Essentials of Supersonic Commercial Aircraft Conceptual Design. Egbert Torenbeek

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jetliner programs in order to develop a supersonic transport (SST) designed to travel at up to three times the speed of sound in the stratosphere. Its funding required direct government sponsorship, with a series of competitions, selecting Boeing as the airframe manufacturer and General Electric as the engine manufacturer. Due to a variety of economic, environmental, and political issues, the development of the Boeing 2707 prototype was discontinued in 1971, nine years behind schedule and 20% above design weights. In 1962 an Anglo‐French consortium consisting of the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) and Sud Aviation started the development of the Concorde. Almost concurrently the Soviets revealed that they were developing a supersonic transport in a manner conventional to their style, with the government assigning the project to Tupolev. Both aircraft (Figure 1.1) were designed to fly at approximately twice the speed of sound (Mach 2). The TU‐144 made its first flight in January 1969, was introduced into service in 1977 but suffered from excessive fuel consumption and severe operational difficulties. Since it was apparently unsafe and considered virtually useless, the first TU‐144 was withdrawn in June 1978 after 55 scheduled flights. Commercial transport at supersonic speeds was a reality from January 1976, when Concorde entered successful commercial service for 27 years with British Airways and Air France. It is therefore stunning that many “experts” have considered the Concorde a great technical achievement but an economic disaster.

      In 1956 the RAE and aircraft manufacturers established the Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee (STAC) with the intention of taking the lead in designing and producing SST. The STAC concluded that most operational advantages of supersonic long‐range flying were secured if the vehicle cruised at a speed near 2000 km h−1 (Mach 2), which would enable the airline to fly two transatlantic round trips per day. Moreover, at this speed the kinetic heating of the structure would allow the use of advanced light alloys instead of steel or titanium required for Mach 3. In 1960 Bristol Aircraft was awarded a contract for designing a supersonic commercial transport (SCT) for 130 passengers, which was completed in 1961.

      The aircraft, baptized “Concorde” produced by BAC and Aerospatiale, made its first flights in early 1969. A total of twenty aircraft were constructed, including two prototypes and two pre‐production models. Fourteen of the sixteen series‐produced aircraft served mainly on North Atlantic routes, split between British Airways and Air France. They carried their passengers cruising at speeds up to Mach 2 at 18,000 m altitude and thereby saved four of the typical seven hours trip time required by high‐subsonic jetliners. However, Concorde was developed just prior to the establishment of FAR 36 noise regulations and – with its afterburners operating during the take‐off – the aircraft required a noise rule waiver to allow its operation out of American airports. Moreover, the establishment of FAR 91 rules in 1973 prohibited sonic booms over inhabited areas, making flight at Mach 2 over these areas impossible. It was not until 1980 that Concorde reached the point where it could carry a full load of hundred passengers year‐round on the North Atlantic routes.

      The Concorde and Boeing SST programs were conceived at a time when fuel prices were coming down. However, supersonic cruise requires more energy per unit of payload and range, and both designs were known to be sensitive to the availability of fuel. Due to the oil crises in the 1970s and the subsequent increase in fuel price as well as the increasing concerns about the effects of supersonic flight on the environment, the interest in supersonic civil aviation decreased and Concorde remained the only SCT in regular airline use during the twentieth century. Scheduled flights were principally London–New York and Paris–New York and they attracted mostly high utilization. During the 27 years of their operational life a fleet of only twelve flying Concordes accumulated some 350,000 hours, most of the time flying at supersonic speed – more than all of the world's military aircraft together – and with high reliability. During the years of Concorde's operational life, it was generally concluded by British Airways and Air France that, despite its high maintenance costs, the technology generally satisfied or exceeded the expectations at the start of the project.

      In spite of its high cruise speed reducing the time to travel drastically, and the fact that it provided a safe and reliable Atlantic service from 1976, Concorde is sometimes portrayed as a folly and a failure, but this ignores the fact that the USA once viewed it as a threat to its aerospace leadership. The Concorde was a technological and systems integration marvel in its time – an achievement that since its emergence has never been surpassed. Its development, production, and service have enriched the knowledge of European technological cooperation. Apart from the excellent flying qualities demonstrated during its service, the Anglo‐French supersonic transport was the first international aerospace program that reshaped industrial and political

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