Tobruk en route) becoming known as the “Gazala Gallop”, and the long westward retreat of the Afrika Korps, the “Tripoli Gallop”.
The desert war is often portrayed as the last of the conflicts in which chivalry and comradeship between enemies played a part. This was due mainly to the mutual struggle of the two sides against the elements, the swarming flies and pervasive, invasive dust. It was as much at times a “private war” as one between foes – though it was brutal and costly. Some 100 000 men lost their lives over the three years of fighting.
The desert war was also an extreme demonstration that a modern army required a considerable and complex logistical tail. By January 1941, it was calculated that each British division in the Middle East (about 18 000 men) required another 41 000 men to maintain it in the field. Rommel had completely outrun his supply abilities by the time his army reached El Alamein, a situation made worse by the fact that only one in four of his supply ships was reaching the ports of Tripoli and Tobruk, many being intercepted by the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force operating out of Malta. In September 1941, for instance, Rommel wrote: “Out of 5 000 tons of petrol which had been due to arrive by the 3rd, 2 600 tons had already been sunk and 1 500 tons were still in Italy.” Many of the supplies which did make it to North Africa “consumed themselves” in their delivery to the front.
The campaign in East Africa
The South African forces that served “up north” are remembered mainly for their part in the great battles in the Western Desert – defeat at Sidi Rezegh and humiliation at Tobruk, but also glory in the saving of North Africa at El Alamein in July and November 1942. However, the Springboks distinguished themselves in early 1941 as part of the British-led effort to drive the Italians out of East Africa, Abyssinia, Somalia and the Sudan.
Benito Mussolini’s empire in East Africa was established following the Italo-Abyssinian War of 1935–1936, when Italian forces conquered Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia). The empire incorporated this newly occupied territory as well as the colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. In June 1940, when Mussolini took Italy into the war on the German side, Italian forces in East Africa (numbering some 300 000) were seen as a threat to British supply routes along the Red Sea and through the Suez Canal.
Overall command of the East African theatre was in British hands, and this was accepted by the South African government when it raised a division for service against the Italians. By August 1940 the 1st South African Division was formed. It included three infantry brigade groups, each consisting of three rifle battalions, an armoured car company and supporting signal, engineer and medical units. By the end of the year, approximately 27 000 South Africans were serving in East Africa. That figure rose to 43 700 troops by the end of the campaign. They included just under 10 000 Coloured, Indian, Malay and African troops, who, though unarmed, played a significant role as drivers, cooks, stretcher-bearers and labourers.
The relationship between the UDF and the British did not get off to a good start. The GOC (general officer commanding) for East Africa, Major General DP Dickinson, ordered the 1st South African Brigade group to be split up into its component battalions. It thus ceased to operate as an entity, and by the end of September 1940 the battalions were spread out along the northern frontier of Kenya. The “dissection” was completed before the divisional commander, General George Brink, had even arrived in the country. Prime Minister Jan Smuts flew to Nairobi to intervene with Dickinson. The story goes that Smuts ordered Brink and Brigadier Dan Pienaar to leave the room, but Pienaar left the door slightly ajar so that what Smuts had to say could be heard: “You are no general for me,” he screamed at Dickinson, “I did not send my young men to die of fever in East Africa. I sent them here to drive the enemy out of Africa.”
Churchill and General Archibald Wavell, the GOC Middle East, were informed by Smuts. The result was that Dickinson was replaced by General Alan Cunningham. The South Africans would again fight as a united formation – and they achieved spectacular success. The war reporter Carel Birkby, whose book Springbok Victory told the story of the East African campaign, wrote that “in two breathless months General Cunningham’s force blasted its way from Kenya through Italian Somaliland, into Abyssinia and on to Addis Ababa. There was little doubt of the success of his lightning drive once he had forced the enemy’s first main defensive line on the Juba River. And I think the Battle of the Juba in February 1941 was won at the Battle of El Wak in December 1940.”
El Wak was an Italian fort situated on the Kenya-Somali border, 644km northeast of Nairobi and about 160km north of Wajir, one of the jumping-off points for the attacks on Abyssinia and Somaliland. The objective of the 1st South African Brigade, going into action for the first time, was to seize and destroy not only El Wak but also a number of surrounding outposts. The whole operation, wrote Birkby, was “an almost flawless model for a bush-war raid – a textbook exercise in earnest”. He witnessed the attack by South African infantry and armoured cars:
At 08h15 as the sun began to pour down its drenching heat, the infantry moved up and found strong Italian defences behind barbed wire. The rattle of musketry began. Ten minutes later the tanks on the left were heard crashing through the dry thorn bush. They passed the infantry and swept round parallel with the enemy wire. One of the tanks broke down with clutch trouble a few yards from the wire. An enemy 65mm gun was brought to bear on it. Grenades burst around it. Machine-gun bullets thup-thupped against its side. Its headlight was blown off. The crew, busy as bees in an upset hive, laboured to get the clutch right and soon had the tank careering onwards again. The whole line of tanks rolled along the defences letting loose a deafening and devastating broadside for a quarter of a mile. The tank crews were so close that they could see the enemy working their guns.
The South African infantry, with support from the Gold Coast brigade, followed the tanks through gaps that had been blown in the wire and “shot and bayoneted those of the enemy who did not flee from their machine guns and artillery.” Apart from taking 120 prisoners, the troops seized 15 guns, 300 000 rounds of small-arms ammunition and 1 000 shells, and destroyed huge quantities of stores and ammunition. About 200 Italians escaped and “became our unwitting allies; they were walking pamphlets far more convincing than any exhortation in the vernacular that our aircraft could drop among the natives; they were missionaries of terror among their comrades”. The commander of El Wak had fled the fort the day before the battle, “hurrying off as fast as he could go in a mule cart. He left all his secret documents behind him, including complete plans of the Italian defensive scheme for the Lower Jub. The garrison was not heartened by the defection of their commander. They fought with little heart.” For his leadership in the field, Brigadier Pienaar was immediately awarded the DSO.
The next major encounter was the battle for Mega, a strongly defended fortress on the southern Abyssinian plateau. It was assaulted by the 2nd and 5th South African brigades, which constituted General Brink’s main force. Joel Mervis, the legendary editor of the Sunday Times, wrote this account of Mega in his history of South African forces in the Second World War:
Rain fell during the night, and on a wet February 16 a thick mist hid the hills which were the first objective. The enemy had spotted the advance and having already established and registered the road and its vicinity, opened fire with artillery. The South African trucks scattered, and troops rushed from their transports. They started to advance on foot across the hills. At midday a tremendous storm broke, the mist grew thicker, and the troops were lost in the mist.
They were travelling lightly, without either greatcoats or groundsheets, and had little protection against the bitter cold. The supply trucks were bogged in the mud and that night the ration was one can of bully beef and one biscuit to every four men.
On February 17 the weather was bleak but the battle grew hotter. The South African artillery moved up, but not until 18h00 was a Scottish unit able to capture a machine-gun post on a hill dominating the line of the regiment’s advance. By dark the men were so tired and cold they could scarcely move, but there was naught for their comfort. They had to spend another bitter
