beating and imprisoning the same peasants who had driven them from their estates only months before. The Germans saw the supply of raw materials from Ukraine as essential: ‘we are justified to use our troops there’ wrote Ludendorff, ‘it would be a mistake to do otherwise’.102 But many local men had returned from the front carrying arms, and the Germans had little understanding of the political forces at play. They lacked a clear policy and failed to exploit Ukraine’s resources effectively. The rivalry with the Austrians was an irritant, and even the German Foreign Office and the Supreme Army Command were unable to agree on policy matters.103 As late as September a German officer, Lt.-Col. Bach, wrote that ‘the bands of partisans [are] not political organisations, but only gangster bands, people too lazy to work’.104
In Ternovka, Makhno began to raid country estates, and the Austrians sent a punitive detachment, forcing Makhno to flee westwards towards the Dnepr, where he recruited some demobilised Ukrainians.105 He then set off back to Guliaipole to resume operations. The evidence for this period is sparse and, in Timoshchuk’s words, ‘of a romantic and legendary character’. These ‘terrorist actions of Makhno’ can be seen as ‘ordinary armed robberies’, which were reported as having been ‘decisively suppressed’ by the Warta and the military.106
Makhno’s return coincided with the arrival of various anarchist intellectuals who attached themselves to the movement and subtly changed its character. One outcome of anarchist emigration to Ukraine was the establishment in Khar’kov in autumn 1918 of the ‘Nabat’ Confederation of Anarchist Organisations.107 With a network of branches in Ukrainian cities, it was dominated by Volin (V. M. Eikhenbaum), Petr Arshinov and Aron Baron, and attempted to bring anarcho-syndicalists, anarchist-communists and individualists together, while simultaneously allowing them considerable autonomy.108 The newly-arrived comrades started telling Makhno how to conduct his affairs, arguing that an uprising was impractical and he should wait for Bolshevik help. But Makhno was afraid of losing the initiative if he delayed.109 He had recruited about 100 followers, but still lacked the strength to raid Guliaipole itself; he had already attempted unsuccessfully to blow up the Austrian headquarters.110
It was mid-September before he had built up sufficient military strength to move closer to Guliaipole. His campaign opened with a stroke of good fortune: on the way to Guliaipole he disarmed a troop of haidamaki, capturing horses, uniforms and weapons. Disguised, his men then came upon and routed a militia detachment.111 Guliaipole itself was garrisoned by Austrian troops and in a state of alert. The Austrians took brutal reprisals against anyone who helped the partisans, shooting some and exacting fines on others. The repression, together with Makhno’s growing popular reputation gained him more recruits, some with weapons. Eventually, he attacked the Austrian garrison with 400 fighters, capturing the post office and the railway station. It turned out that most of the Austrians were out on patrol at the time: nonetheless, the raid was a morale-booster.112
The makhnovtsy knew that they could not defend the town against Austrian regular troops and withdrew north-westwards when they heard that two troop trains were approaching. They gathered in a wooded area near Dibrovka (Velikaia Mikhailovka, also known as Bol’shaia Mikhailovka), where Makhno encountered Fedor Shchus’, a former petty officer in the Imperial Navy, now leading a small band.113 Shchus’ agreed to join forces,114 and later became a valued commander.115 Meetings were held to discuss the successes of Denikin’s Volunteer Army in the Kuban and the Caucasus: Makhno warned that this force might prove to be their most dangerous enemy.116 While the partisans met, the Austrians and haidamaki were preparing to attack. On 30 September they set up roadblocks around Dibrovka, isolating Makhno in the forest with a group of 30 men and a machine-gun. According to one account the Austrians had a battalion of about 500 men in the village, reinforced by 200 haidamaki and auxiliaries, with reinforcements on the way.117
The makhnovtsy attempted a surprise counter-attack. Some partisans approached the main square undetected, and Shchus’ led a machine-gun detachment to the far side of the town. The Austrians, surprised, allegedly fled in panic when the insurgents opened fire from both sides of the square – but archival sources indicate that they had already departed, and ‘the gang of the anarchist Makhno terrorised the population … engaging in battle with the Warta’. The booty was insignificant, just ‘the armament of a small Warta squad’.118 Nonetheless, it was at this point that Makhno earned the honorific Bat’ko,119 a moment that Golovanov argues acquired a ‘sacred meaning’ that is ‘undoubtedly a key to the whole mythology of Makhno’.120 While the historical status of the engagement at Dibrovka as a military operation against Austro-Hungarian units is therefore questionable, its symbolic importance as a personal victory for Makhno – who escaped the encirclement and gained the loyalty of his followers – remains undeniable.121
The German general staff were annoyed by the unrest, and the Commander-in-Chief in Kiev ordered that Makhno’s band should be eliminated.122 On 5 October the Austrians bombarded Dibrovka with artillery, wounding both Makhno and Shchus’ and forcing out both the insurgents and many residents. The remaining peasants were abandoned to the swift reprisals of the Austrians and the haidamaki, who burned their houses down. The next night, when the partisans were a day’s march away, they saw a glow in the sky from the blaze.123 Later, in what rapidly became a ‘devastating vendetta’, the makhnovtsy took revenge on the Mennonite colonists who had collaborated with the Germans and the Hetmanate. Later, monetary and other indemnities were imposed on them; horses, carts, food and weapons were seized for military purposes.124
By the autumn of 1918 the Central Powers were losing the war on the Western Front, and their grip on Ukraine loosened. In October the Austro-Hungarians left Guliaipole, and the insurgents marched in.125 Makhno’s power in the area now seemed secure, and he tested his strength by sending a message to the Hetmanate’s commander in Aleksandrovsk, demanding the immediate release of five Guliaipole prisoners, including his brother Ssava. The authorities refused, but assured Makhno that no harm would come to the prisoners.126
Makhno believed that an organised army was necessary to defend political gains, but as an anarchist, he also believed that no person had the right to command another. At an extraordinary conference held in late 1918 in Guliaipole he proposed a solution: the reorganisation of the various partisan bands as ‘federal’ units of a standing army with its headquarters in Guliaipole. Through such a reorganisation, and by maintaining a tight cohesion among the units and the staff, argued Makhno, the federal principle could be guaranteed, and they could organise effective common defence.127 He envisaged units of combined cavalry and tachanki that could cover large areas at speed. Some insurgents argued against these ideas, on the grounds that there were no professional commanders in the movement with the experience necessary to conduct operations on a large scale.128 The command staff consisted of Makhno himself as commander-in-chief, Viktor Belash as chief of staff and, additionally, a Bolshevik and a Left SR.129 Makhno began to conduct conventional operations and in late October led a raid to the right bank of the Dnepr, collecting large supplies of arms.
He established three fronts; at the railway junctions of Chaplino-Grishino to the north, from Tsarekonstantinovka to Pologi in Mariupol’ region, and at Orekhov in the Tauride. Pologi was an important railway junction between Chaplino and Berdiansk, connecting Aleksandrovsk and Ekaterinoslav to the Sea of Azov. The railways had continued to function, transporting troops and military cargo, as well as metal ores, coal and other commodities. From October onwards, the makhnovtsy began to raid the trains for booty. The departure of the Germans and Austrians created a surge of refugees, including former collaborators, along the lines of rail. One memoir tells of Makhno himself appearing at Pologi station in November:
The railway station was brightly illuminated, and soldiers paced up and down on patrol … Makhno himself was strolling about among the refugees and observing the crowd … people
