of the struggle between the executive and legislative and judiciary branches of government following the plague reflect how far neo-illiberal democracy had already proceeded down the road in each country; all the authoritarian way in Hungary, and half way in Israel. So far, in this early stage, in countries that had not been on the road to illiberalism and authoritarianism already before the plague, the plague increased the popularity of incumbents irrespective of their politics, but had few other apparent political effects.
Indian neo-illiberalism has been violent and involved militias of young men. Yet, it does not falsify Runciman’s thesis above because India is not as prosperous or old as the first-world countries who turned to neo-illiberalism. Though Hindu illiberalism turned into violence against Moslem Indians, that violence was not distinctly neo-illiberal or a new political phenomenon in India. Intercommunal and political violence in India has preceded illiberalism. Violence has been a feature of Indian majoritarian politics. The new neo-illiberal element is the retreat of the federal state from its secular liberalism that should have protected minorities from the state, though not from their neighbors.
The opposite Jacksonian interpretation gained credibility when the Reichstag failed to ignite, the storm troopers made it as far as Charlottesville Virginia, but failed to arrive in the cities, and life seemed to go on for many people who were not refugees, immigrants, or members of minorities but remained in their intact social and economic bubbles; though, as I write, the plague hits the cities and the social and economic bubbles are being punctured. Previously, some people were able to tell themselves that over the centuries, democracy resulted in many types of governments, some quite unsavory. Arguably, today’s neo-illiberal populism is unexceptional in comparison with previous populist episodes such as the presidency of Andrew Jackson, an uncouth representative of rural frontier America, who supported slavery and resented the urban, educated, wealthy parts of the country. Democracy in America and its liberal independent institutions survived Jackson. Donald Trump himself seems to encourage such an interpretation. He hung a portrait of Jackson in the Oval Office and paid a respectful visit to Jackson’s gravesite, though some of his statements indicated that he was not too familiar with the history of Jackson’s presidency and when he lived. Arguably, populism ebbs and flows, while democracy and liberal institutions persist. All democracies have some populist aspects. As long as populism does not dominate government policies, the system can contain it without becoming self-destructive. People do not die each time they indulge in an excessive piece of cake or smoke a cigar. At least not immediately.
Yet, though the current crisis has been fueled by populism, and the dramatic noises of populism drown the steady droning of neo-illiberalism, its substance is neo-illiberal democracy, the unprecedented systematic attempt to deconstruct the independent branches and institutions of the liberal state. Populist president Jackson was a lawyer and he knew better than to challenge the constitution, such as it was, allowing slavery. The most extreme challenge president Jackson posed to liberal institutions was in his struggle with the Bank of the United States (Signer 2009). A comparable contemporary liberal populist to Jackson is Trump’s first Attorney General, former Alabama senator Jeff Sessions, a populist xenophobe and likely racist, but also a liberal in respecting the constitution and the separation of powers. Trump, Orbán, Kaczyński, and so on, by contrast, are strictly illiberal. They have no respect for the rule of law and the institutions in charge of enforcing it.
The final Singaporean misinterpretation of neo-illiberal democracy is Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán’s deliberate misrepresentation of illiberal democracy as resembling Singapore’s government. Orbán attempted to confuse a prosperous technocratic liberal authoritarianism with its diametrical opposite, populist neo-illiberal democracy. Using the dialectical trope of totalitarian rhetoric, the identification between opposites, Orbán attempted to associate his regime with the successful modernization and wealth of its political opposite. Singapore enjoys the rule of law and independent judiciary and government free of corruption, though with authoritarian limitations on political freedoms and the freedom of the press (Rajah 2012). It is rich and attracts immigrants. Hungary is the opposite. It is among the five poorest members of the European Union on a per capita basis, and its skilled and young workers try to move to more liberal countries.
Plan of the Book
The strategic plan of the book is to move from a general historically based comparative study of illiberal democracy to the current crisis of populist neo-illiberal democracy, its causes and scenarios for its future. The current predicament raises general questions about its historical evitability. Finally, on the basis of the previous chapters, I propose policy reforms that may preempt similar recurrences in the future, laying the foundations for new liberalism without nostalgia.
The next chapter, “Old Hemlock in Plastic Cups,” examines what neo-illiberal democracy is by comparing ancient and modern forms of absolutist democracy.
The third chapter, “All the Roads Lead to Caesarea,” examines the two types of path dependencies that have led to neo-illiberal democracy recently: Post-totalitarian technocratic to populist illiberalism, as it developed in Hungary and Poland; and the post-liberal populist illiberalism of established liberal democracies like the United States and Israel. I argue that neo-illiberal democracies are inherently unstable. They may result in a Caesarian transition to stable authoritarianism, or in a stable liberal restoration. Other scenarios are less probable.
The fourth chapter, “It Ain’t Necessarily So: The Historical Evitability of Neo-Illiberal Democracy,” examines the causes of neo-illiberalism. It argues for two mutually reinforcing large linear causes, atavistic misinterpretation of economic crises as evolutionary extinction events, and the blocking of social mobility. Numerous additional small non-linear causes were necessary for the apparent wave of populist neo-illiberal democracy. Therefore, this wave was evitable. It could have easily been otherwise and it may be reversed for similarly minute and non-linear causes.
The final chapter, “New Liberalism without Nostalgia,” proposes policy prescriptions. It is divided into three parts: first I propose measures for the preemption of populism; then, I suggest how to remove barriers to social mobility; finally, I suggest measures to strengthen liberal institutions. My policy recommendations are mostly “blue sky” or “loonshots,” and decidedly non-nostalgic. Unlike many political programs, I do not advocate a return to any “golden age.” I do not think the past was as great as nostalgia paints it, and I do not think it can be restored. Instead, I advocate the opposite of neo-illiberal democracy, new-liberal democracy. I outline what new liberalism may mean for the contemporary irreversibly globalized world, marked by syncretism more than universalism.
Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.
Текст предоставлен ООО «ЛитРес».
Прочитайте эту книгу целиком, купив полную легальную версию на ЛитРес.
Безопасно оплатить книгу можно банковской картой Visa, MasterCard, Maestro, со счета мобильного телефона, с платежного терминала, в салоне МТС или Связной, через PayPal, WebMoney, Яндекс.Деньги, QIWI Кошелек, бонусными картами или другим удобным Вам способом.
