are saturated with values. Whether acknowledged or not, there are social and political ramifications of all truth posits. For example, research that differentiates between male and female genders discriminates against gender fluid people; psychological research lends itself to an ideology of individualism; economic research emphasizes the importance of wealth; and the natural sciences themselves – lodged in the assumption of a material world – denigrate those whose lives are anchored by religious and spiritual beliefs. Within the scholarly world, such commentaries have played a major role, from early Marxist and feminist movements, to the work of Foucault (1979; 1980), and onward to include the critical voices of virtually every marginalized minority.
The second line of critique centers around language as representation. The positivist vision of science was largely committed to the view that language can function more or less like a picture or mirror to nature. With developments in semiotic theory in general and literary deconstruction in particular (Derrida, 1976), attention was variously drawn to the ways in which conventions of language precede all claims to knowledge. Whatever nature may be, its representation will inevitably be dominated by traditions of representation. For example, to describe the world in English language will demand the use of nouns. Regardless of the nature of the world, in relying on nouns the description will automatically segment the world into separate units (persons, places, or things). Or, to make a compelling description of events over time (for example, Darwinian theory, or an account of child development) will take the form of a narrative. Such proposals are also congenial with Wittgenstein's (1953) view of language as a social practice, with differing linguistic traditions reflecting different ways of life. Words are not maps or pictures of the world as it is, but ways of representing the world within particular communities. What we might commonly index as ‘a person’, might variously be described as a mammal, a living system, a father, a schizophrenic, or a sinner, depending on the language community from which one is drawing.
The third significant line of critique counters the philosophic claims to logical foundations of science with a social account of knowledge making. Of major importance here was the 1962 publication of Thomas Kuhn's The structure of scientific revolutions. Kuhn portrayed normal science as guided by paradigms – an array of assumptions and practices – shared by particular communities. What we view as progress in science, he proposed, is not the result of increasing accuracy in understanding of the world, but the product of shifting paradigms. In effect, we make progress not by ‘seeing better’ so much as ‘seeing differently’. This critique of foundational science was further buttressed by a welter of inquiries demonstrating the way in which what we take to be ‘facts’ are established through an elaborate and unsystematic process of social negotiation (see for example, Feyerabend, 1975; Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Historians added to the argument by illuminating how the very concepts of objectivity and truth have emerged and changed across cultures and times (Daston and Galison, 2010; Shapin, 1995).
Together these three lines of reasoning converge toward a view of knowledge as socially constructed. Knowledge making is understood then, as a social process invariably reflecting the values, assumptions, and ways of life of the time and culture. Or more generally, what we take to be true as opposed to false, objective as opposed to subjective, scientific as opposed to mythological, rational as opposed to irrational, moral as opposed to immoral is brought into being by communal activity. This does not at all eliminate the importance of truth claims, but invites cognizance of the time, place, and communities for whom they have value (or not). When flying across the country, it is wise to trust the knowledge of the community of engineers who designed the plane, and to vilify anyone who intentionally falsifies their account of the aircraft's safely. Constructionist ideas invite, then, our replacing of the traditional image of a universal, value-free knowledge, with an orientation of reflective pragmatism. What we should ask of various knowledge-making communities, is what they offer to the world and for whom these offerings are valuable or not. These themes will reverberate throughout this chapter and this Handbook.
Theory and the Provisioning of Practice
With the contours of a constructionist orientation in place, we return to the question of how to account for the enormous watershed in professional practices accompanying these dialogues. Here it is first helpful to consider some of the reasons why the practical contributions of positivist social science were so unremarkable. At the outset, the alliance of social science with positivist foundationalism, carried with it a range of restrictions. These included limits on the aims of inquiry, assumptions about the nature of the subject matter, the relationship between the observer and the observed, the acceptable forms of explanation, and methods of research. Such restrictions in what constitutes knowledge and its acquisition ultimately limited the potentials of the social sciences in terms of their offerings to society.
For example, the distinction between knowledge making and its application posed a major obstacle to practical innovation. On the one hand, this meant that the research community could proceed in generating and testing theories of sweeping scope, without regard to societal utility. Programs of experimentation, along with complex sampling and statistical procedures, were placed in the service of theories without obvious application. The challenge of application was left to outsiders, often viewed by the research community as parasitic. Thus, for social practitioners such as therapists, organizational leaders, social workers, human service workers, and so on, the academic community had little to offer. And too, should practitioners take the initiative in exploring the scientific offerings, they would frequently encounter an impenetrable thicket of ‘jargon’. They were not the intended audience. The hope that basic social science could contribute to flourishing societal practices began to fade.
The emergence of more practically focused social sciences – such as education, organizational behavior, and social work – did speak more directly to societal needs. However, inquiry in these domains was largely conducted within a positivist paradigm, and thus subject to positivist restrictions and assumptions. For example, one might propose a theory of organizational leadership, and proceed to generate data to support the claims. Counter-claims might soon appear, accompanied by relevant statistics. Conflicts would then ensue regarding the methodological purity of the various findings, the clarity and coherence of the conceptual claims, and so on. More research, more conceptual distinctions … and the route to application was occluded.
Let us turn, then, to the relationship between a constructionist orientation to knowledge and its generative relationship to societal practices. We focus in particular on five animating forces.
Liberation from Authority
Perhaps the chief incitement to innovation resulted from the constructionist challenge to authority. Whether it be philosophical foundations, rational structures, ethical principles, bodies of evidence, the demands of tradition, or divine inspiration, all claims to authority were thrust into question. An enormous literature began to emerge pointing out the socially constructed character of taken-for-granted realities, both in the natural and social sciences. One had reason to ask of any authoritative pronouncement, from whose standpoint, in what context, for what purposes, at what point in culture or time in history, and with what ideological political implications is this given? It wasn't that such claims should thus be dismissed, as indeed all counter-claims were equally without foundations. And for many purposes, one might well wish to sustain existing traditions. However, the removal of any fundamental grounds of legitimacy provided an open door to innovation. If existing traditions of understanding are limiting, oppressive, or contrary to favored values, how else could one proceed? Could one create practices that would realize one's valued goals?
In the social sciences, a pervasive sense of ‘what if …?’ thus became evident. New forms of pedagogy began to emerge, often emphasizing dialogue and collaboration as opposed to mastering the words of authoritative texts. The ideological and political implications of traditional texts were also thrown into question, thus paving the way for more varied, inclusive, and individualized curricula. Perhaps the most radical
