She is described as a Polish lady of great beauty, being known in this country as an earnest advocate of human liberty. Though a slight foreign accent is perceptible, her delivery is effective. She spoke with great animation. The impression made by her address was favorable both to the speaker and the cause. In speaking of the personnel of the platform, it says:
Mrs. Lydia Ann Jenkins, of New York, who made an effective speech, is habited in the Bloomer costume, and appears to much advantage on the stage. Her face is amiable, and her delivery excellent. She is as fine a female orator as we have heard. The address embodied the usual arguments offered in favor of this cause, and were put in a forcible and convincing manner. We say convincing, because such a speaker would convince the most obdurate unbeliever against his will.
Miss Stone is somewhat celebrated for an extraordinary enthusiasm in the cause of her sex, and for certain eccentricities of speech and thought, as well as of outward attire. She is as independent in mind as in dress. She is as ready to throw off the restraints society seems to have placed on woman's mind, as she is to cast aside what she considers an absurd fashion in dress. Without endorsing the eliminated petticoats, we can not but admire Miss Stone's "stern old Saxon pluck," and her total independence of the god, Fashion. Her dress is first a black velvet coat with collar, fastened in front with buttons, next a skirt of silk, reaching to the knees, then "she wears the breeches" of black silk, with neat-fitting gaiters. Her hair is cut short and combed straight back. Her face is not beautiful, but there is mind in it; it is earnest, pleasant, prepossessing. Miss Stone must be set down as a lady of no common abilities, and of uncommon energy in the pursuit of a cherished idea. She is a marked favorite in the Conventions.
During the proceedings, Miss Brown, in a long speech on the Bible, had expounded many doctrines and passages of Scripture in regard to woman's position, in direct opposition to the truths generally promulgated by General Assemblies, and the lesser lights of the Church. Mrs. Emma R. Coe took an equally defiant position toward the Bench and the Bar, coolly assuming that she understood the spirit of Constitutions and Statute Laws. Some lawyer had made a criticism on the woman's petition then circulating in Ohio, and essayed to give the Convention some light on the laws of the State, to all of which Mrs. Coe says:
I have very little to say this evening beyond reading a letter, received by me to-day. (Here follows the letter). I beg leave to inform the gentleman, if he is present, that I believe I understand these laws, and this point particularly, very nearly as well as himself; and that I am well acquainted with the laws passed since 1840, as with those enacted previous to that time. I would also inform him that the committee, some of whom are much better read in law than myself, were perfectly aware of the existence of the statutes he mentions, but did not see fit to incorporate them into the petition, not only on account of their great length, but because they do not at all invalidate the position which the petition affects to establish, viz: the inequality of the sexes before the law. Their insertion, therefore, would have been utterly superfluous. This letter refers, evidently, to that portion of the petition which treats of the equalization of property, which I will now read. (Then follows the reading of one paragraph of the petition). Again I refer you to the letter, the first paragraph of which is as follows:
"Mrs. Emma R. Coe, will you look at Vol. 44, General Laws of Ohio, page 75, where you will find that the property of the wife can not be taken for the debts of her husband, etc.; and all articles of household furniture, and goods which a wife shall have brought with her in marriage, or which shall have come to her by bequest, gift, etc., after marriage, or purchased with her separate money or other property, shall be exempt from liability for the debts of her husband, during her life, and during the life of any heir of her body."
Very true: we readily admit the law of which the gentleman has given an abstract; and so long as the wife holds the property in her hands, just as she received it, it can not be taken for the husband's debts, but the moment she permits her husband to convert that property into another shape, it becomes his, and may be taken for his debts. The gentleman I presume will admit this at once.
The next paragraph of the letter reads thus: "Also in Vol. 51, General Laws of Ohio, page 449, the act regulating descent, etc., provides, that real estate, which shall have come to the wife by descent, devise, or gift, from her ancestor, shall descend—first, to her children, or their legal representatives. Second, if there be no children, or their legal representatives living, the estate shall pass to the brothers and sisters of the intestate, who may be of the blood of the ancestor from whom the estate came, or their legal representatives," etc. True again: So long as the wife holds real estate in her own name, in title, and in title only, it is hers; for her husband even then controls its profits, and if she leave it so, it will descend to her heirs so long as she has an heir, and so long as she can trace the descent. But if she suffers her husband to sell that property and receive the money, it instantly becomes his; and instead of descending to her heirs, it descends to his heirs. This the gentleman will not deny. Now, we readily admit, that while the wife abides by the statutes, of which our article has given us an abstract, her husband can not take the property from her, he can only take the use of it. But the moment she departs from the statute, she comes under the provisions of the common law; which, when they do not conflict, is equally binding in Ohio, as the statute law. And in this case the common and statute laws do not conflict. Departing from the statute, that is, suffering her property to be exchanged, the provision is thus: (Here follows the common law, taken from the petition). I have nothing further to add on this point, but will quote the last paragraphs in the letter.
"If you would know what our laws are, you must refer to the laws passed in Ohio since 1840."
This has already been answered.
"You said last night, that the property of the wife passed to the husband, even to his sixteenth cousin! Will you correct your error? And oblige
A Buckeye."
I should be extremely happy to oblige the gentleman, but having committed no error there is nothing to correct; and I do not, therefore, see that I can in conscience comply with his request. I am, however, exceedingly thankful for any expression of interest from that quarter. There are other laws which might be mentioned, which really give woman an apparent advantage over man; yet, having no relevancy to the subject in the petition, we did not see fit to introduce them. One of these is, that no woman shall be subject to arrest and imprisonment for debt; while no man, that is, no ordinary man, none unless he has a halo of military glory around his brow, is held sacred from civil process of this kind. But this exemption is of very little benefit to woman, since, if the laws were as severe to her as to man, she would seldom risk the penalty. For this there are two very good reasons. One is, that conscious of her inability to discharge obligations of this kind, she has little disposition to run deeply into debt; and the other is, that she has not the credit to do it if she wished! If, however, she does involve herself in this way, the law exempts her from imprisonment. This, perhaps, is offered as a sort of palliation for the disabilities which she suffers in other respects. The only object of the petition is, I believe, that the husband and wife be placed upon a legal and political equality. If the law gives woman an advantage over man, we deprecate it as much as he can. Partiality to either, to the injury of the other, is wrong in principle, and we must therefore oppose it. We do not wish to be placed in the position which the husband now occupies. We do not wish that control over his interests, which he may now exercise over the interests of the wife. We would no sooner intrust this power to woman than to man. We would never place her in authority over her husband.
The question of woman's voting, of the propriety of woman's appearing at the polls, is already settled. See what has been done in Detroit: On the day of the late election, the women went to the offices and stores of gentlemen, asking them if they had voted. If the reply happened to be in the negative, as was often the case, the next question was, "Will you be kind enough to take this vote, sir, and deposit it in the ballot-box for me?" Which was seldom, if ever, refused. And so, many a man voted for the "Maine Law," who would not, otherwise, have voted at all. But this was not all;
