par with a Plotinus or a Sosipatra. What was equally offensive to some Hellenes was the way in which many average, everyday Christians did take up ascetic practices, and at times, with embarrassing zeal. For Porphyry, the idea that the average person who enjoyed sex or food was at risk of becoming possessed was not troubling in the same way it was for Origen. Because Porphyry followed the Platonic belief in the reincarnation of souls, the average human being who had regular congress with evil daemons in this life, and who lived in a state of pollution, was not eternally doomed as he or she might be in some Christian schemes of things. Rather, although the soul of such an individual might descend into Hades at the end of this life, being too moist and heavy to rise above the earth and ascend to the supralunary sphere, it might well have a chance in the next life to live a relatively unpolluted existence. This soul could dry out, so to speak, through ascetic and contemplative practices.126 It could be strengthened and purified. Furthermore, most Platonists believed that the world was eternal and objected to the Christian view that God would act in the cosmos in a historical way.127 Origen was one of the most innovative of early Christian writers in creating a linear, historical narrative for the soul’s descent and eventual salvation, one that fundamentally undercut the cyclicality of the Platonic framework. Hence, although Origen and Porphyry shared similar views regarding the polluting effects of blood sacrifices, Origen, like most other Christian thinkers, believed that this demonic pollution should and could be avoided by everyone. The principal means for doing so was to avoid participating in traditional cult.
On the other hand, although Porphyry and Iamblichus believed that ordinary people who participated in polluting practices or those who failed to live as philosophers and theurgists had multiple opportunities to get it right, so to speak, they disagreed violently about the place of ritual in the salvation of human souls.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the positions of a number of third-century Platonists on the ontological status of evil daemons, a first step in exploring their more comprehensive spiritual taxonomies. It has demonstrated that it would be difficult to predict the precise positions of thinkers such as Origen, Porphyry, and Iamblichus based solely on what we might assume are their religious or ideological affiliations. Reflection on daemons and other spirits in the late ancient cosmic hierarchy results in strange bedfellows, as we have seen. For instance, Porphyry is more akin to Origen and other Christian apologists in his genealogical account of evil daemons and in his estimation of the cosmic damage and destruction wrought by these creatures. Further instances of this phenomenon emerge when we explore the more global taxonomic discourses of these philosophers, their comprehensive efforts to locate and fix spirits in universal taxonomies. These totalizing discourses are the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 2
Everything in Its Right Place: Spiritual Taxonomy in Third-Century Platonism
[D]ivine appearances flash forth a beauty almost irresistible, seizing those beholding it with wonder, providing a wondrous cheerfulness, manifesting itself with ineffable symmetry, and transcending in comeliness all other forms. The blessed visions of archangels also have themselves an extremity of beauty, but it is not at all as unspeakable and wonderful as that of the gods’ divine beauty, and those of angels already exhibit in a partial and divided manner the beauty that is received from the archangels. The pneumatic spirits of daemons and heroes appearing in direct visions both possess beauty in distinct forms…. If we are to give them a common denominator, I declare the following: in the same way that each of the beings of the universe is disposed, and has its own proper nature, so also it participates in beauty according to the allotment granted to it.
THE ENDEAVOR TO assign a moral valence to various cosmic beings by both Christian and non-Christian Platonists in the third century was but one step in a more comprehensive philosophical project, namely the creation of complex discourses that mapped and ordered the realm of spirits in more systematic, universal terms.1 The most extensive and detailed work we have of this sort is Iamblichus’s On the Mysteries. But, as this chapter will demonstrate, both Origen in On First Principles and Porphyry in a number of his fragmentary works were likewise involved in this taxonomic enterprise.2 Given the shared cultural and educational context of these thinkers highlighted in the previous chapter, it is not surprising that they should all participate in this common undertaking. This chapter will focus on the efforts of these thinkers to emplot spirits in a larger cosmic framework while attending to the sorts of intellectual concerns that drove this project. It will also consider moments in each of their writings where their respective discourses fail to preserve proper order, moments where moral and ontological taxonomy cease to map tidily onto each other and spirits refuse to stay put. For instance, key distinctions between various orders of spiritual beings are at times subverted or rendered ambiguous in the works of these philosophers. In other cases, the line between good and evil spirits is blurred such that good spirits are characterized by rather ambivalent qualities, or evil daemons fulfill important soteriological roles. In other words, this chapter will demonstrate that the act of creating and enforcing difference leads these thinkers to conclusions that at critical junctures call difference into question in radical and interesting ways.
This chapter will offer a number of suggestions for why these taxonomic discourses go astray. First, these philosophers, in their efforts to provide theological and philosophical rationales for specific ideas about spirits and particular religious rites, were engaged with traditional or “popular” beliefs and practices in ways that limited or resisted their endeavors.3 In other words, their taxonomic thinking crossed not only religious boundaries, as the previous chapter demonstrated, but social ones as well. These philosophers were attempting to explain and order a preexisting spiritual landscape populated by beings about which the vast majority of people held some beliefs and with whom they interacted via well-established rites, a tendency already evident in the writings of earlier thinkers such as Plutarch, Numenius, Apuleius, and even, to some extent, Pausanias.4 Subsequent chapters will discuss why Origen, Porphyry, and Iamblichus paid heed to this landscape by situating these thinkers in their third-century social context and its complex of ritual practitioners and intellectuals.
Second, the more crucial factor that accounts for disruption in these discourses is the way in which matter was theorized in antiquity. I will argue that the materiality of spirits, as conceived of in this period, accounts, in part, for some of the resistance encountered by Origen, Porphyry, and Iamblichus in their attempts to construct a totalizing perspective on the spiritual realm. Drawing on the insights of writers such as Jane Bennett and Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, both of whom pay attention to the way in which matter in antiquity had an agency all its own, including movement and desire, we may be able to better assess the significance of the materiality of spirits, the nature of the matter in which they were embodied, whether they were evil daemons addicted to moist, damp vapors, or the fixed stars inhabiting bodies of ethereal fire. These two explanations for discursive rupture are interrelated insofar as most people in antiquity thought of divine and daemonic beings as material in some key sense. Furthermore, when we speak of a spiritual landscape in this period, we are speaking of space that was not distinguishable from everyday landscapes connecting earthly and heavenly realms.
All the philosophers under consideration here were certainly interested, as Plotinus was, in the nature of the very highest cosmic beings and their interrelations. Origen, Porphyry, and Iamblichus all engaged in extended reflection and heated debate either among themselves or with others over the relationships between the first three levels of being. All three also used a range of triadic nomenclature to refer to these hypostatic levels.5 They also reflected on the precise nature of the relational bond between the first two levels, and whether or not and how this bond was mediated. And the terminology used in some instances was shared or borrowed across religious boundaries. For instance, Origen equated Christ with the Demiurge in his Commentary on John.6 And both Plotinus and Porphyry seemed to have adopted a number
