our course, the more difficult the task will be.
These truths are gaining acceptance across the American political spectrum. In May 2014, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates gave a commencement address at Georgetown. Gates said that the United States remains the country that the world looks to for advancement of the cause of freedom, liberty, and democracy. Yet, at a time of growing threats around the globe, we have degraded our defense capabilities severely. As Gates reminded his listeners, “soft” power means little without hard power to back it up. The Economist, always a fair and nuanced critic of the president, has made a similar point: “Credibility is about reassurance as well as the use of force. Credibility is also easily lost and hard to rebuild.” Arguing that Obama has been an “inattentive friend” to American allies, the magazine also invoked his Syrian retreat to underline that he had “broken the cardinal rule of superpower deterrence: You must keep your word.”80
Obama has often defended his approach by pointing to the growing isolationist sentiments of the American electorate. Polls do show such leanings, as they have for years, but the case for engagement remains compelling—and needs only a president who can make the public argument for it. Indeed, in an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll in which respondents voiced isolationist sentiments, 55 percent nonetheless agreed that it was important for the U.S. to project an “image of strength.”81 In our view, this suggests that isolationist sentiment is only skin-deep. We believe that, recent discouragements aside, most Americans still identify with assertion over accommodation—and with standing up for our principles, our values, and our broader interests.
This should not be confused with advocacy of endless war or of an overly intrusive United States. Rather, what we must do is offer credible deterrence again. As this book went to press, the Justice Department announced the indictment of five officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army for violations of cyber security. The charges are almost certainly symbolic—Beijing isn’t going to extradite these gentlemen to Washington for a trial—and more important, they are incomplete. We made no mention of going after government officials or Chinese businesses that enable and facilitate these hackers. However, at least the charges suggest accountability, recognition, and acknowledgment; all are essential if America is to grasp what it faces and begin fighting back.
In this book, we have outlined a bold and multifaceted set of initiatives the U.S. should implement if we are to begin restoring our place in the world as the bulwark of freedom, liberty, and democracy. Yet no matter how many good ideas are offered, strong leadership remains essential. The Obama administration has been hesitant, halting, and hamstrung.
This simply must change. Unless the United States rebuilds a robust defense, clearly asserts its interests and values, assures its allies, and offers unapologetic leadership, we will fail. And our failure will carry with it a huge price: the collapse of the post–World War II international architecture. To avoid such a scenario, the United States—still the world’s only “indispensable nation”—must reassume its rightful role as the world’s only superpower.
Superpowers, as Robert Kagan wrote recently, “Don’t get to retire.”82
Time is short, but it is not too late—yet.
“That is why the strategic partnership between us is of great importance on both a bilateral and global scale. [Russia-China relations are] the best in their centuries-long history. They are characterized by a high degree of mutual trust, respect for each other’s interests, support in vital issues. They are a true partnership.”
—VLADIMIR PUTIN1
It was a dramatic, even spellbinding, scene. A Russian honor guard stood at attention and martial music played as the jetliner taxied into Moscow’s Vnukovo Airport. As millions of Russians watched live on television or at their computers, seemingly every cameraman and print reporter in the country jostled for position—something like when the Beatles arrived at Idlewild Airport. And then, finally, the sighting: Xi Jinping, China’s new president, touched Russian soil for the first time.
The hype didn’t end at his arrival. Those millions of Russians continued to watch live as Xi went directly to the Grand Kremlin Palace, where, for the first time in memory, Russian cavalry units greeted a visiting dignitary. They watched as Russian president Vladimir Putin greeted Xi warmly. They watched as Xi’s glamorous wife, a renowned singer and actress, carried herself with poise and elegance. The day played out on television almost like a royal wedding. And in many ways, it was. The pomp reflected reality: China and Russia have increasingly become devoted to each other.
Like smitten newlyweds, the two leaders even parroted each other’s lines. “China will make developing relations with Russia a priority in its foreign-policy orientation,” Xi said before arriving in Moscow.2 Said Putin: “Russian-Chinese relations are a crucial factor of international politics. Our trade is growing, both countries are involved in large humanitarian projects, and all of that serves the interests of the Chinese and Russian people.”3
“The fact that I will visit Russia, our friendly neighbor, shortly after assuming presidency is a testimony to the great importance China places on its relations with Russia,” Xi told Chinese journalists before departing. “The two sides have had closer strategic coordination on the world stage.”4 Putin agreed: “The strategic partnership between us is of great importance on both a bilateral and global scale.” The Russian-Chinese partnership, Putin added, was “characterized by a high degree of mutual trust, respect for each other’s interests, support in vital issues.” It was “a true partnership,”5 and Russian-Chinese relations were “the best in their centuries-long history.”6 Xi spoke of the two nations as close friends who treat each other with “open souls.”7 He even expressed his love of Russian literature and culture.
What’s happening here? Russia and China, suspicious neighbors for centuries and fellow Communist antagonists during the Cold War, have been drawing closer and closer together because of a confluence of geostrategic, political, and economic interests. The overwhelming evidence suggests that an unprecedented partnership has developed.
The world is seeing the formalization and strengthening of a historic new alliance—a Russia-China Axis that presents the leading national-security threat to the United States in this young century, against which we seem almost willfully unprepared. Few appreciate the full nature of the threat; far fewer are even aware of it. Some who are, such as journalist Joshua Kurlantzick, see the Russia-China cooperation as part of an adverse trend for democratic governance, which is losing ground around the world to autocracy.8 But the significance of the Russia-China Axis is even broader.
Russia and China now cooperate and coordinate to an unprecedented degree—politically, militarily, economically—and their cooperation, almost without deviation, carries anti-American and anti-Western ramifications. Russia, China, and a constellation of satellite states seek to undermine American power, dislodge America from its leading position in the world, and establish a new, anti-Western global power structure. And both Russia in Eastern and Central Europe and China throughout Asia are becoming increasingly aggressive and assertive, even hegemonic, in the absence of a systematic U.S. response—notwithstanding the Obama administration’s “strategic pivot to Asia.” For now, the most obvious example of American impotence is the Russian repossession of Crimea in March 2014 and the seemingly inexorable preparation for further territorial claims in Ukraine. Here as elsewhere, Russia, with the quiet but clear backing of China, has called America’s—and the West’s—bluff, with little consequence.
In
