therefore, the Allies wanted the Ridge to create a powerful position in Northern France.
It was critical to the Germans not to lose Vimy Ridge, for if they did, their position in the entire region would be jeopardised. The loss of Vimy Ridge would expose a vast amount of German held positions to the Allied guns. It also protected the Hindenburg Line; the last German defence.
Both sides were more than aware that the previous times they fought over the Ridge in 1914 and 1916, over one hundred and fifty thousand French and British lost their lives, as did many thousands of Germans.
The German defences were, as usual, formidable with barbed wire, machine gun nests and artillery. They also had an extensive network of tunnels, including very comfortable living quarters.
The battle plan was for the British forces to flank the ridge traversing across no man’s land, while the responsibility for taking the Ridge was the Canadians’.
Every soldier and officer knew just how critical this battle was and how it would affect the outcome of the war.
An essential part of any campaign is the quality of the leadership. In this case, unlike at Fromelles and other battles, the leadership was magnificent.
The two commanders were Lt. General Sir Julian Byng and Major General Arthur Currie, who would lead a united Canadian force to take the Ridge. Many thought this was an impossible task.
Both these leaders had an enormous amount of experience and had seen the slaughter at Ypres and Verdun; they knew the old strategy of ‘let’s throw our soldiers at the German machine guns’ was futile and insane.
They were going to conduct this battle with a new and effective methodology.
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They knew the old method of throwing wave after wave of closely packed infantry at the German defence was wasteful. The soldiers had no defence against the machine guns and barbed wire. The results were horrendous casualties and very little success.
The Canadians developed a system of placing machine gun, grenade and rifle specialists within a single platoon. These platoons would strike at the enemy, not in a straight line, but in a more fluid action where German defenders had less chance of merely mowing down the attackers. This attack would find the attackers able to cover their own advances.
Instead of directing the battle from behind the lines, safe in a chateau, the Canadian officers were fighting with their men, keeping a close tab on what was happening on the battlefield. They briefed each man on their objective and each man received detailed maps. This would ensure that the Canadian troops were clear on the objectives, and if an officer were killed, they could continue knowing what needed to be done.
By the time the attack had begun, twenty-one miles of signal cable and sixty-six miles of telephone wire had been buried on the battlefront. The corps had dug eleven underground tunnel-ways to aid in the movement and protection of the troops. These underground roads were equipped with electricity, medical stations, supplies and rest stations. Portable bridges were built to assist in the movement of artillery pieces over the most difficult terrain and trenches.
Prior to Vimy Ridge, the machine gun was used by both the Germans and the Allies as a weapon of defence. The Canadians changed all that and used them as an attack weapon.
The machine gun fire became a supplement to the artillery barrage. During the attack, the lighter weight Vickers guns would be set up along with the Canadian advances, providing both cover and a true attacking power designed to keep the German troops from attempting their usual defence, and giving them the opportunity of repairing their barbed wire barriers.
The Canadian Forces established an enormous strike capability with their artillery; almost two hundred and fifty heavy guns and almost six hundred field guns were aimed at the German positions. The bombardment lasted three weeks, targeting Fritz’s machine guns and artillery. On average, two thousand five hundred tons of shells blasted the German positions daily. German communications were destroyed, stopping food, ammunition, and replacement troops from getting to their lines.
Supplying the Canadian troops was a network of rail lines built to bring the huge numbers of shells into position. Special fuses were developed for shells that would cause an almost instantaneous explosion, designed to take out enemy’s barbed wire. That was something the British could not do at the Battle of the Somme. During the week preceding the attack, the “week of suffering” as the Germans called it, over one million shells were fired at Vimy Ridge.
One of the faults with the British bombardment method was that the Germans hunkered down in their secure dugouts drinking tea and playing cards, and when the shelling ceased, they knew it was time to enter their trenches and starting slaughtering the enemy.
The Canadian plan called for artillery to keep a precise pace in front of the Canadian troops moving across no-man’s-land. A well-rehearsed movement of man and shell, moving at a pace of about one hundred yards every three minutes, would provide a dangerous but effective cover for the Canadians. German machine guns were kept silent as gunners stayed protected within the tunnels and trenches. This method also afforded an element of surprise, as many Germans left their positions to face their attackers, only to find the Canadians already in their trench.
The essential difference between Vimy and other battles was the collection of good and detailed intelligence. Microphones were placed throughout no man’s land, and aircraft and balloons were used to determine where Fritz’s gun and artillery placement were located.
By having the information available, the Canadians were able to destroy eighty-five per cent of the German Batteries prior to the attack.
On April the 9th, 1917 at 5:28 am, the battle began. The weather was atrocious; a combination of snow and sleet, when the Canadians exploded their underground mines. Gas shells fell onto German positions and transportation routes, and the artillery began to blast the German positions. All hell broke loose.
Over eleven thousand Canadian and British guns opened up on the Ridge. The Canadians kept to their timetable and followed their detailed plans. By early afternoon, seventy per cent of their objectives were taken.
Thousands of Germans were taken prisoner, and many thousands more had been killed. However, still to be taken was the high ground position called “the Pimple”. That was the responsibility of the British forces attached to the Canadians. Hill 145 was also yet to be taken.
By the morning of April the 10th, Hill 145 had been taken and by April the 12th, the Canadians had reinforced the British attacking “the Pimple” and it was taken as well.
By the end of the battle, all objectives had been met and the Canadians had established themselves as an elite fighting force. The German line had been soundly breached, and the Canadians had fended off any thoughts of a German counterattack.
Unfortunately, British High Command, through ineptness, did not organise British and French battalions to take advantage of the breach in the German lines. Apparently, they did not believe the Canadians would be successful because they were basing
