The Nature of Conspiracy Theories. Michael Butter

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time. Although the debunking of such theories is not as popular on the internet as their formulation, it is by no means rare. And given the obviously problematic basic assumptions of conspiracist thinking in terms of its conception of humanity and history, it is often quite easy to do. The trouble is that the vast majority of diehard conspiracy theorists refuse to accept even conclusive counter-evidence. Instead, they ignore it, seek to invalidate it or even try to turn it into a proof of their suspicions, as I show in detail in the next chapter, which deals with the argumentation strategies of conspiracy theorists. The problem in this case is not, therefore, the theory itself, but the behaviour of those who believe in it.

      But even this behaviour is by no means so different from that of the proponents of many scientific theories. Inconsistent though it may be with the scientific ideal, in practice even serious academics sometimes have great difficulty in accepting the refutation of their ideas. They too can be positively irrational, clinging to their views even when they fly in the face of the facts. This phenomenon was demonstrated by Thomas Kuhn in the 1960s with reference to the great paradigm shifts in the history of Western science, but it also applies at a lower level, to scientific theories in the narrower sense. Many economists, for example, still hold fast to the notion that subjects behave entirely rationally – something psychologists claim to have disproved long ago. Similarly, social scientists operating along traditional Marxist lines persist in views that researchers subscribing to other schools of thought regard as obsolete. In these debates, each side accuses the other of mistaking reality, and since both parties reach their conclusions from very different positions, they are highly unlikely to be convinced by any argument proceeding from the theoretical foundation of the opposite point of view.

      What counts as refuted and what does not is thus – at least to a certain degree – also a matter of opinion. It depends on the underlying assumptions of the parties concerned, and here the divide between scientific disciplines is often as great as that between conspiracy theorists and non-conspiracy theorists. As far as the debate between the latter is concerned, we could say – drawing on Kuhn – that the opposing parties operate within different paradigms. What appears logical to one strikes the other as absurd, and vice versa. The problem with conspiracy theories is not, therefore, that they are wrongly described as theories. There are plenty of arguments in favour of such a description. What is problematic is the fact that these theories are based on assumptions regarding human agency and the dynamic of historical processes that are no longer shared by the modern sciences. This explains both the attraction and the stigma of conspiracy theories today.

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