governor of Madras, that Mornington was not set on an immediate and unwarranted war, but after he reached Madras he worked hard to draw Clive into the war party. The governor was nicknamed ‘Puzzlestick’ by the Wellesleys, although Arthur wrote that ‘I doubt whether he is as dull as he appears, or as people think he is.’ Arthur found this sort of work uncongenial, and told Henry that he would consider becoming governor of Ceylon if there was no war. Then, gradually, Clive yielded to the pressure. Wellesley wrote to Henry that:
Now that he has begun to find out that he has no difficulty in transacting the business of the government, he improves daily, takes more upon himself, and will very shortly have less need for the opinions and abilities of those who have long done the business of the country.6
Clive’s senior civil servant, Josiah Webb, continued to oppose war, arguing that the British were less prepared for what would necessarily be a more extensive campaign than the one in which Lord Cornwallis had beaten Tipoo in 1790–92, but Wellesley argued that proper preparation would overcome many of the difficulties. Meanwhile, relations between Mornington and Tipoo worsened, with the governor-general writing sharply to the sultan that:
You cannot imagine me to be indifferent to the transactions which have passed between you and the enemies of my country; nor does it appear necessary, or proper, that I should any longer conceal from you the surprise and concern with which I perceived you disposed to involve yourself in all the ruinous consequences of a connexion, which threatens not only to subvert the foundations of friendship between you and the Company, but to introduce into the heart of your kingdom the principles of anarchy and confusion, to shake your own authority, to weaken the obedience of your subjects and to destroy the religion which you revere.7
Arthur’s own role in the war that now seemed almost inevitable was at first unclear. Detailed military preparations were in the hands of Colonel Henry Harvey Ashton of HM’s 12th Regiment and Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close of the Company’s service. The former was a few days senior to Wellesley, and was described by a subaltern as:
a great fox-hunter, a patron of the fancy, and a leading member of sporting circles. He had many good points about him; he was generous and brave, but he had a most inveterate disposition to quizzing, which involved him in many personal encounters, whereby he obtained the reputation of a professed duellist.8
Wellesley turned the 33rd over to his second-in-command, Major John Shee – not a wholly satisfactory arrangement, for in March the following year he wrote sharply to Shee that he had seen some of the regiment’s soldiers away from their battalion as it formed up, some of them without their muskets. Shee’s response was intemperate and offensive, and Wellesley warned him that he would show any similar letter to the commander-in-chief. However, he concluded that:
I have no intention whatever of doing anything which can have any effect unpleasant to your feelings, and that the best method of coming to such an understanding as we ought to live upon is, to inquire before you act in consequence of anything that passes. Of this you may be certain, that however my attention may be engaged by other objects, whenever I find it necessary I shall interfere in everything that concerns the 33rd.9
When Wellesley joined General Harris’s staff he was overshadowed by Ashton and Close. Then, in December 1798 Ashton was seriously wounded in a duel with his senior major. Wellesley rode from Madras to Arnee, in the army’s forward concentration area, to take command. Ashton lived long enough to give him his grey Arab charger Diomed: then, on 23 December 1798, he died. Wellesley, now in charge of the troops in the Arnee-Vellore-Arcot area set about the careful logistic preparation that was to become his hallmark. It is 250 hot and jungly miles from Madras to Mysore as the crow flies, and more on the primitive roads along which the army would have to travel. The force had both British and Indian units, and both relied heavily on purchasing food in local bazaars, which were soon exhausted by the unprecedented demand. Wellesley encouraged merchants to bring in goods from a wide area, and arranged for them to accompany the army when it moved, because it would be impossible for such a large force to live off the land. Contracts were agreed with ‘brinjarries’, described by Wellesley as ‘a class of carriers who gain a livelihood by transporting grain and other commodities from one part of the country to another. They attend armies, and trade nearly in the same manner as they do in common times of peace.’ They maintained their own bullock-trains, so that the army could be supplied with grain without the need to buy its own bullocks.
Lastly, when the army reached Seringapatam, the modern fortress close to Mysore, it would need heavy siege guns to batter the walls, and by early 1799, Wellesley had assembled two 24-pdrs, thirty 18-pdrs and eight long 9-pdrs, complete with 1,200 rounds per gun. Daily battalion drill was instituted, and Wellesley ensured that battalions were combined into brigades and gained experience of drilling together. There was even target practice with live ammunition.
Mornington arrived in Madras on 31 December 1798. He had originally hoped that General Sir Alured Clarke, commander-in-chief of all British troops in India, would command the expedition, but the situation in the north was unstable and so Clarke had been left in Calcutta. The honest and hardworking George Harris, commander-in-chief of the Madras army, was offered the command, but did not immediately take it. Modesty and lack of self-interest, combined with a recognition of the very real difficulties confronting the force, caused him to delay, but eventually he accepted because he considered it his duty to do so. Arthur Wellesley was no less aware of the difficulties, and on 2 January 1799, he told his brother Henry that the proposals made to Tipoo ought to be moderate, because he doubted if the war could be won in a single campaign, primarily because of the shortage of grain. He was somewhat more optimistic a week later, although he complained bitterly that he had been sent two Company’s officers to help, ‘one of them … so stupid that I can make no use of him, and the other such a rascal that half my occupation consists of watching him’.10
Although the governor-general was no soldier, he seriously considered accompanying the army, and got Henry to consult Arthur on the matter. Arthur firmly advised him against it:
It appears to me that your presence in the camp, instead of giving confidence to the General, would in fact deprive him of the command of the army … if I were in General Harris’s situation and you were to join the army, I should quit it.
In my opinion, he is at present awkwardly situated, and he will require all the powers which can be given him to keep in order the officers who will be in this army. Your presence will diminish his powers, at the same time that, as it is impossible you can know anything of military matters, your powers will not answer this purpose …11
Arthur’s loyalty to Harris was rewarded by particular praise for his ‘masterly arrangements in respect to supplies’. However, Harris told Arthur that he was reluctant to commend him publicly because ‘others would be displeased and jealous’, and Arthur himself admitted that, because of his relationship with the governor-general, others in the army thought him ‘very little better than a spy’.12
The governor-general took his brother’s wise advice, and remained in Madras whence, on 3 February 1799 he ordered an advance into Tipoo’s territory, with Harris moving up from the east with more than 20,000 troops, 4,300 of them European, while a smaller force from the Bombay army under Lieutenant General James Stuart advanced eastwards from the Malabar coast. Harris reached Amboor on 18 February, and was joined there by a contingent of the Nizam of Hyderabad’s army. There were four Hyderabad infantry battalions under Captain John Malcolm, with a mixture of British and Indian officers,
