modernism, and “critical realism.” Each, he argues, to one degree or another exhibits “autonomous criticism” of which there is no “autonomous escape.”
207. Poythress, In the Beginning, 79–80. This is an example of Van Til’s notion of “borrowed” or “stolen” capitol (Van Til, Systematic Theology, 152–53; Case for Calvinism, 147–48).
208. Poythress, In the Beginning, 114–15.
209. Poythress, In the Beginning, 320–25; Frame, Knowledge of God, 14–18.
210. Poythress, In the Beginning, 371; Derrida, Of Grammatology, 158.
211. Poythress, In the Beginning, 372.
212. Poythress, “Christ,” 312; Van Til, Defense of Faith, 59–69; Christian Epistemology, 12–18; 34–37.
213. Poythress, In the Beginning, 374.
214. Frame, Knowledge of God; Christian Life; Pike, Linguistic Concepts.
215. Poythress, “Reforming Ontology,” 187–219; Redeeming Science, 25–26; God-Centered, 16–20, 38–43, 52–58, 63–76.
216. Poythress, “Why?,” 96–98.
217. Here, Poythress and Frame rely on Van Til’s previous formulation of his own latent perspectivalism with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity (Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 29n4; Frame, Van Til, 119–23, 170–72).
218. Poythress, “Reforming Ontology,” 191–93, 197; God-Centered Interpretation, 72–74.
219. Poythress, “Reforming Ontology,” 198–200. Similarly, Torres has seen a multiperspectival approach as a useful tool in order to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of postmodernism (Torres, “Perspectives,” 123–36).
220. Poythress, “Reforming Ontology,” 215–17.
221. E.g., Van Til, Defense of Faith, 123.
222. Poythress, “Reforming Ontology,” 218.
223. Poythress appreciates the Trinitarian nature and function of each triad while, at the same time, acknowledging that no one triad captures the Trinity, nor his Trinitarian word. Rather, like his view of perspectives, multiple triads are needed in order to appreciate the inherent complexities involved.
224. Poythress, “Why?,” 97–98.
225. Poythress, “Divine Meaning,” 241–56.
226. Poythress, “Divine Meaning,” 256.
227. Poythress, “Truth and Fullness,” 212; “Divine Meaning,” 252–54.
228. Poythress “Presence of God,” 87–103; “Divine Meaning,” 241–79; God-Centered, 20–25, 32–36, 43–47, 75–76; Symphonic Theology, 16–17, 45–51.
229. Poythress invokes Van Til’s notion that one must have complete comprehension in order to begin to reason with one piece intelligibly. In this case, the piece is an historical event (“Presence of God,” 98).
230. Poythress, “Truth and Fullness,” 223–24, 227; Symphonic Theology, 55–91
231. Poythress, “Divine Meaning,” 241, 243–47, 256; Symphonic Theology, 85.
232. Poythress, God-Centered, 89.
233. Poythress, God-Centered, 89, 94. At this point, he cites Van Til’s Theistic Evidences, along with others, such as, Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, and Kuhn’s influential work.
234. Poythress, “Truth and Fullness,” 213–27.
235. Poythress, “Why?” 97–98.
236. Poythress explicitly states that both he and Frame are indebted to Van Til with regard to these points, citing six of his works in particular (Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 29).
237. Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 30.
238. Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 32; Van Til, Systematic Theology, 117–22.
239. Poythress, “Christ,” 312.
240. In this portion of his article, he employs Frame’s epistemological triad (control, authority, and presence), summarizing God’s Lordship (Frame, Knowledge of God, 109–22).
241. Poythress highlights three general movements in his discussion: rationalism, empiricism, and subjectivism (“God’s Lordship,” 37–39).
242. Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 37.
243. Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 43–58.
244. Poythress, “God’s Lordship,” 63.
245. Poythress, “Christ,” 321.
