makes a definitive “com-prehension” of it impossible. To know the essence is a contradiction in terms. The interpretation of signs, conversely, is an endless process of learning: the sense of a sign can only be learned, not known.
What does it mean to describe sense as the object of learning? Learning is not, as the eighth postulate, the postulate of knowledge, states, and, as the first postulate presupposes, a preparatory and temporary stage that finally dissolves when it reaches its goal, knowledge. To learn, for Deleuze, is to “enter into the universal of the relations which constitute the Idea, and into their corresponding singularities”; knowledge, conversely, “designates only the generality of concepts or the calm possession of a rule enabling solutions” (DR, 204). In order to understand this definition, we have to look at the seventh postulate, the postulate of solutions, which holds that representational thought traces problems from supposedly preexistent propositions and evaluates them according to their solvability, to their susceptibility for a solution. Representational thought poses a problem in function of the propositions it already has, and in function of the propositions that can possibly solve the problem. The problem itself is secondary. Deleuze, for his part, wants to think problems in themselves. Hence, he understands thinking thought not so much as the process of finding solutions to problems, but as creating problems. Deleuze agrees with the representational idea that “a problem is determined at the same time as it is solved” (DR, 203), but for different reasons, namely, because a problem is explicated in the solution. Thus, the problem, rather than disappearing in the solution, insists and persists in it (DR, 203). The problem is immanent and transcendent in relation to its solutions because its persistence does not imply that it is deduced from the solutions.
Now, thinking the problem in function of the propositions we have at our disposal means thinking in terms of particularities, since propositions are always particular. These particular propositions can be examined for what they have in common so as to be able to establish general principles. Tracing problems from propositions implies thinking them in terms of generalities and particularities. However, if we think the problem in itself, we think it in function of universality and singularities. Is this not a contradiction? No. We already saw how the Idea synthesizes in a way that is disjunctive, which means that it unites not by looking for what there is in common—that is what a generality does—but by playing out the differences between what is subsumed under this unity. Universality thus comprises a distribution of singular and distinctive points (DR, 202). Hence, the difference between knowledge and learning is that in knowledge, the solution “lends its generality to the problem,” whereas in learning, the problem “lends its universality to the solution” (DR, 202). Learning is a matter of penetrating the Idea (DR, 243), that is, the problem. Learning is about starting to see where the problems are. When we learn to swim, for example, our “knowledge” of water and of our own body changes because certain things, such as the ability to breathe, for instance, lose their self-evidence. We need to explore the singular points of the water (its weight, its movement, etc.), of our body (how to regulate breathing, etc.), and of the combination of both (under what circumstances do we need to lift our head higher so as not to swallow water, for instance?). Learning is not about acquiring something that already exists but about making your world more complex, about creating more distinctions and relations.
This description of thought in terms of learning, of creating problems that do not presuppose solutions, also has implications for the notion of truth. Whereas representational thought connects truth with the solution—the solution is true or false with respect to the problem posed, which is understood in function of the solution—Deleuze connects it to the problem. A problem is false when it is overdetermined; when it mistakes banalities for profundities, ordinary points for singular points (DR, 191); or when it is underdetermined, in which case it fails to identify the singular points. In other words, the truth of a problem has to do with its meaningfulness. As such, it determines the nature of its solution: “The problem always has the solution it deserves in proportion to its own truth or falsity—in other words, in proportion to its sense” (DR, 198). A problem always has the solution that corresponds to the way the problem is posed.
Stupidity as the Highest Finality of Thinking Thought (Fifth Postulate)
I have already mentioned, in passing, how representational thought understands error: an error occurs when one faculty appropriates an object actually intended for another faculty. For example, one might say, “Good morning, Theodorus,” when, in fact, Theaetetus is the one passing by, because one confuses Theodorus, whom one saw yesterday (memory), with Theaetetus, who is right now before one’s eyes (perception). An error is due to a failure of good sense. Representational thought also offers another explanation for error, namely, the false recognition or representation resulting from a false evaluation of opposition, analogy, resemblance, and identity (DR, 186). Thus, one says “Theodorus” instead of “Theaetetus” because of an overestimation of the resemblance between the two. Both explanations, however, see error as a temporary blinding, occasioned by external forces, of a thought that is by nature upright and thus in perfect alignment with the other postulates. Representational thought considers error to be an empirical fact, an extrinsic attack on the natural affinity with the truth.
According to Deleuze, the negative of thought cannot be reduced to error. Madness (folie); stupidity (bêtise); and malevolence (méchanceté), for example, cannot simply be explained as failures of true, identical thought. More than that, Deleuze thinks that the negative of thought is not caused by external forces but is part of thought itself. It forms the structure of thought as such because it makes thought possible. In order to indicate that he is talking about the negative of thought as a transcendental feature and not an empirical fact, Deleuze exchanges “error” for “stupidity.”
The cogitandum, the unthinkable that is at the same time that which must be thought, already indicates that the negative of thought, understood as that which is not thought and cannot be thought, is part of the very structure of thought. Deleuze develops this idea further. How is stupidity possible? “It is possible by virtue of the link between thought and individuation” (DR, 189), an important notion of Deleuze’s ontology, which we will examine in the following chapters. For now, suffice it to say that individuation is used in distinction to specification. Specification refers to the process by which individuals distinguish themselves from one another, whereas individuation refers to a process that precedes and conditions specification. Individuation allows individual qualities or determinations to be formed. As a condition, it is not itself determined or qualified. On the contrary, it “involves fields of fluid intensive factors which no more take the form of an I than of a Self” (DR, 190). Individuation, or the process through which individual determination originates, issues forth from a formless, indeterminate, chaotic ground. During this process of determination, this ground can rise to the surface. More than that, this ground always rises to the surface of forms; individual determination implies that the individual distinguishes itself from the ground out of which it originates, without, however, being able to completely detach itself from it. Hence, the distinction between the ground and the individual is never a complete separation. This indeterminate ground is a threat to the individual and to every form in the sense that it can suddenly manifest itself and unsettle all determination or form. This is the moment when hideousness, staggering chaos, and an absolute exterior shine through the human face, determined forms, and the familiar. Stupidity, then, “is neither the ground nor the individual, but rather this relation in which individuation brings the ground to the surface without being able to give it form” (DR, 190). In this sense, stupidity is the “highest finality of thought” (DR, 193). As the moment in which determinations lose stability, such that the faculties are brought to confront their limits and are forced to create something new, stupidity “constitutes the greatest weakness of thought, but also the source of its highest power in that which forces it to think” (DR, 345).
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According to Deleuze, the eight postulates that describe the different characteristics of representational thought manifest a confusion
