psychological, socio-economic and other ill-effects that result from leaving large groups of persons in limbo in relation to their aspirations for Bahamian citizenship. Not only are the affected individuals badly damaged and marginalized, the entire society is put at risk and its future compromised by having within its borders a substantial body of persons who, although having no knowledge or experience of any other society, are made to feel that they are intruders without any claim, moral or legal, for inclusion. Such feelings of alienation and rejection are bound to translate into anti-social behavior among many members of what is, in effect, a very large underclass in our society. (Government of The Bahamas 2013b, 96–97; italics added)
Additionally, the combination of poor living conditions, limited employment prospects, and social stigma sometimes leads to communal tension in the states where the stateless reside. As UNHCR points out, the “Denial of basic human rights [to stateless persons] impacts not only the individuals concerned but also society as a whole, in particular because excluding an entire sector of the population may create social tension and significantly impair efforts to promote economic and social development” (2010b, 4). During the past few years, for example, significant violence has erupted between Buddhists and stateless Rohingya in Myanmar, with hundreds of people being killed and thousands of homes destroyed.55 Banyamulenge, who have struggled for citizenship recognition in the Democratic Republic of Congo, continue to face “discriminatory treatment and ethnic tensions” (UN HRC 2008b, 17), and “excessive force” has been used by the Kuwaiti authorities against Bidoon who have been peacefully protesting for citizenship recognition in that state (Al Jazeera 2012; Reynolds and Cordell 2012, 2).
The problems associated with statelessness are not limited to one state’s borders either. States that refuse to grant citizenship to stateless persons may be providing grounds for these people to “seek full national legal identity elsewhere” (Batchelor 2006, 10). This is problematic because international law does not allow one state to “release itself from the international duty, owed to other states, of receiving back a person denationalized who has acquired no other nationality” (McDougal et al. 1974, 951). That is, states are not permitted to allow stateless people to become “charge[s] on other States” (951). While most stateless groups do not cross borders (they are “noncitizen insiders”), the Rohingya are a prime example of a stateless group that has crossed borders—leaving Myanmar for Bangladesh, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Gulf States—in the hopes of finding a home elsewhere.
The Bidoon of the Gulf region, European Roma, and Banyamulenge are also cases of stateless people who have crossed state borders, whether forcibly or voluntarily. Conflict between states may arise when they do not agree on the origin of stateless people or on which state should be granting citizenship to them, especially when resources are scarce. As Andrew Shacknove remarks, “The potential for international conflict is increased when ambiguity exists about the allocation of, and responsibility for, either territory or populations of forced migrants” (1993, 527).
The issue of deciding who belongs where, and how a given minority population should be treated, can be a particularly politically sensitive regional issue when a state has to deal with stateless persons on its territory who also happen to belong to a recognized minority population in a neighboring state. For instance, the stateless Lhotshampas are allegedly straining Nepal’s resources. Nepal has asked Bhutan, the ethnic “origin” state of the Lhotshampas, to sort out the latter’s nationality status (Khan 2001, 24–25). India, being the regional power, has the clout to negotiate an agreement between Nepal and Bhutan concerning this stateless group, but will not do so because of the huge number of ethnic Nepalis within its own borders. “India is no longer particularly anxious to be associated with Nepali minority rights movements in third countries for fear of its own vulnerability on the matter” (21). Thus, the Lhotshampas end up in a protracted stateless situation. Relatedly, many Roma have found it difficult to obtain citizenship in the states that succeeded the USSR because those states tried to pass them off as residents of a neighboring state at the time of independence.
Surrounding states may also act as staging grounds for stateless persons to engage in activities aimed at overthrowing a particular regime. As Peter Mutharika notes, “Where political enemies have been expelled and denationalized, they may continue to engage in activities aimed at overthrowing the ruling elite” (1989, 17). He adds that neighboring states may “even be drawn into attempts by some stateless persons to subvert the state of origin” (19). Statelessness is thus not only a human rights issue, but a matter of regional security as well.
International Activity Around Statelessness
Since statelessness is a pressing issue from an individual, community, state, and regional perspective, UNHCR and the Inter-Parliamentary Union have encouraged UN member states to accede to the 1954 and 1961 statelessness conventions as a means of “bolster[ing] national solidarity and stability” and “improv[ing] international relations and stability” (UNHCR and IPU 2005, 49). UNHCR has been actively campaigning for statelessness treaty accession since 2011. As Figure 2 illustrates, there has been a sharp increase in the number of states ratifying the two statelessness conventions since the turn of the century.
Former UNSG Ban Ki Moon also engaged in increasing activity on the issue of statelessness, publishing several reports on the arbitrary deprivation of nationality (UN HRC 2009a and b, 2011, 2013b), another report on discrimination against women under nationality law (UN HRC 2013a), as well as a Guidance Note on “The United Nations and Statelessness” (UNSG 2011). The former Secretary General made clear in the latter report that the UN “should tackle both the causes and consequences of statelessness as a key priority within the Organization’s broader efforts to strengthen the rule of law” (3).
Figure 2. Ratifications of statelessness conventions by decade, 1950s–present. UN Treaty Collection 2016.
While the UN considers statelessness a rule of law issue today, when international concern around statelessness first surfaced in the aftermath of WWII it was primarily tied to another group of forcibly displaced persons—refugees. UNHCR, the body created for the protection of refugees in 1950, did not acquire its second mandate over stateless persons until more than twenty years later through General Assembly Resolution 3274 (XXIX) (UN 1974).56 Since that time, UNHCR’s mandate on statelessness has expanded through a series of other resolutions (UNHCR 2014a). Prior to the establishment of the agency’s second mandate, however, the UN had already produced the two aforementioned statelessness conventions.
The Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (UN 1954) delineates the rights and duties of stateless persons in their states of residence. It asks signatory states to treat the stateless as well as “aliens generally in the same circumstances” regarding the rights of property, association, gainful employment, housing, and freedom of movement and to treat them as well as nationals regarding artistic and scientific rights, access to the courts, elementary education, public relief, and labor legislation. The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (UN 1961), which followed a few years later, asks contracting states to offer citizenship to children on their territories who would otherwise be stateless, provide an expedited naturalization procedure to stateless people, avoid denationalizing a person arbitrarily, and to ensure that an individual has access to another nationality before being denationalized, among other stipulations. Although more than a half century has passed since these conventions were issued, and despite the fact that there has been an uptick in the number of ratifications since the early 2000s, the statelessness conventions are among the most poorly ratified human rights treaties of the UN system.57 At the time of this writing, and as Figure 3 reflects, of the 193 UN member states, eighty-eight (46 percent) are party to the 1954 convention and sixty-seven (35 percent) are party to the 1961 convention (UN 2016).
