with more reverence than an archbishop or a viceroy, it has so fallen in estimation that some say that all is over with it. The officials and familiars feel this every day in the withdrawal of their privileges and exemptions, and it is palpable that in all that does not concern the faith, the ancient powers of the tribunal of Aragon are prostrated.[1116]
It was not long before the sullen yielding of the Inquisition to the changed situation was manifested in a case which did not tend to restore it to reverence. Inquisitor Lazaeta was involved in an intrigue with a married woman of San Anton, whose husband, a Catalan named Miguel Choved, grew suspicious and pretended to take a journey. Lazaeta fell into the trap. October 27, 1647, he went to the house at nightfall, leaving his coach in hiding behind the shambles; the coachman waited for him in vain, for the injured husband had entered by a side-door and given him a sword-thrust of which he died in the street, while stumbling forward in search of his coach. The woman escaped and Choved disappeared, but some demonstration was necessary and the tribunal arrested one Francisco Arnal as an accessory. The court of the Justicia issued a manifestacion in his favor, when the inquisitors complained of the interference with their functions of such orders and that the tribunal could not be maintained if they were to be banished and their temporalities be seized whenever they judged that a case was not comprehended within the fueros. To this the Council of Aragon replied that the court of the Justicia always acted with great caution and that, in the present case, Arnal had renounced the manifestacion and had been returned to the tribunal, which had found him innocent and had discharged him. The Suprema insisted that it would be better to remove the tribunal from Aragon than to have it subjected to such insults, to which the Council rejoined that there was no admission of firmas and manifestaciones except in matters not of faith; if the inquisitors would keep within their just limits, such troubles would be avoided, while, if they exceeded them, the kingdom must avail itself of the remedies provided by the laws.[1117] Now in this case the tribunal was strictly within its rights under the Concordia and its abstention from excommunication and interdict indicates how thoroughly it was humbled.
Another grievance of the Inquisition shows how completely the tables were turned. September 23, 1648, the Suprema represented in a consulta that the tribunal had been notified to reduce the number of its officials and familiars to the prescribed four hundred and fifty, which had not been done under the plea that the number was insufficient, that the Concordia did not order the dismissal of the overplus and that the incumbents could not be deprived of their rights. Still there was little doubt that persistent refusal would lead the Diputados to obtain a firma compelling a selection and until this was done no familiar would be allowed to enjoy their privileges—in fact a number of towns had already assumed this position and others were taking steps to obtain firmas. The Suprema endeavored to show the illegality of this on the ground that the Concordia of 1646 was not valid in the absence of confirmation by the inquisitor-general. Philip submitted this to the Council of Aragon and merely transmitted its answer, in non-committal fashion, to the Suprema for its information. This took the ground that only the secular and royal jurisdiction was concerned; the king had confirmed the laws which provided that the acquiescence of the inquisitor-general was unnecessary; if parties were aggrieved they could apply to the court of the Justicia.[1118]
ARAGON
Under these conditions, the laws of 1646, by restricting the tribunal to its proper functions, were a severe blow to its predominance, diminishing the terror which it inspired and affecting in some degree its finances. The continual suits brought before it had afforded a rich harvest of fees for its officials and the fines imposed had been a resource to its treasury. All this fell off greatly and, in 1649, the Suprema reminded Philip that, in 1646, it had predicted this result and he had promised indemnification by a fixed income to be paid by Aragon or by the royal treasury; although it did not regard the laws as binding in the absence of confirmation by the inquisitor-general, and had resisted their execution in every way, still they were executed and the officials were suffering keenly from their diminished fees, wherefore it asked the king to grant to the four notaries and messengers eight hundred ducats a year out of the fund for the Catalan refugees. This demand, and the impudent assertion of the nullity of the laws which he had approved, provoked Philip into one of his rare assertions of kingship. The Catalan fund, he replied, could not be touched; he would listen to other suggestions for the relief of the incumbents but not of their successors; he was master of the secular jurisdiction granted to the Inquisition for his service and could make laws and abrogate them at his pleasure.[1119]
Philip had learned a lesson and the laws of 1646 were duly executed. When, in 1677, there was another convocation of the Córtes of Aragon, the Suprema, in a suppliant tone contrasting strongly with its former arrogance, begged Carlos II to influence them to condescend to a modification. It gave a most dolorous account of the condition of the Saragossa tribunal resulting from that legislation. It forebore to discuss whether the officials had given just cause of complaint, but the total destruction of the Inquisition was curing one malady by introducing a worse one, and the Inquisition of Aragon had been destroyed. The number of officials was reduced below that at the time of its foundation, and its poverty was so great that wages were unpaid and the tribunal would probably have to be abandoned. The treasurer was compelled to collect its income and debts through the court of the Justicia, where it was impossible for him to carry on so many suits, so that only those paid whose consciences compelled them. The reduction of the officials impeded its usefulness; possibly there were fewer culprits but certainly there were fewer convictions—less in Aragon than in the other provinces—and a single one who escaped correction was a matter of greater consequence to God than the enjoyment of the fuero by five hundred persons. It was impossible to fill the allotted number of familiars, for the fuero in criminal matters left to them was rather a disadvantage, for they died in prison owing to the interminable delays in settling the numerous competencias, while other defendants were released on bail. At the same time the deprivation of the active fuero exposed them to the effects of the general hatred felt for them. It was inconceivable that, in so pious a nation, this hatred could be caused by their functions, but its existence was a matter of experience and, in the absence of protection, the risks to which it exposed them prevented men from seeking the position. The Inquisition did not desire jurisdiction, but it could not exist without revenue and officials, and it therefore prayed the king that proper measures of relief be discussed in the Córtes, or a junta could be formed from both parties and a new Concordia be framed. Even allowing for customary exaggeration, this paper shows how greatly the Inquisition had outgrown the functions for which it had been imposed upon the people.
The concessions asked for were singularly moderate—that the treasurer should not be required to make collections through the court of the Justicia, that more familiars be allowed—though it had just been said that they could not be had—that they be admitted to bail during competencias, and a timid suggestion respecting the firma and manifestacion. The time, however, was not propitious even for demands so modest. The youthful Carlos II had just relegated his mother to a convent and her favorite Valenzuela to the Philippines; all power was in the hands of Don Juan of Austria, who held the inquisitor-general Valladares to be his personal enemy. The appeal of the Suprema was received unsympathetically and it seems to have gained nothing. That the Aragonese were content with the situation appears from the fact that the only complaint made by the Córtes regarded the non-observance of a law of 1646 prescribing the number of natives to be employed by the tribunal, and this arose merely from greed of office, for they suggested that, for each foreigner appointed in Aragon, an Aragonese should have a corresponding berth in a tribunal elsewhere.[1120]
CATALONIA
The legislation of 1646 remained a finality. As late as 1741 the Suprema remonstrated against the Audiencia of Saragossa for impeding the jurisdiction of the tribunal by employing the firma, which, with customary disingenuousness, it characterized as an innovation.[1121]
Catalonia was as intractable as Aragon, while its more pronounced spirit of independence rendered it particularly troublesome. Although it lacked the institution of the Justicia, it had a somewhat imperfect substitute in the Banch Reyal, or King’s Bench, which was used in the appeals por via de fuerza from the spiritual
