2.3.5 References to Dominant National Identity Narratives
To reiterate, studies of social and political psychology (recognition, justice and status research) have shown that acknowledgment and verification of an actor’s distinctive identities, reflected in an external interaction partner’s [55] behavior, determine whether that conduct is regarded as respectful or not76. As the PRC has been, and perhaps still is, facing a critical period of national identity-formation77 (chapter 4.1), it is argued that in such a period collective actors are particularly dependent on external respect through confirmation of their self-defined identity78, not least as it serves as some kind of reassurance of its own significance (Ringmar, 1996, 2002). In anticipation of the results of the qualitative content analysis (QCA), four national identity79 narratives appear to dominate Chinese foreign policy discourses in general:
- China, the exceptional country (achievements, merits, culture, history),
- China, the victim (of foreign intervention and oppression),
- China, the harmonious country,
- China, pursuing the Chinese Dream.
These narratives all relate to respect concerns in one way or another. For instance, comments by Chinese scholars stressing China’s exceptionalism can, depending on the context, be interpreted as respect expectations. Accordingly, conduct perceived as violating China’s self-defined identity (or significant parts thereof) is regarded as a disrespect experience80. Furthermore, reconciling with the upcoming indicator (emotional critique), such perceived misrecognition is likely to arouse negative emotions such as anger, contempt, aggression and frustration (Lindemann, 2010; Ringmar, 1996; Taylor, 1991). For instance, a sense of victimhood is likely to be associated with a feeling of injustice and frustration capable of negatively affecting China’s status and self-worth. In this vein, conduct regarded as an attempt to slow down or halt China’s rise is a possible example of such inadequacy81. Moreover, a sense of [56] victimhood usually demonstrates that other parts of Chinese identity narratives, such as harmonious country and the Chinese Dream, are neglected or misinterpreted at the same time. In addition, ‘impression management’82 by Chinese FPTTs, for instance, manifested by a constant and strong emphasis on China’s benign intent and its positive image, may signal identity misrecognition as well. In total, this fourth respect indicator seeks to scrutinize frequent identity references and the context in which they occur in order to spot underlying disrespect experiences.
2.3.6 Emotional Critique
Closely related to each of the previous indicators, emotional complaints about the way China feels treated by external actors constitute the fifth respect indicator. Such complaints may differ in degree, ranging from an uncommon wording, given the usually rather pragmatic and diplomatic language adopted in official publications in China, up to fully-fledged outrage and “unproportionate critique” (Wolf, 2008, p. 21). As negative emotions are especially associated with the non-material and non-instrumental dimension of disrespect (disrespect as a sentiment) and are not just mere side-effects83 of disrespect experiences but a possible cause thereof,84 they are devoted an independent indicator. For the sake of this project, emotional complaints are expected to particularly take the shape of anger and frustration, hence affecting the way in which external conduct is perceived. For instance, if anger (let alone resentment) is prevalent, an actor’s threshold determining whether certain conduct is disrespectful or not is expected to be lower than in the absence of such emotions (Dodge et al., 1990; Graham & Hudley, 1994). In total, indicator four is concerned with emotions (limited to the input dimension) aroused by (or preceding) external conduct in the SCS. Its main focus will be placed on emotional critique in reaction to the presumed external misrecognition of China’s status and identity. That said, emotions shall be captured and recognized, on the one hand, by tracing emotional terms and terminology (e.g. aggression, affront, provocation) adopted including strong criticism voiced. On the other hand, the discursive context in which those terms and representations are spotted is to be taken into consideration as well. Moreover, the level of anger and frustration is assumed to be negatively affected if any external conduct is regarded as deliberate or hazarding the consequences, directed against oneself, lacking an excuse or justification, involving third parties, or gaining public attention (Miller, 2001).
[57] 2.3.7 Reliance on Minor Issues
In addition, a close look at China’s perception of decision-making processes and international negotiations is another approach to gauge the role of (dis)respect. Negative emotions resulting from disrespect experiences may incline actors to propose (or in the case of states: pursue) fast and hasty measures, largely ignoring possible costs and other negative (material) consequences implied (Rosen, 2005). For instance, policy recommendations (cf. Hypothesis III) suggesting fierce policy measures even though a more cooperative approach would be less costly and would bring about fewer disadvantages may point to the relevance of respect. Likewise, cases in which Chinese policy actors are “forcefully expressing their national position, even though they are presuming that this may cause undesired diplomatic responses” (Wolf, 2008, p. 20) may also indicate that respect concerns are at stake. The same logic applies to circumstances under which Chinese policymakers made their position abundantly clear and were adamant about the latter, even though the issue at stake was a rather marginal one to which a more cautious (or no) response would incur less diplomatic, symbolic and political costs85 (cf. Schröder, 1994). Such circumstances, for instance, may be illustrated by international negotiations (on certain rights) that are actively being interrupted or suspended by China even though a continuation would appear to be much more to China’s advantage than struggling for such minor rights as a matter of principle.
Ultimately, if these six indicators described, or at least the majority of them, can be traced in FPTT discourses on the SCS in question, Hypothesis II, pertaining to the presence of respect dynamics and disrespect experiences, is considered to be confirmed.
[58] 2.4 Think Tanks as Research Subjects
In theory, a whole range of different methodological research subjects appears feasible to conduct the research project’s single case study research. For instance, it may be possible to examine any kinds of documents likely to contain discursive manifestations of disrespect and respect expectations such as political speeches by Chinese government officials, PRC strategy papers, media articles by the leading Chinese mouthpieces (such as Xinhua News Agency) and others. PRC documents naturally reflect official party/government line and position commonly adopting official public diplomacy wording86 and tend not to go into details regarding certain South China Sea policy issues but offer somewhat limited and rather pragmatic insights into different facets of ‘China’s political psyche’ with regard to face, respect needs and expectations. As mentioned previously, the project at hand scrutinizes expert or elite discourses by two of the most prestigious Chinese foreign policy think tanks (FPTTs)87 instead, the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS).
The reasons for examining elite think tank discourses are manifold. In general, scientific policy advice and political counseling play an ever-increasing role for national governments and political decision-makers around the globe (Jasanoff, 2009; Wilsdon & Doubleday, 2013). As a result, the significance of think tanks in (particularly U.S.) foreign policy-making has received considerable academic attention during the last two decades (Abelson, 2006; Higgot & Stone, 1994; Parmar, 2004; Stone & Denham, 2004). It is agreed that roles, objectives and ultimately influence of a given think tank depend on its specific structure and the context it operates in (Glynn et al., 2002; Stilgoe et al., 2014). For instance, a think tank may constitute an independent institution (financially and/or by structure) or can be affiliated
