the present trajectory is becoming unsustainable. Most obviously, this relates to the careless disregard which the active legacy of the minerals-energy complex and the present growth pattern have on the economy. Just as the present existing form of global capitalism is rapidly reaching its ecological limits, so South Africa’s failure to rein in the mining industry’s abuse of the environment (notably the country’s limited water resources) and to commit seriously to moving away from dirty energy (Eskom’s recalcitrance compounded by the government’s passivity) points to a developing crisis of survival whose parameters are almost unimaginable to the present generation.
The economic crash and the global environmental crisis are two sides of the same coin, prompting growing struggles and debate about the future of capitalism itself. Whatever the future, South Africa’s bid to adapt to changing global necessities and popular demands requires an imaginative response. South Africa made one such leap in 1994: can it make another in the near future?
NOTES
1 Defined by the international measure of living on less than US$1 a day.
2 Thus, for instance, Sanlam gave birth to three significant BEE groups, with Pamodzi taking over from what was Fedfood, Royal Bafokeng from Impala Platinum, and Tsebo Outsourcing from Fedics. Tokyo Sexwale’s Mvelaphanda was to buy a large stake in Old Mutual’s Benguela Concessions, while Brimstone (a Cape based empowerment company) now owns clothing firm Rex Trueform. Anglo’s unbundling has provided a basis for various empowerment deals with, for instance, Cyril Ramaphosa’s Shanduka now having a 5 per cent stake in Anglo’s Scaw Metals.
3 But see Kariuki below for an optimistic perspective on present developments.
4 According to the Annual Surveys of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), (1994–95: 400; 2008–09: 166), the proportion of the budget spent on ‘social security and welfare’ was 6.9 per cent in 1990–91 and 9.3 per cent in 1995–95. By contrast, the National Treasury estimates that ‘social protection’ will amount to 15.9 per cent of budget expenditure in 2010. Although these figures may not be directly comparable, the sharp upward trend is unmistakeable.
5 Annual total disposable income for whites dropped from 44.3 per cent of the total in 1998 to 40.3 per cent in 2008 (SAIRR 2008–09: 288).
6 The principal examples in 2009 were highly publicised battles over the suspension for alleged disciplinary offences by the Transnet board of Siyabonga Gama, the head of Transnet Freight Rail, who received vigorous backing from elements within the ANC and Cosatu in his bid to become CEO of Transnet, and the forced resignation of Jacob Maroga as CEO of Eskom, who similarly had strong support from within the ANC, in a messy battle which culminated in the subsequent resignation of Bobby Godsell, former CEO of Anglo-Gold Ashanti, as chairman of the board following, apparently, lack of backing by President Jacob Zuma.
7 Public expenditure as a proportion of GDP and as a proportion of total government expenditure for South Africa in 2007 was 5.4 per cent and 17.45. Comparative figures for Germany were 4.5 per cent and 9.7 per cent. For the UK they were 5.5 per cent and 12.5 per cent. For the US: 5.7 per cent and 13.7 per cent (SAIRR 2008/09: 379).
8 A few basic statistics can illustrate the problems: in 2006, 4 per cent of public schools had no toilet facilities whatsoever, and only 31.6 per cent had flush toilets; 10 per cent of schools had no water supply; only 23.1 per cent had a laboratory, and only 10 per cent of these were adequately stocked; 14.7 per cent had no electricity supply; and only 23.15 per cent had a computer centre; and, horrifically, only 21.1 per cent had a library (SAIRR 2008/09: 407–415 citing figures from the Department of Education’s National Education Infrastructure Management System).
9 The Index is conducted by the World Economic Forum in partnership with ‘leading academics and a global network of research institutes’ and calculates its rankings ‘from publicly available data and an annual poll of over 12 000 business leaders worldwide’. See http://www.southafrica.info/busines/economy/competitiveness2009.htm.
10 World Bank Governance Indicators saw South Africa’s control of corruption decline from 75.7 out of 100 in 1996 to 66.7 in 2007 (SAIRR 2008–09: 726).
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