of “child neglect” (probably a state statute). For example, the state of Wisconsin defines child neglect as follows:
Any person who is responsible for a child’s welfare who, through his or her action or failure to take action, for reasons other than poverty, negligently fails to provide any of the following [necessary care, food, clothing, medical care, shelter, education, or protection from exposure to drugs], so as to seriously endanger the physical, mental, or emotional health of the child, is guilty of neglect. (Wisconsin Penal Code, 2005, §948.21[2])
If you are practicing in Wisconsin, respecting the parents’ autonomy may contribute to the death of their child, a Class D felony. A similar statute exists in the state of Idaho. It appears that in both states the most relevant principle is beneficence, in particular the beneficence of a child.
This family example shows the constructivist nature of ethical decision-making when viewing problems through principle ethics. The words and intent of the codes, together with relevant legislation, all carry various meanings. In such cases, the local interpretation of ethical principles significantly influences a family practitioner’s actions.
Freeman and Francis (2006) noted one significant problem with principle ethics: They have been given relevance and authority separate from and prior to their actual use in ethical decision-making. Autonomy, for example, is important in any given case, because autonomy is valued as a principled guide to action. In theory, it supersedes localized interpretations and applications of ethical standards. To be sure, principle ethics in some cases can remind family practitioners to be sensitive to diverse cultures when local interpretations and laws are not (e.g., in supporting the welfare of sexual and gender minority clients). In some cases, however, the principles themselves may not be culturally sensitive (e.g., autonomy in relation to non-Western cultures), and the practitioner is left to adapt them to fit the needs of the culture, thereby challenging the very foundation on which principle ethics is based (DuBois, 2004).
The family case we have presented highlights the potential impact of religion on the application of the ethical principles. Other cultural influences include race, ethnicity, nationality, age, gender, sexual and affectional orientation, ability and disability, and poverty. DuBois (2004) suggested that ethical principles may have universal relevance, but the focus should be on how the specific principles are enacted within a given culture. That is, the question is not whether autonomy is a relevant principle in Sri Lanka; rather, it is how Sri Lankans respect autonomy.
Virtue Ethics
Whereas principle ethics focuses on actions and choices based on predetermined values (Corey et al., 2019), virtue ethics focuses on the character traits of individuals or the profession (Kleist & White, 1997). Principle ethics asks, “What shall be done?” Virtue ethics asks, “What kind of person shall the family practitioner be?” What do you think? Is it possible that your ethical behavior as an emergent family counselor or therapist is more about personal moral being than a mere understanding and application of a set of ethical principles?
There are multiple positions on virtue ethics just as there are on principle ethics. Jordon and Meara (1990) defined virtue as “nurtured habits grown mature in the context of a formative community and a shared set of purposes and assumptions” (p. 110). Virtue in this sense is not innate: It is learned. Although principle ethics can be taught, it is not as easy to teach integrity, courage, and humility. And if these are important virtues to have, how does one measure them? Virtue ethics involves “making ethical judgments based on the development and implementation of professional virtues associated with [professional] practice” (Bitter, 2014, p. 524). Advocates of virtue ethics argue that family practitioners should not merely seek the safety of ethical behavior, as in principle ethics, but should aspire to an ethical ideal. At the beginning of this chapter, we considered some of the virtues that might serve as ethical ideals in couples and family practice. Not only must we be individually and collectively clear about those characteristics, we must also be mindful of the virtue ethics reflected in the families we serve (Gamino & Ritter, 2009). Cohen and Cohen (1999) and Vasquez (1996) have long argued for ethical decision-making based on principle ethics but grounded in a foundation of virtue ethics. For Vasquez, virtue ethics can facilitate multicultural practice in the same way that boundary setting enhances flexibility.
For example, you are seeing a Native American family in counseling at a local agency that offers free counseling for those families with limited means. You have successfully guided the family to a place at which they would like to terminate the counseling relationship. At your final session, the family presents you with a blan ket that they have made together. To them, the blanket represents a thank you for the services provided. Typically great caution is suggested in all professional codes when considering accepting a gift or bartering for therapeutic services. Vasquez (1996) would suggest that the virtue of respect may contribute to understanding that the blanket is offered as a cultural means of expressing appreciation. Emphasis on the character of the individual and the profession provided by virtue ethics adds a sense of personal responsibility to the more external guidelines of principle ethics.
That said, virtue ethics has plenty of detractors. Like principle ethics, virtue ethics can be challenged for their cultural relevance. Bersoff (1996) acknowledged the social construction and social embeddedness of virtues and community wisdom, the very foundation of a virtue ethics perspective. Think of the virtues that you hold dear. Where did they come from? Do you have any idea of the history of these virtues in your own cultures? The very nature of multiple cultures means that there will be diverse perspectives on what is defined as virtue and virtuous behavior.
The teachability of virtue ethics is an additional dilemma (Bersoff, 1996; Kitchener, 1996). Can the virtues of the helping professions be taught within a 2- or 3-year program? What about the nurtured habits that you developed within your family of origin? What if some values nurtured in you from the time you were an infant do not fit well with the virtues of the helping professions? Would you be willing to give up values you have held all your life and adopt the values supported by your profession? What would that mean for you within your own family life? If professionally congruent virtues cannot be taught and learned during a graduate program, those programs may have to adopt the difficult position of choosing candidates who already possess professionally desirable attributes and values (Bersoff, 1996). What are the problems that accompany this idea? The problems would be even more complex if members of a profession had to agree on a set of professional virtues and then create a means of assessing candidates during the interview process. Impossible, you say! Maybe, but some preparation programs are currently attempting to do exactly that.
Participatory Ethics
Another perspective on ethics is grounded in postmodern philosophy, thought, and sensibilities: It is called participatory ethics. Postmodernism is based on a multiplicity of realities and truths; it values people’s meaning-making processes as they create narratives of experience, and it examines dominant cultures that impede the self-agency of people who have only marginal participation in society. Feminism, social constructionism, and multiculturalism have all embraced this shift away from the modern to the postmodern. Participatory ethics invites families to be cocontributors to the ethical decision-making processes in family practice (Rave & Larsen, 1995). Postmodernists have critiqued family counseling and therapies based in modernist philosophy as attempts to colonize clients by viewing family practitioners as the keepers of knowledge and the people responsible for any decision related to counseling or therapy (see Hoffman, 1985). Participatory ethics seeks to include and value the knowledge brought to counseling or therapy by families. Client feedback on the processes of family practice is encouraged. That is, client input is valued as expert in relation to how individuals, couples, and families experience their own lives, and practitioner expertness is related to leadership of the therapeutic process.
For our family with the 14-year-old child, how might their
