knowledge that determines the precise conditions for their appropriate use and the symbolic nuances that should be added to their interpretation.20
Symbolism is therefore exemplary, since its implicit forms are unintelligible by themselves and their study has always assumed the existence of underlying tacit knowledge. Common sense could then be understood, according to Pierre Bourdieu, as a type of collective knowledge with a practical character: in the midst of the dispute to classify reality – with the pretension to gain a monopoly over order and nomination - categories are established through the construction of representations; categories that are validated when they become widely accepted by means of a naturalization process of the dominant order and its relationships.21
A “cultural system”, as defined by Clifford Geertz,22 predisposes toward certain interpretations of reality and determined cultural behaviours, and establishes shared significances. Common sense is constituted through learning processes in childhood, through observation, experiences of the world, situations lived collectively in society, normative social precepts and through institutions and instituted performative practices of behaviour, practices, discourses, representations…, that is, performances of reality. Common sense also participates, as a good number of studies have already shown, in the construction of western knowledge, of the so called scientific knowledge.23
In The Imperfect Garden,24 Todorov splits the ways of thinking that arrived with what he calls the modern man from Enlightenment into four families: conservatives, scientificists, individualists and humanists. We are interested here in the scientificist family, adhered to a deterministic vision of the world, that increased during the 19th century, when three forms of causality and determinism consolidated: social and historical; biological, and psychic and individual;25 forms of thought that, although still part of our interpretative background, could be traced back to Greek philosophy and Christian religion. For them, willpower is void “because nature (or history) has decided everything for us”. “Omnipresent, causality is also the same everywhere: scientificism is a universalism” that recognizes the differences arising from the contingences of facts, since “… the inexorable concatenation of causes and effects can be known in an exhaustive manner, and modern science constitutes the real path of such knowledge… it opposes the passive acceptance of the world as it is”.26
That’s why this type of knowledge can conceive a better reality, adapted to our needs (progress):
[…] the one who has penetrated the secret of plants can produce new plants, more fertile and nutritive; the one who has understood natural selection can institute artificial selection. […] Knowledge of what exists leads to technique, which enables the fabrication of an improved existent.
[… But] what is a better animal or plant species? How to judge a landscape superior to another? By which criteria do we decide which political regime would be preferable to the existing one? […]. Scientificism consists, effectively, in founding, on top of what we believe to be the results of science, a form of ethics and politics. In other words, science, or what is perceived as such, stops being simple knowledge about the existing world to become a generator of values, in the same way as a religion; it can, therefore, guide political and moral actions.27
Its results are universal, valid for all, since they determine the “objective laws of the real” that can be put in place by its supporters to guide the world at their will. That is, extending Todorov’s reflections a bit more, what all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism have done all around the world to a certain extent since the Modern Age.
We have, then, a plurality of rationalities, logics, ways of thinking and living the world and the experience that includes all the other-rationalities unrecognized by a part of western university knowledge and systemized in a type of knowledge, that I would define as a diverse cognitive apparatus composed of parts of varied species, such as representations, practices, observations about the world, ways of acting and of know-how, discourses, institutions…, that come into play in particular cultures. That’s why these reflections become more pertinent today, when transnational population migrations confront us with a new encounter of worlds – an uneven encounter of knowledge and experiences of life and the world28 – just like in the early Modern Age, when, as today, there were misunderstandings, disagreements and fear towards the other-one.29
And it’s here where, as I see it, cultural analysis30 turns out to be productive for the study of knowledge and its production, beyond discussions of whether we should conduct an internalist or an externalist history of science, and of whether epistemology, philosophy, history or sociology are more convenient; a debate, I consider, we should have already left behind. German cultural critique, as we could name it, had already used this type of analysis to account for thought phenomena. It is sufficient to mention three relevant cases, situated at the transition from the 19th to the 20th century: Wilhelm Dilthey, Ernst Cassirer and Karl Mannheim. All three contributed to establishing the foundations of the forthcoming analysis of the then called Human Sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), for which Dilthey established epistemological principles, besides laying out important stepping stones for contemporary hermeneutics.31
We could say that reflections on culture have taken place within two great traditions that, although not unique, are the most outstanding and, more importantly, most sustained over time, and from which a large part of current studies are derived: the tradition of studies, history, philosophy and sociology of culture, and the German cultural critique (including the Volkskunde), which can be traced back to the18th century, and the so-called cultural and social anthropology, with all its derivatives.
As for the first tradition,32 it’s important to emphasize that the terms “cultural studies” and “cultural history”, “Volk” (people, folk, nation) and “popular”, as well as these perspectives, were already being used in the German academic field during the transition from the 18th to the 19th century by men as important as Johan Christoph Adelung, with his Versuch einer Geschichte der Kultur des Menschlichen Geschlechts (“Essay in a history of the culture of the human race”, Leipzig 1782);33 Johann Gottfried Eichhorn and his General History of Culture and Literature of the New Europe (1796-9),34, and of Johann Gottfried von Herder, Kant’s student, whose work lies at the foundation of modern culture studies. In this sense, his most important work was Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (“Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind”, Riga 1784-1791).
Adelung introduced the term “cultural history” to the German language; the term “culture” had been settling on during the 18th century, but only with Herder can it be said that the concept of culture has the implications that it has today. As Isaiah Berlin ascertained, Herder didn’t share the theory of progress; on the contrary, he thought about and emphasized diversity, particularity, and incomparability of cultures; he was against classifying people by race (and against the consequent racism it introduced), against colonialism and slavery. To this we must add the role he assigned to each culture’s own historicity, and the role of language, which granted each of them a unique
