therein. The Chinese perspective is vital for several reasons. First, the PRC represents the most influential SCS-claimant party. Its behavior and attitude directly and significantly determine the future of regional order and the SCS dispute at large. Any measure by the PRC in the SCS, no matter whether based on a misperception or deliberate action, is capable of exacerbating the dispute. The same holds true for other SCS stakeholders’ interpretation of Chinese gestures or measures in the SCS region. At the same time, Chinese conduct can easily cause spillover effects from the regional to the international level at any time, not least due to external actors’ profound stakes in the SCS, but also its vast significance for global trade, its strategic and geopolitical value, as well as its relevance for questions of international (legal) order and, arguably, international prestige and respect. Second, given the traditionally prevalent role of face and respect in Chinese culture (chapter 2.1.3), the focus on Chinese discourses is expected to represent a somewhat prototypical13 and likely case of the role of respect dynamics. Third, essentially motivated by the objectives of regional stability and conflict management, this [21] project intends to demonstrate as to why it is not feasible for scholars, experts and politicians alike, to blindly join the prominent ‘China threat’ and ‘new assertiveness/revisionism (cf. Friedberg, 2012; Lind, 2017; Mearsheimer, 2010; Thayer, 2010; Yahuda, 2013) discourses, thereby largely neglecting Beijing’s psychological motives, viewpoints and cognitive needs. That said, the decision in favor of the Chinese perspective also serves the purpose of addressing the still present (Western) bias regarding Chinese foreign policy in general, and China’s stance on the South China Sea particular. Fourth, this very case study is pursued to demonstrate that preliminary research, frequently adopting traditional international relations (IR) perspectives and analytical variables such as security and (relative) power interests, is too limited in terms of its explanatory power with regard to China’s modified SCS policy in specific and prospects of effective SCS conflict management at large. This equally applies to research employing economic variables such as economic interdependence, economic gains or economic diplomacy. They, too, are neither capable of providing a comprehensive account of the rapid increase in tensions in the SCS as of 2009 and particularly 2012, nor of potential variances in Chinese assessment of other SCS stakeholders’ attitudes and conduct vis-à- vis itself over time. Moreover, major schools of thought focusing on the aforementioned variables widely regard state behavior to be rational14, an assumption not shared by this book. Instead, seeking to overcome the rational-irrational dichotomy in IR research, it maintains that disrespect may fuel emotions15 and other psychological effects, which in turn lead to less rational preferences and responses that are not the result of any rational calculation. Hence, simply imposing traditional, Western-style international relations theory concepts and interpretations on China is not sufficient to provide a fully-fledged picture of Chinese viewpoints and causes of action:
“[B]ecause China, like any other power, big or small, is not alone in the world, there is a reciprocal influence that external powers and strategic thinkers will inevitably exert in setting [22] China’s path. This is yet another reason why gaining insider knowledge of the current Chinese strategic debate is of the utmost importance” (Zhou Liqun, 2010, p. 5).
Therefore, the case study aims to demonstrate that cognitive variables considering Chinese psychological, self-evaluative motives and needs need to be taken into the equation in order to account for China’s assessment of the SCS dispute over time in a more comprehensive manner. In so doing, it intends to provide an additional, yet highly relevant elucidation of the Chinese past, present and future patterns of foreign policy behavior toward the SCS. In this vein, Chinese respect needs and expectations are deemed crucial as they are expected to affect Chinese foreign policy preference-shaping processes, especially toward a region such as Southeast Asia in which perception gaps are particularly severe (cf. Godement, 2014)16.
Furthermore, on an additional, less case-study-specific note, the alternate approach of this book with its embrace of cognitive variables is meant to supplement the present tableu of foreign policy analysis (FPA) in general17. Likewise, the project at hand is inspired by the author’s conviction that more attention shall be paid to the general existence and implications of gaps in perception and recognition among various SCS stakeholders, on the one hand, and to the peculiarities of China’s respect sensitivities with regard to its counterparts’ conduct in the SCS, on the other hand. This conviction very much derives from the assumption, drawing from preliminary studies of recognition, justice, status, prestige, emotions and similar concepts, that an actor’s perception of inadequate recognition of its needs, ideas, values, status and the like has adverse effects on its propensity to engage in cooperation, even more, if such non-recognition is deemed as deliberative. This perspective is underpinned by Crawford who strongly accentuates the significance of emotions:
“[I]t is no wonder that postconflict peacebuilding efforts too frequently fail and wars reerupt because peace settlements and peacebuilding policies play with emotional fire are that practitioners scarcely understand but nevertheless seek to manipulate. Systematic analysis of emotion may have important implications for international relations theory and the practices of diplomacy, negotiation, and postconflict peacebuilding“ (Crawford, 2000, p. 116).
Applied to the SCS dispute, such inadequate recognition may lead, on the political level, to suboptimal policy choices with destabilizing consequences on regional stability, thereby rendering confidence-building and conflict management in the SCS even less viable; in addition, on a more analytical level, it forestalls a fully-fledged account of China’s SCS policy. Hence, in the event that this analysis is indeed to confirm such correlations between respect dynamics and foreign policy preferences in the case of the PRC, this alternate cognitive variable should no longer be neglected by international scholars and diplomats alike if a comprehensive picture of the development of the PRC’s SCS policy and possible avenues for future and long-term stability in the SCS are seriously desired.
The consecutive chapter introduces the theoretical framework, thereby establishing a working definition of respect and specifying its operationalization.
[23] 2. Analytical and Theoretical Framework
The research project at hand pursues a theoretical perspective closely related to political psychology and social constructivism. Commonly distinguishing between material and social reality, constructivism regards language and communication as crucial in terms of portraying, defining and modifying material reality. In this vein, material reality is socially constructed through communication and interaction (social reality) and is reflected in and shaped by language. That said, the subjective perception of social reality constitutes both the key assumption of constructivist thought and the starting point of this research project.
Against this background, respect and disrespect dynamics manifested in Chinese elite discourses pertaining to the SCS dispute constitute this project’s independent variable. The adopted approach builds upon the presumption that [24] any neglect of China’s social reality, including its self-evaluative respect needs and related preferences and self-evaluative motives, is problematic. Instead, a solid understanding of the PRC’s social reality and insights into its cognition and judgment of external behavior is indispensable for a robust understanding of China’s general order of preferences vis-à-vis the South China Sea dispute, now and in the future to come.
2.1 A Conceptualization of Respect
“A nation’s reputation is clearly very important, just as important as its economic or military power” (Pang, as cited in Shirk, 2008, p. 107).
The analysis at hand seeks to address the aforementioned empirical and theoretical blind spot by rendering some pioneering work, including a method-guided and extensive identification and critical qualification of respect dynamics in Chinese elite discourses on the South China Sea dispute. This section first provides a rough conceptual approximation to individual and national respect, thereby also introducing related cognitive
