leaders stood out, even in their absence. These leaders oversaw the processes of change, and their behavior decisively informed the crises that these countries experienced and are experiencing. As we have mentioned, the Chilean case was exceptional in that it combined the application of a relatively heterodox model of neoliberalism with political reforms overseen by the Concertación. Nevertheless, the parties involved in the Concertación dealt with clientelist practices every day.
Neoliberalism was associated with meager economic outcomes, with increases in social inequality, and especially with rising levels of poverty. Thus the result of neoliberal policies was a severe crisis of legitimacy for neoliberal institutions and political projects. Neo-developmentalist projects were more porous and variable than neoliberal ones. Notably, these projects resulted from looking back and reflecting on past national popular movements, especially those led by the first generation of populist social and political leaders after the Mexican Revolution. The ghosts of Emiliano Zapata, Juan Lechín, Juan Perón, Getúlio Vargas, Fidel Castro, and even indigenous leaders like Túpac Katari, among others, presided over the construction of charismatic neo-developmentalist forms of leadership.
It is worth mentioning some key points of reference in this context. On the one hand, a critical social vision emerged, one that was dissenting but widespread and that expressed dissatisfaction with increases in social inequality. For example, in 2010 only 21 percent of Latin Americans considered the distribution of wealth in the region fair (Latinobarómetro, 2010: 19). On the other hand, we can easily recognize these movements as continuous with a long history of popular demands that the state play a leading role in the economy and in society, that it promote both social integration and the creation of jobs and social benefits, including the expansion of access to the systems of consumption that characterize societies centered on information and communication.
The rates of support for statism by country, calculated by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (see figure 1.2), reflect average levels of citizens’ support for a state that plays a leading role in four economic areas: ownership of the most important industries, social welfare protections, job creation, and the reduction of inequality. The conclusion is clear: the demand that the state play a fundamental role in the economy and society was prevalent. Similarly, in a study of social protest in 17 Latin American countries, the state was found to be the main target in the majority of social conflicts in the region between 2009 and 2010 (Calderón, 2012). These data show the importance of the state for Latin Americans.
Figure 1.2: Average Levels of Support for Statism: Selected Latin American Countries, 2010
Paradoxically, it seems that one of the reasons for the demand that the state play such a key role is clearly related to the weakness of the state as it seeks to confront and resolve demands for social integration and development. But this demand also follows from a profound distrust of economic and political elites in virtually all Latin American countries.
In this context, para-institutional mechanisms come to the fore, with their ability to mediate between society and the state, thus helping to enhance leaders’ charisma. Given the weakness of institutions, the relation between the state and social organizations becomes informal rather than formal, and it acquires clientelist and charismatic traits, which then inform everyday relationships and introduce anomalies into formal institutions, further enabling corruption. The availability of informal alternatives, caused by failed socioeconomic policies in the past, favors the emergence of a fertile but limited relationship between charismatic leaders and society. In this way, an inability to generate satisfactory living conditions for the people decisively contributes to the demand for, and the installation of, charismatic leaders with populist traits.
We can conclude that, in this context, these kinds of processes make the presence of charismatic domination possible. The leader’s identification with the people is a key feature in the phenomenon of Latin American charismatic politics. In his origins as well as his image and his dramatic and complicated trajectory, the leader must identify as one more member of the people in order to recast himself as a symbol of the people. In this way, an affective unity is created, one that is inseparable from the idea of “the people.” The leader is one with the people because he is part of the people; he himself is the people. He lives for, and can sacrifice himself for, the people. In this sense, the people are reified, materialized in the image of the leader. The process of political change is motivating, a reason for living. But charismatic reason, as Weber said, is an epiphany in and of itself.
In this sense, in order to understand neo-populist movements in Latin America, it is crucial to understand the relationship between charismatic leaders and society in the region. These movements arise when institutions are structurally weakened, when processes of social integration and national cohesion are limited, when public insecurity is widespread, and when citizens’ expectations are frustrated. But in addition to noting their commitment to social democracy, it is important to mention that none of these charismatic leaders disavowed or questioned electoral democracy either. The latter was, in fact, fundamental to their legitimacy.
On the other hand, today’s society of information and communication has transformed the kinds of action in which charismatic leaders engage. The new demands made by communities, like the new forms of action taken by leaders, are increasingly expressed through the internet and through the multiple forms of communication that tend to proliferate online. The leader is no longer on his own in the public square, but rather in a mediated public sphere, in multiple and diverse public spaces of communication.
It is worth mentioning that the crisis of neo-developmentalism is inseparable not only from national and global socioeconomic conditions, but also, more specifically, from the fate of charismatic leaders, from what they have experienced and are experiencing. They disappeared for various reasons (the deaths of Chávez and Néstor Kirchner, the electoral defeats of others like Correa or Lula, and illnesses, among others), and their disappearance affected the unfolding of neo-developmentalist processes. They are among the fundamental factors that explain the current crisis of these political orientations toward development and democracy (Calderón and Moreno, 2017 [2013]).
The Neo-Developmentalist Model and the New Globalization: China and the Global South
China’s rise to a prominent position in the new world economy created an enormous market for the kinds of exports that still characterize most Latin American economies: agricultural products, raw materials, and energy. The more China imports from and invests in Latin America and the rest of the Global South, the more it spurs economic growth in the Global South, which becomes an expanding market in its own right. Latin America took advantage of the boom in commodity prices linked to the explosion of demand from China, India, and other large markets; it modernized its primary sector, using new technologies of information and genetically modified agriculture as well as new business strategies. A new model arose, one that we have called informational extractivism. Although information technologies did not completely transform the productive system, they did transform the production of soy, the production of meat, the creation of energy and gas, and the mining of precious metals (like lithium in Chile, Argentina, and most recently Bolivia), raising both quality and productivity in a virtuous circle of economic growth. Nevertheless, the success of neo-developmentalism followed from two premises that were soon shown to be fragile: first, that global demand for commodities would continue to increase; and, second, that the prices of these commodities would remain high. Reclaiming its redistributive role through new policies, the state could avoid opposition thanks to the fact that society remained active, was increasingly informed, and significantly increased its participation in consumption.
The Crisis of Neo-Developmentalism
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