H. ON HEGEL'S CRITICISM OF NEWTON'S PRINCIPIA.
APPENDIX TO THE MEMOIR ON HEGEL'S CRITICISM OF NEWTON'S PRINCIPIA.
Appendix K. DEMONSTRATION THAT ALL MATTER IS HEAVY.
WORKS BY WILLIAM WHEWELL, D.D. F.R.S. MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE .
New Books and New Editions, Published by John W. Parker and Son, West Strand .
| PAGE | ||
| Append. A. | Of the Platonic Theory of Ideas | 403 |
| B. | On Plato's Survey of the Sciences | 417 |
| BB. | On Plato's Notion of Dialectic | 429 |
| C. | Of the Intellectual Powers according to Plato | 440 |
| D. | Criticism of Aristotle's Account of Induction | 449 |
| E. | On the Fundamental Antithesis of Philosophy | 462 |
| F. | Remarks on a Review of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences | 482 |
| G. | On the Transformation of Hypotheses in the History of Science | 492 |
| H. | On Hegel's Criticism of Newton's Principia | 504 |
| Appendix to the Memoir on Hegel's Criticism of Newton's Principia | 513 | |
| K. | Demonstration that all Matter is Heavy | 522 |
ON THE
PHILOSOPHY
OF
DISCOVERY.
Wär' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft
Wie könnten wir das Licht erblicken?
Lebt' nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft
Wie könnte uns das Göttliche entzücken?
Goethe.
Were nothing sunlike in the Eye
How could we Light itself descry?
Were nothing godlike in the Mind
How could we God in Nature find?
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
By the examination of the elements of human thought in which I have been engaged, and by a consideration of the history of the most clear and certain parts of our knowledge, I have been led to doctrines respecting the progress of that exact and systematic knowledge which we call Science; and these doctrines I have endeavoured to lay before the reader in the History of the Sciences and of Scientific Ideas. The questions on which I have thus ventured to pronounce have had a strong interest for man from the earliest period of his intellectual progress, and have been the subjects of lively discussion and bold speculation in every age. I conceive that in the doctrines to which these researches have conducted us, we have a far better hope that we possess a body of permanent truths than the earlier essays on the same subjects could furnish. For we have not taken our examples of knowledge at hazard, as earlier speculators did, and were almost compelled to do; but have drawn our materials from the vast store of unquestioned truths which modern science offers to us: and we have formed our judgment concerning the nature and progress of knowledge by considering what such science is, and how it has reached its present condition. But though we have thus pursued our speculations concerning knowledge with advantages which earlier writers did not possess, it is still both interesting and instructive for us to regard the opinions upon this subject which have been delivered by the philosophers of past times. It is especially interesting to see some of the truths which we have endeavoured to expound, gradually dawning in men's minds, and assuming the clear and permanent form in which we can now contemplate them. I shall therefore, in the ensuing chapters, pass in review many of the opinions of the writers of various ages concerning the mode by which man best acquires the truest knowledge; and I shall endeavour, as we proceed, to appreciate the real value of such judgments, and their place in the progress of sound philosophy.
In this estimate of the opinions of others, I shall be guided by those general doctrines which I have, as I trust, established in the histories already published. And without attempting here to give any summary of these doctrines, I may remark that there are two main principles by which speculations on such subjects in all ages are connected and related to each other; namely, the opposition of Ideas and Sensations, and the distinction of practical and speculative knowledge. The opposition of Ideas and Sensations is exhibited to us in the antithesis of Theory and Fact, which are necessarily considered as distinct and of opposite natures, and yet necessarily identical, and constituting Science by their identity. In like manner, although practical knowledge is in substance identical with speculative, (for all knowledge is speculation,) there is a distinction between the two in their history, and in the subjects by which they are exemplified, which distinction is quite essential in judging of the philosophical views of the ancients. The alternatives of identity and diversity, in these two antitheses—the successive separation, opposition, and reunion of principles which thus arise—have produced, (as they may easily be imagined capable of doing,) a long and varied series of systems concerning the nature of knowledge; among which we shall have to guide our course by the aid of the views already presented.
I am far from undertaking, or wishing, to review the whole series of opinions which thus come under our notice; and I do not even
