as the highest good, could be easily interpreted, as they later were by German writers of the historicist and German Idealist tradition, in terms of the subordination of the welfare of the greatest possible number of individuals to the historic destiny of the community.
In that case, could the limited state, advocated by Humboldt in the Limits of the State, actually be established? This raises the question whether man possesses meaningful choices in his political behavior or must act exclusively within the framework of historical institutions. In the final chapter of his book on the application of theory to reality, Humboldt deals with this question, and develops a theory of social change. Classical liberalism holds that society could be effectively changed by the application of theory to social reality. Without entirely discounting the role of ideas, Humboldt emphasizes the limitations of such an approach. Change could take place only within a concrete historical and social situation, he argues; hence the application of theories to societies is possible only within very narrow limits. Every situation (Lage) in which men find themselves has a definite inner structure or form that can not be transformed into any self-chosen one. Change is possible, however, but it requires a prior transformation of opinions and attitudes. One could, without disturbing the existing order of things, prepare for transformations by acting on the minds and characters of men and giving them a direction no longer in accord with the status quo. Any other approach would disturb the natural course of human development.21 and have disastrous consequences.
This stress upon the role of “pure theory” in legislation sharply distinguishes Humboldt from the historicist position of a Savigny. Despite his recognition of historical realities, Humboldt affirms:
that natural and general law is the only foundation of all positive law, and that one always has to come back to natural law, and that therefore—to cite a principle of law which serves as the source of all other principles of law—no one can ever in any way obtain a right through the energy or the ability of another person without that person’s consent.22
Humboldt’s affirmation that such a transcendent law exists signified, of course, his recognition that not all institutions function in accord with this transhistorical norm. This was already implied in the mere fact that Humboldt wrote a book on the theory of a nonexisting state. But did this recognition of a “natural and universal law” not stand in contradiction with Humboldt’s belief that the individual should be judged only by measures proper to him, and not by external abstract norms? Humboldt thus agrees with the French revolutionaries that the state must bring the “real condition of things” as close to the “right and true theory” as possible. But this “approximation” is possible only insofar as “true necessity” does not hinder its course. The possibility of change, however, rests on the assumption that “men (were) sufficiently receptive of that liberty which the theory (taught), and that this liberty could bring about those wholesome consequences which always accompanied liberty when there were no obstacles in its way.” But the “possibility” of applying the theory is always limited by “Necessity” (Nothwendigkeit). Doubtlessly keeping in mind the developments in France, Humboldt warns that to ignore “necessity” in effecting social reforms would lead to the destruction of the very values these reforms are intended to bring about.23
What is left of theory and of “universal, natural law” in view of the force of “necessity?” Apparently very little. The state “must always let its actions be determined by necessity.” This principle was not conceived in terms of historical determinism; rather, necessity was defined in terms of the “unique individuality” of men.24 Necessity, the respect for the uniqueness of the individual, determines the theoretical demand for the limited state. The recognition of the uniqueness and diversity of men forbids the state to undertake “positive” action to achieve “useful” ends, since what is useful to an individual is always subject to speculation and can not be determined from the outside. Necessity is thus in harmony with freedom. No “other principle [could] be reconcile [d] with respect for the individuality of independent beings and the concern for freedom which derive [d] from this respect.”25 Then what remains of theory, of “eternally immutable reason,” of the “natural, universal laws of nature” is merely the recognition of the total diversity of men. The theory of the state, confronted by the necessities of the real situation, hangs in mid-air as an abstraction, incapable of realization.
Humboldt is quite aware of all this. In describing the “theoretical principles” of political power, he proceeds from the “nature of man,” viewing man “in the form most characteristic of him,” not yet determined by any concrete relationships. “But man nowhere exists like that,”26 he adds. The implementations of the theory require a degree of maturity for freedom. “Albeit, this maturity is nowhere perfect and in my opinion will remain foreign to the sensual, extroverted individual.”27 Thus, Humboldt asks his readers to refrain from all comparisons with reality, “despite all the general observations of these pages.”28 As he wrote to Schiller: “This treatise has no relation to present-day circumstances.”29 This may explain in part why this classic of German liberalism was never published in its entirety during Humboldt’s lifetime, but appeared only in 1851, long after his death.30
2.
Humboldt’s defense of the liberal state in The Limits of the State, however, includes two basic assumptions which in their modified form are still reminiscent of classic liberal theory. Humboldt maintains that there is a “pure theory” of the state, one based upon the principle of “eternal reason” and thus opposed to the existing “positive” state. This holds true even if for him, in contrast to classic liberal thought, the chasm between the ideal and the existing state are unbridgeable. Moreover, he finds a human dignity common to all men. In his other writings, Humboldt carefully attempts to free himself from all abstract or universal principles and more closely approaches an organicist concept of society and history.
This had been already true of his critique of the new French Constitution which he had written in August 1791, a year before the Limits of the State?31 It had been a great error of the Constituent Assembly, he holds, to attempt to base a constitution upon “pure reason.” Only that could develop harmoniously in men or in the state as “a sum of active and passive human energies” which has its origin within and is not imposed from without. Constitutions can not be drafted on men as sprigs on trees. “Where time and nature have not done the spade work, one might as well bind blossoms with threads. The first noonday sun will wilt them.”32 He does not urge the wise legislator to work out the “pure theory” of the intended reform in detail, as he does in the Limits of the State, but asks him to free himself from abstract considerations, to determine the actual direction of change, and then modify this direction by degrees. While reforms are possible within narrow limits, human institutions are only to a very small extent the result of deliberate human action. Indeed, as he comments, “when we offer philosophic or political reason for political institutions, we will, in actuality, always find historical explanations.”33
In the fragment “On the law of the Development of Human Energies (1791),” Humboldt sets the limits of reason and abstract law even more narrowly. Even if we possess the key to the universe, “a rational truth that pointed to the necessity of a uniform law,” this knowledge gives us no real insight into the nature of things. For living Nature, in contrast to “lifeless,” physical nature, can be grasped only through an act of understanding, of intuitively experiencing its innermost character. Indeed “understanding” of the lifeless, physical world is not really possible. We can establish uniformities in its behavior, but these relate only to its external appearance, not to its inner essence, which we can grasp in others who are analogous to us in being alive. We can know living things only through the energies they express which reflect their particular individualities. The more we succeed in reducing phenomena to abstract concepts, the further we move away from the understanding of real living forces and of individual essences.35
In other essays
