Light. The true Light is the Word, which is God and has created all.”55
In the lectures which he delivered in 1831 on the “idea of Universal History,” Ranke developed his thoughts regarding the methods and intent of historiography. History as a science shares with philosophy the task to grasp “the core of Existence”; it resembles art in its manner of “reproducing life that has vanished.” It differs from art in referring to a “real” rather than an “ideal,” to a subject matter which requires an empirical approach. Historical thinking requires elements of both philosophical and artistic thought directed toward a “real” subject matter.56
The most significant difference between philosophy and history is in approach. The philosopher approaches reality from the perspective of general concepts. He attempts to subsume all of life under a “unifying concept” (Eiriheitsbegriff), to schematize life and history. The historian proceeds from the “condition of existence” (Bedingung der Existenz).57 For the philosopher the individual matters only as a part of the whole; for the historian the individual is of interest. Both sciences have disputed the sole truth of their approach. The historians have questioned the possibility of nonhistorical truth. They have considered philosophical cognition to be timebound.
(History) does not want to recognize philosophy as something Absolute (Unbedingt) but only as an appearance in time. History assumes that the history of philosophy is the most exact form of philosophy; that absolute truth cognizable by mankind is found in the theories which appear in various ages, no matter how contradictory these theories may be. History goes one step further and assumes that philosophy, especially when it attempts to define doctrines is merely the expression in linguistic form of national cognition (nazionalen Erkenntnis). The historian denies that philosophy has any absolute validity.58
Ranke is quite aware of the radically relativistic possibilities inherent here in the historical approach. But he does not draw radically relativistic conclusions. As he writes: “When the philosopher regards history from the perspective of his field, he looks for the infinite only in progress, development and totality. The historian, on the other hand, finds an infinity in every existence, an eternal element coming from God in every being, and this eternal element is its principle of life. For this reason,” Ranke notes, “the historian inclines to turn to the individual. He makes the particular interest count. He recognizes the beneficient and enduring. He opposes disintegrating change. He acknowledges a portion of truth even in error.”
But can we be convinced that existence really has a divine basis? “It is not necessary to prove elaborately the presence of an eternal element within the individual,” Ranke replies. For our endeavors rest on this religious foundation. We believe that nothing can exist without God or live without Him. Although we have emancipated ourselves from certain narrow theological notions, we nevertheless acknowledge that all our efforts derive from a higher, a religious source.”59 But Ranke never asks himself what remains, once the religious foundations in which he believes so fervently have been destroyed by doubt?
From this belief in the metaphysical foundations of historical reality, Ranke draws several methodological demands. The first is the “pure love of truth.” Because we acknowledge “a higher reality” in the event, the situation, or the person that we wish to understand, we must have respect for what actually happened. But this does not mean “that we should stop with the appearances.” For “then we would grasp only something external although our own principle directs us to what is within.”60 From this arises the need for a thorough, penetrating study based upon sources, without which we are incapable of historical cognition. For historical understanding is not a mechanical act of which everyone is equally capable. Here the differences between Ranke’s epistemology and that of empiricism becomes very clear. For the “essence” (Wesen) and “content” (Inhalt) of the appearances which the historian studies are spiritual unities (geistige Einheiten) which can be grasped only by spiritual apperception (geistige Apperception).61 But apperception is not an empirical act of description or explanation. Rather, it involves a degree of genius present to an extent in everyone, but in very unequal degree.62 There follow the remaining demands for a universal interest on the part of the historian, a concern with establishing causal relationships, impartiality, and the search of the total context. Ranke regards it as “certain” that behind the outward appearance of the historical events, persons, and institutions studied, there is always a totality (Totalität, Totales), an integrated, spiritual reality.
The whole (Totale) is as certain as is its every outward expression at every moment. We must dedicate our full attention to it.… (If we are studying) a people, we are not interested in all the individual details through which it expresses itself as a living thing. Rather its idea speaks to us through its development as a whole, its deeds, its institutions, its literature.63
The task of understanding must always begin with thorough immersion in the subject matter, “exact research, step by step apprehension, and study of the documents.” Having been immersed in the subject matter, we may then approach the spiritual essence through an act of intuition (Divination). Certainly, man knows too little to be able to unfathom the meaning of world history.
“I consider it impossible to solve the problem completely,” Ranke observes. “Only God knows world history. We only perceive its contradictions. As an Indian poet put it, its ‘harmony is known only to the gods but unknown to man’. We can only approach it intuitively and from a distance. Nevertheless we can perceive unity, continuity (Fortgang) and development.”64 “Thus,” Ranke concludes, “our paths as historians lead us to the problems of philosophy. If philosophy were what it should be and history were perfectly clear and complete, the two disciplines would be in complete agreement.”65
3. On the basis of this concept of history, Ranke is able to construct a metaphysics of politics. This view of history is striking in its radical optimism. Although Ranke rejects the Hegelian notion that historical development can be explained in rational terms, he is no less confident that history is a meaningful process. In one sense, his optimism goes considerably further than that of Hegel. For Hegel sees in all history, past and present, the signs of man’s irrationality and imperfection which has not yet been overcome. For Ranke, however, “every epoch is immediate to God.”66 This optimism expresses itself in several ways. History for Ranke is meaningful. Despite his recognition that man at any time could only see small perspectives of the total reality, Ranke was never bothered by the doubts of objective knowledge which troubled later historians. Admittedly, on the basis of religious faith, he assumes that there were meaningful units (geistige Einheiten) in history, something which did not follow from empirical inquiry. He further assumes that these meaningful units, individuals, institutions, states, and nations, are not merely ethically neutral, but as expressions of the will of God represent positive values. From this he draws the conclusion that states are such meaningful units, ends in themselves, and that in following their vital interests, they can only do good.
The belief held by Ranke that there is an ethical order in the universe which applies to the political realm, too, coincides with the faith of most of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. But what is almost entirely missing in Ranke, despite his pronounced Christianity, and for that matter is absent in most Romantic thought, is the recognition of an element of evil in man and in human institutions.67 The biblical prophets, as well as Stoic, Christian, and Enlightenment natural law thinkers, have always seen a dualism between the ethical law and the positive reality. This conflict requires the active intervention of ethical man in order to bring human institutions in harmony with the demands of justice, even if the limitations of human nature permits only an approximation of this ideal. For Ranke there is operative within the political world an automatic harmony which restores the rightful order if it has been disturbed. Thus, in the famous essay, “The Great Powers,” he describes a balance of power among the great states as a central instrument in the European order, incapable of destruction by the urges
