have some other vision of how a stable, secure, and just state can thrive without appeal to moral responsibility, you owe us the details. Waller, in The Injustice of Punishment (2018), makes a brave attempt to do that, but even he concedes that you cannot have such a society without punishment, as announced by the title of his Chapter 2: “The Unjust Necessity of Punishment.” Well, if punishment is a necessity, it isn’t a logical or physical necessity; it’s a necessity for a viable state in which as much justice as practically possible might be achieved. In what way would such a necessity be “unjust”? In the same way, it seems to me, that it is “unfair” that everyone can’t be above average – in beauty, strength, intelligence, whatever. Life is tough, but not ipso facto unjust, and we can use our reason to make life, and its institutions, more and more just, more and more fair, a better world for all.
Caruso: Thank you for clearing some things up for me. You say that my confusion over whether you reject retributivism “baffles” you, since you “have all along stressed the ‘forward-looking’ justification [you] have presented.” I guess my confusion stemmed from the fact that earlier in the conversation you said that rejecting retributivism “doesn’t mean there is no ‘backward-looking’ justification of punishment.” You then went on to defend what looked to be a backward-looking justification of blame and punishment grounded in desert. If, instead, you adopt a forward-looking consequentialist account of punishment, then I’m happy to retract my earlier charge that you are a retributivist in all but name. That said, by adopting a forward-looking consequentialist justification, your view comes much closer to that of the skeptic. The main difference, it seems, is that you want to retain the language of desert while the skeptic wants to consign it to the flames – along with libertarian free will, retributivism, and the idea of being self-made men and women (all of which you reject as well).
You go on to say: “I cannot see how you can think we would be better off without a system of desert.” Well, for me, the notion of basic desert, which has been my target all along, is a pernicious one that does more harm than good. If that is not the sense of desert you have in mind, then so be it. But my claim is that basic-desert moral responsibility, and with it the notion of just deserts, is too often used to justify punitive excess in criminal justice, to encourage treating people in severe and demeaning ways, and to excuse and perpetuate social and economic inequalities. Consider, for example, punitiveness. Researchers have found that stronger belief in free will is correlated with increased punitiveness. They also found that weakening one’s belief in free will makes them less retributive in their attitudes about punishment (for details, see Shariff et al. 2013; Clark et al. 2014; Clark et al. 2018; Clark, Winegard, and Sharrif 2019; Nadelhoffer and Tocchetto 2013). These empirical findings concern me.
There are additional concerns as well. As I argue in Rejecting Retributivism (2021a), the social determinants of criminal behavior are broadly similar to the social determinants of health. In that work, and elsewhere, I advocate adopting a broad public-health approach for identifying and taking action on these shared social determinants. I focus on how social inequities and systemic injustices affect health outcomes and criminal behavior, how poverty affects brain development, how offenders often have pre-existing medical conditions (especially mental-health issues), how homelessness and education affects health and safety outcomes, how environmental health is important to both public health and safety, how involvement in the criminal justice system itself can lead to or worsen health and cognitive problems, and how a public-health approach can be successfully applied within the criminal justice system. I argue that, just as it is important to identify and take action on the social determinants of health if we want to improve health outcomes, it is equally important to identify and address the social determinants of criminal behavior. My fear is that the system of desert you want to preserve leads us to myopically focus on individual responsibility and ultimately prevents us from addressing the systemic causes of criminal behavior.
Consider, for example, the crazed reaction to the then US president Barack Obama’s claim that, “if you’ve got a [successful] business, you didn’t build that alone.” The Republicans were so incensed by this claim that they dedicated the second day of the 2012 Republican National Convention to the theme “We Built it!” Obama’s point, though, was simple, innocuous, and factually correct. To quote him directly: “If you’ve been successful, you didn’t get there on your own.” So, what’s so threatening about this? The answer, I believe, lies in the notion of just deserts. The system of desert keeps alive the belief that if you end up in poverty or prison, this is “just” because you deserve it. Likewise, if you end up succeeding in life, you and you alone are responsible for that success. This way of thinking keeps us locked in the system of blame and shame, and prevents us from addressing the systemic causes of poverty, wealth-inequality, racism, sexism, educational inequity and the like. My suggestion is that we move beyond this, and acknowledge that the lottery of life is not always fair, that luck does not average out in the long run, and that who we are and what we do is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control.
Finally, I do not agree that rejecting free will and basic-desert moral responsibility will “return humanity to Hobbes’s state of nature where life is nasty, brutish and short.” You write: “If you have some other vision of how a stable, secure, and just state can thrive without appeal to moral responsibility, you owe us the details.” First, let me reiterate that the kind of moral responsibility I reject is basic-desert moral responsibility. Of course, there are other conceptions of moral responsibility that are perfectly consistent with free will skepticism – such as Waller’s notion of take-charge responsibility, the attributability responsibility I referenced in the Einstein example, and Pereboom’s forward-looking notion of responsibility, which focuses on three non-desert-invoking desiderata: future protection, future reconciliation, and future moral formation. Second, I agree that I owe you and others an account of how to maintain a stable, secure, and just society without basic-desert moral responsibility. Fortunately, my good friend Derk Pereboom has already provided most of the details for such an account in his two books Living Without Free Will (2001) and Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014). And I have further developed a detailed account of how to address criminal behavior without basic-desert moral responsibility in Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice – it’s called the public health–quarantine model. While I wish we could debate the merits of it here, it unfortunately looks like we have run out of time. The details of my account, however, are readily available for anyone who is interested (see, e.g. Caruso 2016a, 2021; Pereboom and Caruso 2018). [Note to reader: We return to these issues, including a discussion of the public health–quarantine model, in our third exchange.]
Coda: On Determinism
Caruso: I would also like to explore further your thoughts on determinism, since thus far we’ve said very little about it. Determinism, as it’s traditionally understood, is the thesis that at any given time only one future is physically possible (van Inwagen 1983: 3). We can say that a world is governed by determinism if and only if, given the way things are at time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law (Hoefer 2016). Or put differently, it’s the thesis that facts about the remote past in conjunction with the laws of nature entail that there is only one unique future (McKenna and Pereboom 2016: 19). As a compatibilist, I assume you either accept the thesis of determinism or think it’s no threat to the kind of free will and moral responsibility under dispute.
Earlier, I wrote that, “the particular reasons that move us, along with the psychological predispositions, likes and dislikes, and other constitutive factors that make us who we are, themselves are ultimately the result of factors beyond our control.” In reply, you said, “So what?” You then added that what really matters is autonomy, self-control, and moral competency. Of course, this is the standard compatibilist move. Compatibilists maintain that what is of utmost importance is not the absence of causal determination, but that our actions are voluntary, free from constraint and compulsion, and caused in the appropriate way. Different compatibilist accounts spell out requirements for free will differently but widely endorsed views
