the war the mining by the Danes of the northern and central portions of the Great Belt was in accordance with the wishes of our Naval Staff that the safety of the Baltic should) be secured. There may be some question as to whether the Danes had the right to mine these waters, for they were an international strait, but the mining, was approved by the English also, apparently because it fitted in with their plan of not penetrating into the Baltic. Our Fleet regarded these mines as a great obstacle to their freedom of movement, for they deprived it of the possibility, when large ships were sent out on a distant raid in the North Sea, of bringing them back round the Skagen into the Baltic instead of keeping them on the single line of retirement to Heligoland. For political reasons the Naval Staff regarded it as unwise to demand the opening of the Great Belt by Denmark.
Of the different mine-laying enterprises of the High Sea Fleet in the autumn months of 1914 a special mention is due to a cruise which on October 17 began at the mouth of the Ems and had the south coast of England for its goal. Four ships of the 7th Half-Flotilla (Commander Thiele) "S" 115, 116, 117, 119 were employed. These older boats had been chosen with an eye to the possibilities of casualties, because they were no longer fit for other duties. The ships' companies had all volunteered for this dangerous raid. Their task consisted of laying mines at the entrance to the Downs, the Channel leading round the S.E. corner of England from Dover to the mouth of the Thames. The English Admiralty had announced that navigation of the area between Lat. 51 15' N. and 51 41' and Long. 1° 35' E. and 3° 0' E. (that means a strip 35 nautical miles broad from the English to the Dutch coast) was dangerous on account of mines. For this reason traffic was compelled to use the open channel close to the land. It was thus under English control, and the English found their inspection service easier. By mining the channel leading into the Thames we might expect practically a stoppage of London's supplies.
England's behaviour in laying mines in the open sea, a policy made public in this announcement, released us from the necessity of observing the limits we had hitherto imposed on ourselves of restricting mine-laying solely to the enemy's coasts, an operation which was naturally attended with greater danger to the mine- layer the nearer she approached within reach of the coastal patrol forces.
The half-flotilla had left the Ems in the early hours of the morning when it was still dark. Near Haaks Lightship, 15 miles W. of the southern point of the Island of Texel, it met the English cruiser Undaunted and four destroyers of the latest type, escape from which was impossible. As this was realised our ships attacked and, after a brave defence in an action which was carried on at a range of a few hundred yards, were sunk. The English saved as many of the survivors as was possible. After we received the first wireless message that action had begun, no further news of the torpedo-boats was forthcoming, and as we had therefore to assume that they had been lost, we sent out the hospital ship Ophelia to pick up any survivors. However, the English captured her and made her prize, charging us with having sent her out for scouting purposes, although she was obviously fitted up as a hospital ship and bore all the requisite markings.
The auxiliary cruiser Berlin was sent out into the North Sea the same night. Her commission was to lay mines off the most northerly point of Scotland, as we had reason to suspect a lively movement of warships there. The cruise of the Berlin was favoured by better luck, for it was one of her mines to Which the battleship Audacious fell a victim about a week later. She was so damaged that she had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. The English succeeded in keeping secret for a considerable time the loss of this great battleship, a loss which was a substantial success for our efforts at equalisation. When the news leaked out at last its truth was definitely and decisively denied.
The following points deserve to be remembered in considering these two enterprises: (1) Mine-laying in the open seas. (2) The capture of a hospital ship which was engaged in the work of saving life from the best of motives and observing all the regulations. (3) The suppression of the news that an important ship had) been lost in the case of the Audacious.
The behaviour of the English was inspired at all points by consideration for what would serve their military purposes, and was not troubled by respect for international agreements. But this did not prevent England from raising loud cries later on when we also considered ourselves released from our obligation and with far more justification took action against hospital ships which, under cover of the Red Cross Flag, were patently used for the transport of troops. In the case of the Audacious we can but approve the English attitude of not revealing a weakness to the enemy, because accurate information about the other side's strength has a decisive effect on the decisions taken.
The complete loss of the 7th Half-Flotilla was very painful, and the Commander-in-Chief has been freely criticised for having sent it out insufficiently supported. The reply to that is that it is extremely difficult to decide what "sufficient support" is. Suppose, in relation to the case under consideration, we say in the light of after events that if we had had two more cruisers we should have had a superiority, such a method of reasoning involves a knowledge beforehand of the strength of the enemy ; otherwise you might have to bring up your whole fleet at every alarm if you wished to feel perfectly safe. Besides, risk is of the very essence of war. The idea is implied even in Moltke's phrase, "Think first." On the other hand, our failure revealed the importance to our" operations of the base on the Flemish coast, from which enterprises of this kind were much more feasible and indeed led to a permanent threat to the English trade route in the Channel.
In October the enemy submarines outside the Ems and in the Heligoland Bight were very active. There was hardly a day on which reports were not received that enemy submarines had been sighted. Although a good many of these turned out to be false alarms, their presence was frequently confirmed by the fact that torpedoes were fired. Apart from the loss of the Hela on September 13, which has already been mentioned, the torpedo-boat "G 116" was sunk by a torpedo north of Schiermonnikoog on October 6. It was possible to save most of the men. On the other hand, the torpedo-boat "G7" and an incoming auxiliary cruiser which were attacked in the neighbourhood of Amrum had better luck, as all the torpedoes fired at them missed.
The annoyance from submarines increased our determination to master them. In October, after the English "E 3" had fallen a victim to one of our U-boats, which had been lying in wait all day for this exceptionally well-handled ship, and several other English submarines had had unpleasant experiences with our mines in the neighbourhood of Heligoland, the area of the Bight inside Heligoland was given a wider berth. Beyond the island, however, we had perpetually to deal with the watchful activities of English submarines. Moreover, during the autumn storms the neighbourhood of the coasts was particularly unfavourable for navigation. Our own submarine cruises extended farther and farther afield as the commanders continued to gain experience, and by exchanging notes these operations became increasingly effective.
On October 15 "U16" passed Heligoland after a cruise of fifteen days, and on her return reported that she was still perfectly effective. This month also witnessed the first cruise round the British Islands. "U 20 " (Lieutenant-Commander Droescher), which had been sent out against transports in the English Channel, found itself compelled, by damage to the diving apparatus, to avoid the Channel, which was closely patrolled, and therefore returned round Ireland and Scotland. The cruise took eighteen days in all.
On November 1 the English cruiser Hermes was sunk off Dunkirk by the U-boats which were commissioned to hinder the transport of English troops to the French ports. Unfortunately no success in this particular direction was achieved.
To assign this task of interrupting the English troopship service to the Fleet was to make a totally impossible demand, as the losses it would inevitably involve would be out of all proportion to the advantage the army would derive from the disturbance to the transport of English troops such a Fleet action might cause. Even if the presence of our Fleet in these waters held up one or more ships, the way would be open the minute our Fleet left, and nothing could be easier than to arrange for ships to put out as soon as news was received that the enemy had gone. However important a factor in the war on land England's effort might be, the best way of neutralising it would have been the occupation of the French Channel coast.
