their British allegiance for ever.
As I see it, therefore, a Christian vision of things militates against the idealization of the self and the demonization of the other that together stifle sympathy and issue in a bitter, dogmatic nationalism that brooks no compromise in its determination to erase a national boundary. The same vision also militates against a nationalism that, enthralled by an exaggerated sense of its own victimhood, a correlative inclination to transfer its own sins onto a foreign scapegoat, and a consequent lust for independence, refuses all compromise in its determination to erect a national boundary.
Sometimes, of course, there are good reasons for a nation to seek expression in its own fully sovereign state—and so to secede from the larger multinational or imperial whole, of which it is a part. The strongest reason is seriously unjust oppression suffered by a national minority, which the majority consistently refuses to remedy. The Dutch in the mid-sixteenth century, for example, had just cause to secede from the Spanish empire, which was committed to the violent suppression of the Protestant religion; and the Kosovars in the late twentieth century had just cause to secede from the rump of the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav federation, which was engaged in the ruthless and indiscriminate ethnic cleansing of Muslims. A less strong but still sufficient reason for seeking greater autonomy (if not outright separation) is the denial to a minority of proportionate representation or the chronic overruling or neglect of its important and legitimate interests. Thus the Irish in the nineteenth century were justified, arguably, in using their representation in the imperial parliament at Westminster to press for a measure of “home rule” in Dublin, so that Irish concerns could receive the attention that they deserved.
Sometimes, then, a nationalist movement is right to demand greater autonomy, even to the point of full sovereignty. But, equally, sometimes it is wrong. Take, for example, the Scottish National Party’s campaign for independence from the United Kingdom in the run-up to the referendum of 2014. Were it the case that membership of the United Kingdom’s multinational state had inflicted some grave and chronic injustice on the Scottish people, for which remedy had long been sought but never found, then the case for secession would have been cogent. Perhaps the Scots were under-represented at Westminster. Perhaps their legitimate concerns were neglected and their needs unfairly met. Perhaps their culture was suppressed. But none of this was so. Since the Scottish parliament came into being in 1999, the Scots had enjoyed representation both in Edinburgh and in London. Indeed, Scottish Members of (the Westminster) Parliament could vote on matters concerning other parts of the U.K. (England, Wales, and Northern Ireland), whereas the representatives of those other parts could not vote on matters devolved to Edinburgh. In the U.K. the Scots received more public spending per capita than the English, and whatever it was that struck visitors to Edinburgh and Glasgow it was not a signal lack of cultural vitality.
How, then, did the S.N.P. justify its campaign for independence? Its strongest card was the argument that the Scots prefer a left-of-centre, social democratic polity with a more generous welfare state, whereas, judging by its propensity to elect Conservative governments, the centre of gravity of the English electorate is markedly further to the right and more favourable to the free market. If this had been true, it would have been an argument for greater Scottish autonomy and a further devolution of powers from Westminster to Edinburgh, although not necessarily for outright secession from the United Kingdom. As it happens, however, the claims of nationalist politicians did not match the evidence of the social scientific data. According to analysis of the British Social Attitudes (B.S.A.) survey of 2010:
it seems that Scotland is not so different after all. Scotland is somewhat more social democratic than England. However, for the most part the difference is one of degree rather than of kind—and is no larger now than it was a decade ago. Moreover, Scotland appears to have experienced something of a drift away from a social democratic outlook during the course of the past decade, in tandem with public opinion in England.50
From this the authors conclude that “the task of accommodating the policy preferences of people in both England and in Scotland within the framework of the Union is no more difficult now than it was when devolution was first introduced.”51
Beyond the false assertion of a major difference in political preferences between Scotland and England, the S.N.P’s platform consisted of claims that membership of the U.K. somehow inhibits Scotland’s economic growth and that the standard of living in an independent Scotland would be higher. These claims were contingent on a number of variable and (in the crucial matter of the price of oil) volatile factors. They were also necessarily speculative and fiercely contested. The debate went back and forth and seemed quite finely balanced. The very least that can be said is that it was not at all certain that independence would make the Scots better off economically, and that there was little reason to suppose that it would make them dramatically so.
What is most striking about the S.N.P.’s case was its vagueness and ad hoc nature. The goal of independence did not seem to be the logical conclusion of a rigorous analysis of particular problems afflicting the Scottish people. Rather, it seemed an article of faith in search of a rationale. This is certainly the impression given by reading David Torrance’s recent biography of Alex Salmond, the S.N.P’s charismatic leader, which identifies no moment of intellectual conversion, when Scottish independence was revealed as the solution to any particular problem.52 As an early colleague observed of Salmond, “when you went through all the arguments you were left with the impression that he didn’t know if Scotland would be better or worse off as an independent country. All that mattered was that Scots should rule themselves.”53
So what is it that filled the sails of the separatists? In part, a sense of Scottish victimhood, which can find little foothold in actual history, together with a correlative scapegoating of the Sassenach.54 In part, a modern and adolescent faith in the fetish of independence. And in part—judging by the barely visible connection between analysis and aspiration—a desire to escape the hard graft of daily politics into the uplift of a grander, purer, freer vision of things.55 Vision is good, of course, for, as we are told, the people perish without it. But vision needs to be born of a sober and moral reckoning with reality. Otherwise, it is just wishful thinking kept afloat on a mixture of self-pity, resentment, and recklessness, and destined for disillusion.
Nationalist calls for independence and erecting fresh borders are not self-justifying. And Christians, with their sensitivity to the creaturely interdependence of human individuals and communities, and with their conviction that God, the Origin and Basis of things, comprises a unity-in-diversity rather than the isolated and alienated unity of absolute self-sufficiency, should be sceptical of cries for it. They should interrogate the demand closely, asking whether it will bring real and substantial benefits to the people as a whole—and not just, say, provide the local political class with a bigger stage to strut upon.
VI. Conclusion
Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.
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