quiet diplomacy” became more common in Washington. Nixon’s desire for democracy in Greece may have been genuine, but he did little to bring it about.
Some Americans and Greeks lobbied Nixon to cut ties at the outset of his presidency, and both pro- and anti-junta advocates used anticommunism to bolster their arguments. “You are respectfully asked whether you can tolerate any longer the violation of human rights of your Greek allies and friends,” implored a former Greek politician and torture victim. “Increasing hatred boosts the communist cause and may turn Greece into another Vietnam.” But others asked Nixon to restore ties and end the arms embargo. Congressman Edward Derwinski (R-IL), who was angry that “the American liberal establishment” had ostracized Greece, argued that “logic and American national interest” necessitated full U.S. support. Meanwhile, the junta’s leaders pled for support with a combination of polite inquiries and thinly veiled threats. A bitter Greek general told his American counterpart that U.S. inaction imperiled his nation. “When you at last decide to give us the weapons,” he said, “you will probably find no one here to use them.”105 But while it was true that Greeks faced some internal threats, the junta also overstated the problem in order to maintain power, and sometimes even to justify abuse of civilians. The communists in the Western world were “using the students as a spearhead,” argued the deputy prime minister. These were “children [who] smoked marijuana and had little sense of reality.” Urging resumption of full political and military ties, Prime Minister Georgios Papadopoulos argued that the regime had remained loyal to NATO and had prevented an economic collapse, a communist takeover, and a civil war. The junta was moving toward democracy, he asserted to Nixon, but it would have to do so at its own pace.106
Early on, the Nixon administration lobbied for a democratic restoration in the belief that this would enhance stability. In April 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers pressed the foreign minister on a political timetable and on the release of Greece’s eighteen hundred political prisoners, arguing that the United States considered “evolution toward representative government and the application of civil liberties” as important steps. A harsh State Department assessment found that America’s reputation had “to some extent become identified with that of the junta.” There had been no meaningful progress on democracy or on promised economic and social programs, yet the junta seemed to be relying on the U.S. need for Greek facilities. (Europeans, meanwhile, were criticizing the regime while profiting from arms sales.)107 By the end of Nixon’s first year, Ambassador Tasca was advising that there was no alternative to the dual policy of public support mixed with private encouragement for a return to democracy. Because the colonels were maintaining domestic stability and following a foreign policy generally consistent with America’s, Tasca advised against a “self-defeating” policy of military aid cuts and “quixotic public criticism.”108
Beyond the domestic political issues at stake, Nixon considered Greek democracy irrelevant to the bilateral relationship. At a time when the United States was the only NATO member granting military aid to Greece (several were selling weapons), he lifted the embargo on heavy weapons in September 1970 in response to a Greek timetable to restore democracy. “The [anti-junta activists’] idea is that the U.S. shouldn’t give arms and then the Greeks would change,” said Nixon privately. “They’d change alright, but the wrong way…. We need the Greeks…. We don’t like the government, but we’d like its successor less.”109 This resumption of arms shipments forced the administration to defend the regime and to put a positive spin on Greek events, even to the point of stating in September 1970, with scant evidence, that torture had ceased and that political prisoner numbers were falling. Behind the scenes, the United States was dissatisfied with the Greeks’ authoritarianism and their “public relations ineptness,” but Greece’s strategic importance and loyalty to the alliance remained the focal point of Nixon’s policy.110 It is clear, then, that security and continuity overrode any sharp public tones on democracy and human rights. Because Nixon and Kissinger had little interest beyond regional security and the possibility that bad press would hurt their overall foreign policy, from 1970 onward their Greece policy was entwined with détente. The “noninterference” position became a broad cover for Nixon’s desire to free the United States from unwanted commitments, but for better or worse, the United States was now more closely identified with the junta. When Defense Secretary Laird visited Greece in October 1970, his meetings were interrupted by a nearby bomb, and the following month a bomb damaged the statue of Harry Truman in downtown Athens.
In light of Nixon’s unwillingness to pressure the junta, legislators proposed several solutions. Congressional liberals challenged the administration’s line that Greece was fulfilling its NATO obligations. Congressman Don Edwards (D-CA) asserted that Greece’s NATO status was “an excuse for U.S. inaction” because of Greece’s minimal military value, while Congressman Fraser argued that Nixon’s approach contradicted American tradition and alienated America’s friends.111 In 1969–1970,
