has been systematically and deliberately obstructed in Algeria since the historical break represented by colonialism. Deaths, disappearances, and the changing of names have made it impossible to determine who is who, whose child is whose, whose sibling is whose.
The advent of this disaffiliation led not only to the fragmentation of the social body by France and the War of Liberation. The internal wars that marked Algeria’s history during the War of Liberation and continued after it, reaching their height in the 1990s, compel us to ask what the model for such incessantly repeated killing among brothers might be, and what might account for this ongoing search for and repeated removal of the figure of the father. Lazali critically revisits Freud’s theory, developed in Totem and Taboo (she mentions James Jasper Atkinson’s competing theory as well), and she wonders why the removal of the father and founder of Algerian nationalism, Messali Hadj, and the killing of Ramdane Abane (a leader in the National Liberation Front [Front de Libération Nationale, or FLN]) in 1957 did not result in the formation of an alliance among brothers, but instead resulted in a bitter and fratricidal internal war that brutally pitted the FLN against Messali Hadj’s followers and FLN combatants against one another, leading to a series of killings and ousters throughout Algeria’s subsequent history.
In Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm (2015), Giorgio Agamben accounts for the development of civil wars by referring to a permanent and unresolvable tension between the oikos (the house, the family) and the polis, in which civil war functions as a threshold between politicized family relations and the polis redefined in familial terms. It would seem that in this case of conflict between “us” and “them,” at this threshold of difference and foreignness, a particular instance of what Agamben calls the irresolvable is at work. This is no longer the irresolvable tension between an “inside” (oikos) and an “outside” (polis), but rather a tension between a precolonial heterogeneity, excessively open to colonial invasion, and a reactive us whose formation required the suppression of even the most minimal divergence from the aim of constructing an illusory, unbreakable One.
As long as heterogeneity, otherness, and the foreign appear as threats, the social and subjective effects will be incalculable. This is not only because the Other will always be defined as an enemy, will always be regarded with suspicion, but also because, Lazali suggests, otherness instills psychic functioning, and thus the Other within is also experienced as a threat and as an obstacle. Lazali cites Albert Memmi, who argues, in perfect agreement with Fanon, that the task of subjective decolonization, the eradication of both the part of the self that is colonizing and the part that is colonized, is the tragic destiny of the colonized subject. Neither the colonizing nor the colonized part of the self belongs entirely to the self. This is a matter of a doubling at the level of identity that never produces mixing or confluence but instead leads to dissociation.
How, then, Lazali wonders, could we be the inheritors of what preceded our existence and what we cannot speak of, for reasons we do not know? Hogra (an insult, the humiliation that resulted from colonialism and crystallized its effects) is thus necessary as a signifier that gives shape to history. But it also fulfills an aiding and abetting function in that it persists, unaltered and unmodifiable, in the psychic life of future generations. Ultimately, Lazali asks, wasn’t this what colonialism sought to achieve? Wasn’t this the mental territory and the language of generational transmission that colonialism sought to occupy?
The customary tools of psychoanalysis are thwarted, since, in this regard, the subject of speech, even in the sense of repression, has not been constituted. What is at stake, then, is precisely the coming into being of the subject, the subject of a history not so much censored as erased, reduced to nothing, and yet inevitably existing. (Davoine and Gaudillière, 2004, p. 47)
Samir Toumi’s novel L’Effacement, which Lazali cites, was published in 2016. In it, Toumi, a young writer born six years after the end of the War of Liberation, gives an account of the impossibility of appropriating and of transforming the voids and erasures that, transmitted from one generation to another, remain inscribed as pure repetition outside the “interpreting apparatus” of the receiving subject.
Analyzing postcolonialism and the role of a particular form of Islamism in the eradication of the traces of the colonial, Lazali enters a symbolic world that is enormously complex, one in which language, religion, and politics mutually determine one another, in a superimposition that Lazali condenses in the name that she gives to this apparatus: the LRP. In this way, she analyzes the power of the apparatus to shape the psyche: Islamism’s religious morality becomes a substitute for politics in its regulation of what is permitted and what is forbidden, what is thinkable and what is unthinkable, such that the figure of the citizen blurs into the figure of the believer.
We know that language does not reflect but rather constitutes thought. As Lazali explains, the apparatus of the LRP operates at an intrapsychic level, such that it is not possible to distinguish, in analysands, between social and internal prohibitions. The analyst must approach the work of analysis mindful that the subject protects its most intimate thoughts from confiscation, in order to prevent them from appearing in free association. Religious morality and psychic censorship overlap such that it is not possible to determine whether subjects ultimately speak for themselves or are spoken by the community to which they belong.
In a lucid assessment, Lazali reveals a psychic alibi or displacement that replaces an “inner revolution” (the uprising that the subject stages against itself) with another, already completed, revolution: the War of Liberation. This subject’s only oppressor is the oppressor from whom it has already been freed.
The Argentine psychoanalyst Silvia Bleichmar3 (2009) distinguishes between two concepts that she also defines: the constitution of the psyche and the production of subjectivity. The former refers to the universals that contribute to psychic constitution (the unconscious, repression), and the latter names the historical processes that determine the constitution of the social subject. These latter processes are articulated with the processes of psychic constitution as well as with social, ideological, historical, and political variables. According to this description, the apparatus of the LRP would operate at the level of the production of subjectivity.
Every subject enters a narcissistic contract (Aulagnier, 2001)4 with the family group into which it is born, but especially with the social body that gives shelter to, and that constitutes by cathecting, its subjects. This contract will become a link in and guarantee of the generational chain as long as the subject bears a sense of filiation, belonging, or social continuity. The psychic constitution of the infans takes place in a socio-cultural space that transcends the space of the family and makes “foundational statements,” which constitute the infrastructure of the social group that shelters him or her. These statements can be mythic, scientific, or sacred. The discourse of the sacred especially locates the origin and end of the social body in one and the same place: the place of eternal truth.
[F]rom his coming into the world, the group cathects the infant as a future voice that will be asked to repeat the statements of a dead voice and thus guarantee the qualitative and quantitative permanence of a body that will continuously regenerate itself. (Aulagnier, 2001, p. 111; translation modified)
As I have already indicated, in Algeria’s history, the guarantee of continuity at the level of filiation is broken by colonialism and its aftermath, by the disappearances, the fragmentation of bodies, the changing of names, the assaults on tribal forms of belonging, and the persistence of disaffiliating practices implemented by the wielders of political power after the War of Liberation. I wonder, then, if the apparatus of the LRP might operate in the place of, might function as a substitute for, the chain of filiation as the apparatus that guarantees the subject’s narcissistic contract with the society to which it belongs, even while this apparatus conditions the rules governing the production of thought and the subject’s psychic life.
It was Piera Aulagnier (1984) who described
