the two interpretations of God (at least in terms of the attributes that they are said to possess) are minimal. The attributes of the deistic God that I will ultimately come to argue for do not vary at all from any of the attributes of the God of classical theism, rather they will simply require that we envision some of them in particular ways, and this will hopefully illustrate that if one is inclined to believe in the God of classical theism then he can perhaps be persuaded to believe in a deistic God without much amendment to his current beliefs, as the two are not quite as different as some may consider them to be.
Theistic Concessions in Accepting a Multiverse Theory
With all of the different types of multiverse models that have been discussed, there are some potential drawbacks for the theist if he accepts any of them. Of course, the degree to which the drawbacks will affect the theist will vary depending on the particular multiverse theory of which he is a proponent and on the particular ways in which he interprets the 3-O divine attributes, but they will exist, nonetheless. In the first case, some multiverse theories will entail the actualization of a whole host of universes that theists would not necessarily want to acknowledge as existing given the nature of their omnibenevolent God, so this is something for which the theist will have to account and explain. In the second case, multiverse theories will often take away from or discount the design argument, which is generally an argument put forth by theists to argue for the existence of God based on the unlikeliness that this universe could have arisen purely out of chance.1 This argument, however, is generally most persuasive when applied to a single-universe ontological view, and would seemingly not work for the theist who is a proponent of multiverse theory. And in the final case, for multiverse theories that call for the actualization of all possible states of affairs,2 , 3 there is an ethical issue with which the theist must deal. Multiverse theories that call for the actualization of all possible states of affairs raise interesting ethical problems since it seems an agent can remain indifferent to whether he ought to perform a good moral action or a bad moral action since whatever he does not do will be actualized in some other universe. This final difficulty is not exclusive to theists, as it will equally apply to all those who adopt a multiverse theory of this model; it is a difficulty that the multiverse theist will still have to face.
A substantial number of multiverse theories, especially those coming from the scientific perspective, argue for a multiverse that contains or exhausts every metaphysically possible universe. That is, they argue for a multiverse that contains or exhausts every universe that is physically possible given some range of set physical constants. If we are to limit our discussion to scientific multiverse models, then it seems that all of them entail the actualization of all possible universes, be their actualization and existence simultaneous to one another, be they part of an infinite series of big bangs and big crunches, wavepacket collapses, or of part of some other cyclical model.4 Included within these actualized universes, then, would be a whole series of universes that either contain no sentient life, no life at all, significant amounts of evil and suffering, or are just on-balance “bad”5 universes. The existence of many of these universes is potentially at odds with the conception of an omnibenevolent God that many theists hold, given that many theists would argue that God would create only universes that meet specific criteria. Surely there is nothing overtly illogical or incoherent about the existence of such “bad” universes, and there is no clear contradiction between them and the existence of God, but it remains that some theists may not want to concede the existence of, say, multiple universes containing an immense amount of pain and suffering, or universes in which there is no sentient life whatsoever. Furthermore, theists may not even want to concede that the existence of such universes is possible, and this is where the tension lies. While there is no explicit contradiction between the existence of God and the existence of all logically and metaphysically possible universes within a multiverse a contradiction could arise given certain specific interpretations of God’s attributes and His nature.
The scientific multiverse accounts presented are generally concerned not with the content of the universes; rather, they are concerned purely with the physical constants and ways by which these universes can come into existence given quantum mechanics and laws of nature. The concern of physicists and mathematicians is not with the moral content of these universes—whether they are good or bad in relation to some arbitrary scale of worthiness; rather, they are merely concerned with the sheer existence of the universes. The theist, on the other hand, may place considerable importance on the content of the universe, concerned with things such as ethical considerations, overall goodness, inherent value, and the like. Because of this, the scientific approach to the multiverse in most, if not all, cases entails the existence of far more universes than does the theistic one. The theist who aims to adopt a multiverse view and to incorporate the scientific case for that multiverse will then be forced to reconcile this difference, which may be seen as a drawback for theists in accepting multiverse theories. Essentially, a concession concerning the scope of universe inclusion within the multiverse will need to be made, either on the theological side or on the scientific side. Proponents of the theistic multiverse may try to reconcile this difference by inserting a threshold, such that any universe that falls below this threshold given whatever value and method of measurement is being used is not even a possible universe and thus would not be actualized at any point within the multiverse. This approach, however, demands that the theist justify his threshold, both in where he chooses to place the threshold and in what it purports to value. He must also provide reasoning as to why this particular threshold is more suitable than other potential thresholds that are placed at other locations and value other variables. This will not entirely solve the problem for the theist though, since the scientific models would call for very different thresholds and would set out very different definitions of possible, so still the issue remains for the theist that scientific multiverse models entail the existence of far more universes than they would generally like to acknowledge as possible. So many universes that the theist may not want to accept as possible that it may even prove to be damaging to the theist’s particular conception of God and how He operates.
The second potential drawback for the theist is that the multiverse theory undermines the design argument. Design arguments typically argue, in one way or another, that the universe appears to have been intelligently designed, which entails an intelligent designer, and that this intelligent designer is God (Ratzsch, 2010). The arguments generally “involve reasoning from seemingly purposeful features of the observable world to the existence of at least one supernatural designer” (Manson, 2003, p. 1). One particular example of such an observation and inference may be that the physical constants required to produce and sustain life are very narrow, and based on the fact that we see life in this universe, one can argue that it could not possibly be the case that all of these things simply came together by chance, but that the creation of something as complex as our universe would have required significant design and intent.6 It is important to note that many design arguments do not explicitly posit the existence of God, rather they point to the existence of just some supernatural designer, and that a further step is needed to identify that supernatural creator as God (Manson, 2003, p. 1).7 Design arguments, however, are typically used, and generally work better with, single-universe models rather than multiverse models. This is because such arguments appeal to the uniqueness of our particular universe, arguing that the chance of such a universe coming to exist as it has is virtually impossible without some sort of intent and creator behind it. Many multiverse theories, however, claim that since all possible universes have or will be actualized at some particular place or time, then the existence of a universe such as ours is not only highly likely but inevitable. For example, for proponents of cyclical multiverse models, it would merely be a matter of time before, at some point in the infinite sequence of universes coming into and going out of existence, our particular universe with all of these life-supporting features should come to exist.8 So, while the multiverse is not a direct challenge to the theistic view, it does undermine one of the stronger arguments that theists often appeal to in making a case for the existence of God. On most multiverse accounts there is no need to posit the existence of God to account for the apparent design of our universe since the existence of a universe just like ours is inevitable
