international organizations also confront several shortcomings that may undermine their normative and functional potential. First, peacekeeping under the auspices of an international organization does not necessarily confer legitimacy on an operation. It also depends upon the organization, the historical context and the nature of the intervention itself. Second, the cost of accountability may be cumbersome decision-making processes and bureaucratic structures that are ill-suited to conducting and managing complex operations (Esman 1995: 43–7). Third, regional organizations vary considerably, not only in terms of their membership, purpose, bureaucratic structure and legitimating function but also in terms of their capabilities, role and moral standing (Acharya and Johnston 2007).
At this stage it is sufficient to note that regional arrangements have played a significant and growing role in the conduct of peace operations, especially in Europe and Africa. However, this has raised important issues concerning legitimacy, impartiality and capacity, as well as the nature of their relationship with the UN. The next section of this chapter focuses on the United Nations, which has been the single most important international organization in the realm of peace operations.
2.4 United Nations peace operations
This section provides an overview of the legal, bureaucratic and financial frameworks for authorizing and conducting UN-led peace operations. The historical evolution of UN peace operations and the doctrine underpinning them is discussed in part II of the book (chapters 3–5). The first point to note is that the UN Charter neither explicitly mentions ‘peacekeeping’ nor contains provisions for peace operations. This had three important effects on the development of peace operations. First, in practice, UN peace operations have developed as ad hoc responses to particular crises. Second, the key operational concepts, such as consent, impartiality and minimum use of force, were developed through practice. As a result, their meaning was often contested and interpreted differently in different missions and even by different national contingents. Third, member states have reinterpreted the Charter’s provisions over time.
The legal framework for UN peace operations
Despite not providing explicit guidance on peacekeeping, the UN Charter remains the key legal framework within which all peace operations – UN and non-UN – take place (for an excellent overview of the issues, see Gray 2018: chs 6–8). One of the UN’s central purposes is ‘to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace’ (Article 1(1)). This rationale is usually cited as the legal basis for peacekeeping. However, Article 2(4) of the Charter states that its ‘Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’, and Article 2(7) that the UN shall not ‘intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’ unless authorized as part of Chapter VII enforcement measures. Cognizant of these constraints, the specific measures available to the UN to maintain international peace and security are set out in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. As noted above, Chapter VIII sets out the UN’s relationship with regional arrangements.
Chapter VI deals with pacific measures that can be taken with the consent of the belligerents. According to Article 33(1), the pacific measures available to the UN include negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and resort to regional agencies or arrangements.
Chapter VII deals with enforcement measures. These were originally designed to facilitate collective security activities but are now also used to authorize the use of force by peacekeepers to pursue a variety of tasks. Articles 41 and 42 provide for forceful non-military and military responses respectively. The authorization of such enforcement measures requires the Security Council to identify a ‘threat to international peace and security’. Since the enlargement of the Security Council in 1965 from eleven to fifteen members, enforcement measures have required ‘an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members’, as set out in Article 27(3).
The Charter’s drafters left it to the Security Council itself to decide what would count as a threat to international peace and security. Over time, the Council has identified an increasing number of issues as constituting such threats. During the Cold War, for instance, a rebellion in Southern Rhodesia (1965) and South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme (1977) were pinpointed (Chesterman 2001: 130). It was the post-Cold War era, however, that witnessed a dramatic expansion in the Council’s understanding of threats. Arguably the landmark resolution in this regard was number 688: passed in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War (1991), this perceived the flow of Kurdish refugees beyond Iraq’s borders as a threat to the peace. Since then, the Council has identified a range of different threats, including state collapse (e.g. Resolution 794), the overthrow of a democratically elected government (e.g. Resolution 841), HIV/AIDS (e.g. Resolution 1308), international terrorism (e.g. Resolution 1373), nuclear proliferation (e.g. Resolution 1540), humanitarian suffering (e.g. Resolution 770), massive human rights abuse (e.g. Resolution 1199), the massacre of civilians (e.g. Resolution 1674), piracy (e.g. Resolution 2077) and Ebola (e.g. Resolution 2439).
Matters relating to international peace and security may be brought to the attention of the Security Council by three institutions: the Secretary-General, the General Assembly and individual members of the Security Council.
Under Article 99, ‘The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.’ Because it would make little political sense for any Secretary-General to invoke Article 99 without the support of the permanent members of the Security Council, its formal use has been limited to three occasions: over decolonization in the Congo (1960), in response to the Iranian hostage crisis (1979) and in relation to the armed conflict in Lebanon (1989). In 2017, António Guterres used his Article 99 prerogative to raise the situation in Myanmar with the Council, though he did not formally invoke the article. As part of his remit, the Secretary-General has appointed a variety of Special Representatives on such matters as internally displaced persons, sexual violence in armed conflict, children and armed conflict, and the prevention of genocide. Once the Council has become seized of a particular matter and a peace operation has been deployed, the Secretary-General continues to advise the Council by providing periodic reports about the missions. The Secretary-General also plays important roles in relation to peace operations by directing the UN Secretariat, most notably the Departments of Peace Operations and Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and commissioning strategic reviews of particular missions and independent panels of experts on general or relevant thematic issues (Chesterman 2007).
The General Assembly has always been able to play a role in matters of international peace and security by applying pressure on the Council to undertake peacekeeping operations (Petersen 2005). Indeed, the UN’s first peace mission, UNSCOB in Greece (1947–51), was authorized by the Assembly rather than the Security Council. In addition, under the Assembly’s ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’ passed in 1950, it is empowered to recommend collective measures whenever the Security Council is unable to reach a decision (see box 2.1). This resolution was originally passed to counter Soviet threats to veto further Security Council resolutions with regard to the ongoing war in Korea. To pass such a resolution there must be a two-thirds majority of the Assembly in favour. Although the ‘uniting for peace’ option has been used to facilitate UN action (on ten occasions), including to establish UNEF I during the Suez Crisis (1956) and ONUC in Congo (1960), it remained controversial because it brought the primacy of the Security Council into question. Indeed, as Edward Luck observed, not only has this procedure
