also provided an inexpensive vehicle for speculation. CDS can be written against any security; CDS on mortgage-backed securities played an important role in the expansion of market-based credit before the crisis of 2008.
Elements of the market-based credit system had been tested, in particular during the 1970 crisis in the commercial paper markets, and the 1982 crisis in the repo market, but in retrospect these were little more than bumps in the road. Repo, commercial paper, securitization, and credit-default swap markets grew significantly over the subsequent decades, and became closely connected to the boom in residential construction and mortgage finance. In general, despite the anxieties of some, the US financial system seemed, in the early 2000s, more stable than at any time in the past, and the peaks and troughs of recessions had lessened, dubbed the “Great Moderation.”
The crisis unfolded in stages from early 2007 to its apex in September 2008. In the early stages of the crisis, payment problems associated with some of the most adventurous mortgages – the subprime segment of the market – began to emerge, casting doubts over the US real-estate market more broadly. Concerns simmered about the housing market, about the extent of market-based credit that had been extended on the basis of housing loans, and about the potential of losses in these markets to affect major financial institutions. Disruptions in funding markets were evident but the extent of the crisis was not yet widely known. Broadly speaking, owners of mortgage-backed securities were beginning to seek an exit from these positions, and securities dealers, as the proximate intermediaries supporting such business, accommodated this exit by purchasing the securities from those who wished to sell. The dislocation was evident in short-term interest rates, in particular in the cost of repo borrowing against Treasury collateral, which became very cheap relative to borrowing against mortgage-backed security collateral. Borrowing was still possible, but anxiety about financial stability was becoming widespread.
The Federal Reserve (the Fed) did not offer major interventions in the early stages of the crisis. In March 2008, however, the hastily arranged acquisition of investment bank Bear Stearns by its erstwhile competitor JPMorgan Chase marked a shift to a more acute period, and the central bank increased its efforts to support the financial system. Recognizing that the rise of securities-based finance meant that securities dealers were the key intermediary, evident in spiking borrowing costs and increasing dealer reliance on short-term borrowing, the Fed aimed to support a general exit from mortgage-related assets by easing dealer financing conditions. It offered a range of special credit facilities to shore up dealer finance directly or indirectly through dealers’ banks. Notably, the Fed deployed its own, pre-existing reserve of Treasury securities to fund these interventions, without expanding its balance sheet from its pre-crisis size of just under $1 trillion.
These interventions calmed markets for a time, but September 2008 brought a new wave of failures, bringing the crisis to its peak. The government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, instrumental in providing mortgage finance in the US, were placed in receivership on September 7; investment bank Lehman Brothers, heavily exposed to mortgage-backed and other securitized credit, declared bankruptcy on September 15; and insurance company American International Group (AIG), with extensive CDS business, declared bankruptcy the following day. Other institutions, large and small, in the US and internationally, seemed to be in jeopardy. Financial markets came to a halt. The Fed responded with a much more direct presence in the market-based credit system. It rapidly expanded its support to banks and dealers, expanding its balance sheet by $1.4 trillion by December 2008 (with a further $2 trillion to come by January 2015). The special liquidity programs were unwound over the course of 2009, as the central bank settled eventually on the absorption of much of the US mortgage market onto its own balance sheet. By expanding dealer finance, and then acting as a dealer itself, the Fed absorbed major parts of the global money markets onto its own balance sheet; it purchased a huge swath of the market-based credit system (Grad, Mehrling, and Neilson 2011; Mehrling 2010).
The interventions did resolve the acute phase of the crisis, though the wider repercussions were still severe. It is difficult to bracket the endpoint of the crisis – in the US, it led to a major recession. The pre-crisis unemployment rate was not seen again until 2017; the pre-crisis employment-to-population ratio remains distant as of this writing (2018). In Europe, the US events contributed to an extended crisis in sovereign debt, in turn shaking the foundations of the eurozone and the European Union. The contraction and financial disruptions were felt around the world. The populist and proto-fascist political movements that have come to prominence in 2008’s wake surely owe some of their rise to resentments stemming from the crisis and its aftermath.
The crisis prompted wide reflection on the excesses of the boom, on the appropriate scale of the financial system, and on the sustainability of capitalism itself; these reflections continue as 2008 is interpreted in light of what has followed. As a consequence, the work of Hyman Minsky, who argued that “stability is destabilizing,” has been seen as relevant once again: his books were republished, and a range of interpretations have been advanced. This book is more about Minsky’s work than it is about 2008, but my own education, and so my interpretation of Minsky, have been strongly shaped by the events described in this section. I shall return to Minsky’s role in current debates toward the end of the book; for now I turn to the main event.
Note
1 Citations showing a year without author refer to single-authored works by Minsky, e.g. (1954).
Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.
Текст предоставлен ООО «ЛитРес».
Прочитайте эту книгу целиком, купив полную легальную версию на ЛитРес.
Безопасно оплатить книгу можно банковской картой Visa, MasterCard, Maestro, со счета мобильного телефона, с платежного терминала, в салоне МТС или Связной, через PayPal, WebMoney, Яндекс.Деньги, QIWI Кошелек, бонусными картами или другим удобным Вам способом.
