Industrial and Medical Nuclear Accidents. Jean-Claude Amiard

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shutdown of reactor 2 at the Smolensk nuclear power plant (Russia). The same applies to the incident that occurred on April 10, 2003 in reactor no. 2 at the Paks nuclear power plant. This power plant is located in the central region of Hungary, 5 km from Paks and 100 km south of the capital Budapest, on the banks of the Danube. On that day, the reactor was shut down for its annual refueling, and the fuel elements were unloaded and stored temporarily in a cleaning tank located next to the fuel pool. Some of these underwater fuel assemblies were damaged and leaking. The incident initially classified as level 2 was reclassified as level 3 by the authorities because with fuel leaks, there was a risk of reaching the critical mass at the bottom of the cleaning tank.

      2.2.3.8. The Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters

      These two disasters, due to their magnitude and the richness of the literature on them, will be dealt with in two separate chapters (Chapters 3 and 4).

      2.2.4. Spent fuel reprocessing plants

      Spent fuel reprocessing plants routinely represent the most polluting step in the fuel cycle [AMI 13a]. These include significant releases of tritium and rare gases (krypton, xenon, etc.) to the atmosphere and many radionuclides to the freshwater and marine environments: fission and activation products as well as transuranics (plutonium, americium). Thus, the activity rates of 129I and the ratios 129I/127I in marine samples show the spatial and temporal influence of the La Hague site on its near environment as well as on a regional scale along the Channel coast [FRE 03].

      2.2.4.1. French accidents at La Hague

      Before the two most serious accidents, a first accident occurred in the La Hague fuel reprocessing plant on October 2 and 3, 1968. It resulted in an atmospheric release of 185.109 Bq of iodine 131 (Scheidhauer et al., 1971, in [AMI 80]).

       The breakage in the offshore discharge pipeline from the La Hague reprocessing plant

      The estimated date of this breakage was between early September and late November 1979. This resulted in an increase in radioactivity in the marine environment (seawater, sediments, algae, mollusks, crustaceans, fish) of many radionuclides (90Sr, 106Ru, 137Cs, 238Pu, 239Pu, 244Cm) between 1980 and 1981 [GRN 99, BAR 00]. For example, for 90Sr in 1979, 1980 and 1981 respectively, the concentrations in sediments were 122, 823 and 71 Bq.kg−1 wet weights and those in mollusks were 41, 274 and 24 Bq.kg−1 wet weights.

       The fire at silo 130 at the La Hague facility

      On January 6, 1981, a fire broke out in silo 130 of the La Hague plant, where waste from the reprocessing of spent fuel from the “natural uranium-natural graphite-gas” process was stored in the UP2-400 plant, causing cesium 137 to be released into the environment for several hours. It took more than 24 hours to control this fire [JAC 14].

      The last waste container was emptied into silo 130 on January 5, 1981 at 6:30 p.m. It mainly contained magnesium caps and uranium metal. Between recovery and disposal in silo 130, this waste remained dry for several days, but previously the last waste dumped was uranium from a water pit. The most plausible hypothesis is that this uranium, which is most likely present in the form of hydride (UH3) as a result of its prolonged contact with water, is highly pyrophoric, especially when it has been dry for several days, which was the case here.

      On January 6, 1981, at 4:00 a.m., air contamination was detected approximately 800 meters from silo 130 at the AT1 building. Cesium 137 was mainly present in these discharges, which directed research attention towards the silo.

      The resulting contamination inside the site on about one hectare affected building 130 overlooking the silo and outside areas. The maximum values recorded were 111.103 Bq. m-2 in cesium 137. Off-site, contamination remained low and did not exceed 3.7.102 Bq.m−2 in cesium 137 [JAC 14].

      Silo 130 now contains the same substances as those present at the time of the fire, as well as effluents from fire suppression (600 m3) and rainwater infiltration (800 m3). It will be necessary to dismantle this silo despite all the difficulties involved.

      2.2.4.2. Accident in Tokai-Mura

      The first nuclear accident at the Tokai-Mura reprocessing plant occurred on March 11, 1997 at the Dōnen (Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation) spent fuel reprocessing plant. A small explosion occurred during the night, exposing between 35 and 40 workers to unusual radiation doses.

      2.2.4.3. Incidents and accidents in Sellafield

      A first level 3 incident occurred in 1992 with the release of nitrated plutonium into a containment cell in the fuel reprocessing facility.

      On April 19, 2005, 83,000 liters of radioactive material were discovered in a reinforced concrete enclosure at this plant, which followed a pipeline rupture that had not been detected for several months. About 200 kg of plutonium in nitric acid solution had flowed along a tank and accumulated in a drip pan (large collection tank for flow fluids) with a risk of criticality accident. The investigation concluded that the uranium and plutonium had flowed for about 9 months on the ground and then into a sump. The British Safety Council (HSE/ND4) has published a 28-page report [HSE 05]. The company, prosecuted for non-compliance with three authorizations concerning “safety, mechanisms, devices and circuits”, “operating instructions” and “leaks and losses of radioactive materials or radioactive waste”, had to pay £500,000 in fines plus approximately £68,000 in procedural costs. About 19 tons of uranium and 160 kg of plutonium (out of 200 kg according to the IRSN [IRS 12a]) dissolved in nitric acid were recovered by pumping into the reservoir’s sump outside the plant. According to the IRSN ([IRS 12a]), these failures were caused by “excessive confidence in the plant design” and “an insufficient safety culture”. The accident was classified as a level 3 accident on the

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