however, there has been a wide gap between the theory and the practice of Movementism since 1986: old party identifications were still influential under the “no-party” arrangement. At the end of the 1990s, Nelson Kasfir noted that the NRM “permitted a de facto, though unacknowledged, form of party competition to become the basis for the actual practice of Ugandan electoral democracy.”7
Beyond party labels, relatively stable political antagonisms and solidarities surfaced. The constitutional process (1988–1995) in particular saw the polarization of the national debate and of the political class between “multipartyists” and “Movementists.”8 This antagonism was not self-evident at first, because in the official ideology, multipartyism was to follow Movementism.9 However, it was soon simplified into a polarization between “government” on the one hand, and “opposition” on the other.10
Paradoxically, in the years that followed, the NRM leadership was the strongest to challenge the Movementist definition of political competition and encourage the formation of easily identifiable political groupings that were retaking party lines, especially through the creation of the Movement caucus.11 The core of the NRM, around the president, knew how to identify the “true” NRM members from the rest (i.e., persons most loyal to the government and the president).12 Through political and financial support granted to electoral candidates who were deemed more loyal than others, the executive rapidly encouraged allegiance and discipline.
What used to differentiate the NRM fundamentally from a political party was the fact that all citizens were part of it, and that consequently, internal pluralism was accommodated. This was challenged when politicians critical of the presidential line were “expelled,” and when the Movement endorsed Yoweri Museveni as their official candidate for the 2001 election.13 On October 30, 2000, Kizza Besigye, a former personal doctor of the president but more importantly a former freedom fighter and cabinet minister, declared himself a candidate for the presidential election against Museveni. This highly contested electoral campaign divided the NRM, and the “opposition” camp was strengthened.
All this does not mean that the Movement ideology was a smoke screen. It was taken seriously, even by people who are today Museveni’s staunchest opponents, and constantly discussed by Ugandans from all walks of life. The political ideas and principles at stake resonated with older political and moral ideals and impacted the way many Ugandans, from all political sides, imagine the good polity. However, the binary opposition between two identifiable political groupings, “government” and “opposition,” which challenged the Movement model of political confrontation, quickly became structural. It was along these lines that the media staged a national debate and defined political “balance.”
Even if candidates did not run for elections under a party ticket, they were presented in the media according to their party affiliations, or according to their acknowledged membership of the “opposition” or the “government” group. In Uganda as elsewhere, most journalists assimilate “neutrality” with “balance,” and “objectivity” with a “juxtaposition of opposed points of view.”14 According to the first producer of Radio One’s Ekimeeza, establishing that the show was “balanced” meant gaining credibility and avoiding becoming a target for repression: “There is some relative freedom in relation with the media. Just relative. Because you will hear on the talk shows people will come in and say all sort of things, but if you notice, the politically accepted talk shows are those that are balanced.”15 Not being balanced provided grounds for state repression, which could be acknowledged by some as legitimate by media producers, as one said about an occasion when one of his shows attracted the authorities’ hostility: “The presenter had to give the other side of [the story]. . . . So that there’s a balance. But he didn’t, which was very wrong.”16 Respecting what is imagined as political balance reflects a specific professional culture and the anticipation of repression, both of which may coincide, once more.
“Balance” also results from the legal provisions concerning equal coverage, and especially the 2000 Presidential Act, even if it officially applies only to public media. Concretely, this ideal of balance is usually translated by the fact that when talk shows take place in-studio, producers invite two people: one representing government and the other the opposition.17 This binary polarization is also encouraged by the fact that journalists marginalize candidates from small parties, and because they think that creating a straightforward confrontation on the air is more appealing.18 This professional culture thus goes against the official Movement democracy credo, although not necessarily intentionally, and ends up encouraging alternative representations of political pluralism.
The Pragmatics and Ideologies of Political Competition in the Ebimeeza
The ebimeeza were quite different from indoor talk shows, and the ways in which political competition was to be organized were never self-evident. As we will see in detail, they were strongly influenced by the culture of the school debate clubs. School debates follow the Westminster model of politics: they are fundamentally confrontational, and usually feature a “proposition” side against an “opposition” side, with both sides represented by an equal number of orators.19 Pointing out the links between the ebimeeza and the Westminster model of debate helps in understanding their agonistic, binary, and competitive character. But it also helps explain why they were ambivalent toward party politics, as parties are usually officially forbidden from debating societies, even if such societies are full of intrigue and alliances.20
For some journalists, producing an ekimeeza was more politically loaded than just applying the routine rules of the profession or reproducing habits acquired at school. It was an opportunity to stage a pluralist debate, which was seen as an opportunity at least to experiment with the ideal of multiparty politics. As one journalist told me: “The ekimeeza is like to create an ideal. It’s just like having a pilot project. When you say, ‘What would happen if the political space in Uganda was opened?’ [. . .] Perhaps it was the starting point of the ekimeeza, to reflect what a parliament should be. A proper parliament. You know where different views are respected.”21
However, this was more an exception than a rule, and for most of the organizers, the adoption of the categories “government” versus “opposition” corresponded only to the reapplication of journalistic practices or to the Westminster ethos of political balance. It was not presented as an act of resistance against the Movement system.
As mentioned earlier, the first discussions in Club Obbligato started in the context of the announcement of Besigye’s candidacy for the presidential election in 2000. This divided the Ekimeeza’s historicals as it did the NRM. “We had people [. . .] who were supporting Kizza Besigye; we had big people who were supporting President Museveni,” Chairman Wasula explained.22 This had an influence on the way the debates were to be organized.
Ebimeeza members used a whole range of different words to designate the way the political architecture was being redesigned: they talked of different “sides, wings, camps, tendencies, political attachments, ideologies, affiliations, political backgrounds, parties,” and the like.23 They imagined different lines of division: “pro- and antiestablishment,” “multipartyists against Movementists,” or “opposition against government.” People were not unanimous on how to organize the debate. As one orator explained: “Of course the chairman of the ekimeeza could always want to balance the debate, so if he has called two people speaking in favor of government, then he would make sure he would call other people, two people speaking against, from opposition to come and you know, so as it appears as a debate.”24 But the chairman himself, in accordance with the views set out in chapter 1, was rather hostile to this option:
That is a new phenomenon. We practice it now, but I want to discourage it personally. Because it will polarize the discussion. People will start identifying
