The Birth of Sense. Don Beith
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Between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty: The Inversion of Phenomenology
1. Consciousness and Animality: The Problem of Constituting Activity in The Structure of Behavior
Consciousness and the Problem of Organic Form
Genetic Passivity in the Structure of Consciousness
The Epistemology of Form: Learning to Perceive (as) Animals
Autopoiesis and Transcendental Vitalism versus Melodic Forms
2. The Passivity of Life: The Problem of the Genesis of Possibility in Institution and Nature
The Generative Passivity of Life in Nature
The Spatiality of Generative Passivity in Life
The Time of Life in Institution: Beyond A Priori and A Posteriori
Bergson and the Becoming-True of Possibility
Foucault’s Criticisms of Merleau-Ponty’s Naturalism
3. The Passivity of Second Nature: The Genesis of the Person in the Phenomenology of Perception
Static Phenomenology: The Person as Irreducible Form
Genetic Grounds of Personality: The Bodily Temporality of Habit
Habit and the Genetic Passivity of Conscious Activity
The Soil of Habits: The Deconstruction of Generative Passivity
4. The Intercorporeal Institution of Agency: Merleau-Ponty’s Generative Psychology and Politics
Institution of the Person: The Birth of Sense in Nonsense
The Person as Instituted: Childhood
The Emergence of Instituting Personality: Puberty
Beyond Liberalism and Social Constructivism: Intercorporeal Agency
Conclusion. The Hidden Nature of Passivity
Interpreting Merleau-Ponty: Thinking on the Move
Gestures at Future Investigations
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many excellent philosophers have helped to shape this project. I am thankful to John Russon, to whom this book is dedicated, for provocative conversations, particularly one Socratic walk around Toronto where he got me thinking about three levels of passivity in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. Alia Al-Saji, for whom phenomenology is a rigorous science, has been an exceptional writing mentor, leading me to insights about temporality in Bergson and Merleau-Ponty. A natural phenomenologist, David Morris has challenged me to think of being in terms of development. Discovering Ted Toadvine’s deep work on nature was a pivotal moment in my learning, and I thank him for his many insightful comments on this work. I am indebted to Anthony Steinbock for sharing his original investigations at the Phenomenology Research Center, for challenging me to think about personhood, and particularly for his work on generative method in Husserl, out of which I develop the tripartite interpretative method of this study. Thanks are also due to thinkers who challenged me to think more deeply about nature, difference, and expression: Iain Macdonald, Cynthia Willett, Lisa Guenther, Doug Anderson, Hasana Sharp, George di Giovanni, Sunny Wang, Carolina Bergonzoni, William Ross Kemperman, Daniel Elliotte Allan, Zain Raza, Sarah McLay, Meghant Sudan, Donncha Coyle, Thomas Minguy, Filip Niklas, Ivanna Besenovsky, Jack Marcotte, and Jingjing Li.
Inspiring colleagues have supported me and shared their passion with teaching over the years at Bishop’s University, the University of British Columbia, and the University of Maine, especially Kirsten Jacobson, Jessica Miller, Roger King, James Crooks, Bruce Gilbert, Steven Taubeneck, Scott Anderson, and Noah Moss Brender.
I am grateful to John Russon for his outstanding teaching and work to lead vigorous philosophical seminars on the history of philosophy, where I discovered the inspiration to study philosophy and was introduced to a world of philosophers. I owe more than I can say to the participants of the Toronto Seminar for formative discussions over the years, especially Nate Andersen, Joe Arel, Ömer Aygün, Susan Bredlau, Noah Moss Brender, Tim Brownlee, David Ciavatta, Patricia Fagan, Tim Fitzjohn, Bruce Gilbert, Shannon Hoff, Whitney Howell, Kirsten Jacobson, Greg Kirk, Kym Maclaren, Scott Marratto, Laura McMahon, David Morris, Jeff Morrisey, Eve Rabinoff, Greg Recco, Bryan Richard, Karen Robertson, Eric Sanday, Jacob Singer, Maria Talero, and Ollie Wiitala.
Deep thanks to the two anonymous reviewers who provided a wealth of philosophical resources and perspectives on the lacunae in this work. Thanks also to the tireless work of the staff and editors at Ohio University Press, particularly Rick Huard, Deborah Wiseman, and Ted Toadvine. I am indebted to Leonard Lawlor for sharing an early draft of his translation of Institution and Passivity with a small group of dedicated Merleau-Ponty scholars in Montreal in the winter of 2010. It was a gift to have had the colleagues of an informal Merleau-Ponty institution